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ABSTRACT
The recent popularization of mobile devices equipped with high-performance sensors has
given rise to the fast development of mobile sensing technology. Mobile sensing applications
analyze the signals generated by human activities and environment changes, and thus get a
better understanding of the environment and human behaviors. Nowadays, researchers have
developed diverse mobile sensing applications, which benefit people’s living, such as gesture
recognition, vital sign monitoring, localization, and identification.
Mobile sensing has two faces. While benefiting people’s lives, its growing capability would
also spawn new threats to security and privacy. Exploring the dual character of mobile
sensing is challenging. On one hand, while the commercialization of new mobile devices
enlarges the design space, it is challenging to design effective mobile sensing systems, which
use less or cheaper sensors and achieve better performance or more functionalities. On the
other hand, attackers can utilize the sensing strategies to track victims’ activities and cause
privacy leakages. It is challenging to find the potential leakages, because mobile sensing
attacks usually use side channels and target the information hidden in non-textual data.
To target the above challenges, I present the Mobile Sensing Application-Attack (MSAA)
framework, a general model showing the structures of mobile sensing applications and at-
tacks, and how the two faces are connected. MSAA reflects our principle of designing effec-
tive mobile sensing systems, i.e., we reduce the cost and improve the performance of current
systems by exploring different sensors, various requirements for user/environment contexts,
and different sensing algorithms. MSAA also shows our principle of exploring information
leakages, i.e., we break a sensing system into basic components, and for each component we
consider what user information could be extracted if data are leaked. I take handwriting in-
put and indoor walking path tracking as examples, and show how we design effective mobile
sensing techniques and also investigate their potential threats following MSAA. I design an
audio-based handwriting input method for tiny mobile devices, which allows users to input
words by writing on tables with fingers. Then, I explore the attacker’s capability of recog-
nizing a victim’s handwriting content based on the handwriting sound. I also present an
in-shoe force sensor-based indoor walking path tracking system, which enables smart shoes
to locate users. Meanwhile, I show how likely a victim can be located if the foot force data
are leaked to attackers. Our experiment results show that our applications can achieve sat-
isfactory performance, and also confirm the threats of privacy leakage if they are maliciously
used, which reveals the two faces of mobile sensing.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the development of mobile devices, sensors, signal processing and machine
learning has triggered the rapid evolution of the mobile sensing technology. The fundamental
idea of mobile sensing is to get a better understanding of the environment and human
behaviors by executing various sensing strategies in mobile systems. Specifically, different
types of sensors embedded in various mobile devices, such as accelerometers in smartwatches,
microphones in smartphones, and force sensors in smart shoes, are used to receive the signals
generated by human activities or environment changes. By analyzing the signals, a mobile
device can derive valuable information, such as a person’s gestures [1, 2], a user’s vital signs
[3, 4, 5], and the location of the device [6, 7].
Meanwhile, just as the development of computer networks spawned the network attacks
that threaten people’s privacy and finances, new mobile sensing techniques would also lead
to unexpected threats. For example, while the motion sensors in a smartwatch can help
recognize the user’s gestures [8, 9], if the motion data are leaked, an attacker could recognize
the password that the user has input to a turntable password lock [10]. It is also shown
that by using the data from a cellphone’s permissionless sensors, such as accelerometer
and gyroscope, the attacker can reconstruct the victim’s secret PIN (personal identification
number) for unlocking the cellphone [11, 12]. Therefore, besides the benefits brought by
mobile sensing, people should also be aware of the danger caused by the abuse of the sensing
techniques.
In a word, the fast evolving of mobile sensing has been benefiting people’s lives, but would
also raise new threats to security and privacy. Researchers should investigate both the two
sides of mobile sensing, which will be discussed in this thesis.
1.1 MOTIVATION AND CHALLENGES
The explosive growth of new mobile sensing techniques is associated with the commer-
cialization of new mobile devices. One typical example is smartwatch. While the history
of smartwatches can be traced back to 1980s, the recent large-scale commercialization of
smartwatch starts around 2013 [13]. Companies such as Apple and Sony started to equip
smartwatches with different kinds of sensors, such as gyroscopes and microphones. Although
the sensors embedded in smartwatches are quite similar to those in smartphones, the new
wearing position has given rise to the emergence of many new sensing techniques, such as
finger, hand and arm gesture recognition and tracking [1, 8, 14], heart rate monitoring [4],
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and biometric gait recognition [15]. Besides smartwatches, many other mobile devices have
also been rising in recent years, such as smart glasses [16, 17, 18], smart rings [19, 20], and
smart shoes [21, 22, 23]. Therefore, there are expansive spaces for researchers to develop
new mobile sensing techniques on the new platforms. Compared with previous systems, new
mobile sensing designs should achieve better effectiveness, i.e., achieving better performance
or more functionalities while using less or cheaper sensors.
Exploring the capability of new mobile devices raises novel mobile sensing techniques that
benefit people, but meanwhile also spawns the danger of privacy leakage. Attackers could
target on a huge range of privacy information, such as a victim’s name, identity number, and
current location. Some threats are not intuitive and hard to be aware of. For example, it
has been shown that if the motion data measured by smartwatches were leaked, an attacker
could recognize the content that victims input via keyboards [24]. Ignoring the potential
security holes can lead to unexpected privacy exposure and economic losses. Thus, besides
proposing new mobile sensing designs, we should also reveal the possible danger that they
could cause, which help defend users more effectively.
Therefore, the challenge of mobile sensing system design includes the following two aspects.
• Recognizing user behaviors with effective strategies: Although there are plenty of sen-
sors in various mobile devices that enlarge the design space, it is still challenging to
design an effective mobile sensing system. The fundamental challenges come from two
attitudes, i.e., using less or cheaper sensors to achieve better performance, and using
the same sensor to achieve more functionalities. It is also challenging to find proper
user/environment contexts that can be utilized to achieve these design goals. Since
many mobile devices are still in their early stage, researchers need to keep exploring
new ways to recognize user behaviors.
• Revealing potential information leakages: The danger of the measurement data leakage
is usually non-intuitive. Different from the cyber attacks which often focus on literal
data, the mobile sensing attacks usually use side channels and target the information
hidden in raw sensor data. Thus, it is challenging to find the potential information
leakage through the sensor data.
In this thesis, I present a general framework that describes the relationship between the




I claim that the following thesis statement is true.
Every mobile sensing design should be examined with respect to two faces: finding effective
designs to recognize user behaviors, and finding potential threats of information leakages.
1.3 THESIS OVERVIEW
In this thesis, I first present a framework that describes the relationship between the two
faces of mobile sensing. Then, as shown in Figure 1.1, I take tiny mobile devices (such as
smartwatch) and smart shoes as examples, and show how we can design effective sensing
techniques that benefit people, and how we can reveal the potential danger that people
should be aware of. This section provides an overview of each work.
Figure 1.1: Our four approaching showing the two faces of mobile sensing.
1.3.1 Mobile Sensing Application-Attack Framework
Currently, more and more mobile devices are being commercialized, which enlarges the
design space and also the attack surface. It is harder to exam how a mobile sensing technique
could lead to unexpected information leakages. Therefore, a guideline is necessary to clear
the relationship between mobile sensing applications and attacks, and under what conditions
the sensing technique can lead to privacy leakages. Moreover, we also need a guideline that
shows how we can continuously improve the effectiveness of mobile sensing designs.
In this thesis, I present the Mobile Sensing Application-Attack (MSAA) framework, a
general model that shows the structures of mobile sensing applications and attacks, and
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how they are connected by signal and data leakages. MSAA shows that a mobile sensing
application can be improved by finding the defects of the current design, and then trying
various sensors and algorithms to overcome the defects. It is also necessary to investigate
what user or environment contextual information is available, and how it can be used to
enhance the application. The design focus should be using less or cheaper sensors to achieve
better performance or more functionalities. On the other hand, we show that the information
leakage could happen in each stage of a mobile sensing application. Specifically, we should
consider the physical signal leakage, the raw data leakage, the indirect privacy leakage, and
the direct privacy leakage. These leakages enable attackers to extract the user information
by using the techniques that are similar to those used by normal mobile sensing applications.
The MSAA framework provides a guideline that helps improve the effectiveness of a mobile
sensing design, and also helps explore the possible threats brought by a mobile sensing
technique. Following MSAA, we reveal that there are still gaps in the mobile sensing research.
While there are approaches that recognize users’ handwriting via audio signals, it is still not
clear if the leakage of the handwriting sound alone can expose the handwriting content.
While smart shoes are capable of tracking users, it has not been explored if the data leakage
from smart shoes exposes users’ physical locations. Based on MSAA, I first design two mobile
sensing applications for the audio-based handwriting input and the smart shoe-based user
tracking to illustrate how we design effective systems, and then fill the gaps by presenting
two corresponding attack methods that evaluate the aforementioned information leakages.
1.3.2 Audio-based Handwriting Input for Tiny Mobile Devices
The popularization of tiny mobile devices has raised the problem that it is hard to ef-
ficiently input messages via tiny keyboards or touch screens. The widely used voice input
schemes [25, 26] are sometimes inconvenient in quiet-kept scenarios such as libraries and
hospitals. It has been shown that smartwatches can track the motion of users’ hands, and
thus enable users to write on surfaces with fingers [1]. However, this scheme is not conve-
nient for everyone because usually people do not wear watches on their dominant hands.
Soundwrite [27] leverages the embedded microphones in smartphones to record the sound
of handwriting on tables and recognizes the input text. However, a user needs to retrain
Soundwrite before each use. There are also handwriting input methods based on image-
based recognition techniques [28, 29]. However, these methods require large touch screens
or computational-expensive cameras, which raise the cost of tiny mobile devices.
To make the input method easier to use, in this work [30], I present TableWrite, an audio-
based handwriting input scheme which allows users to input words to mobile devices by writ-
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ing on tables with their fingers. The proposed scheme uses widely-embedded microphones
and speakers, and does not require any retraining phase once it has been trained. Thus, the
sensor cost is reduced, and the extra contextual information required by TableWrite is only
the pre-knowledge about the user’s handwriting style, which is acceptable. The prototype
system’s experimental results show that the average accuracy of word recognition is around
90%-95% in lab environments, which validates the effectiveness of TableWrite.
1.3.3 Audio-based Handwriting Eavesdropping
After introducing TableWrite, I investigate the case that the audio based input technique
is maliciously used. When filling out privacy-related forms in public places such as hospitals
or clinics, people usually are not aware that the sound of their handwriting leaks personal
information. An attacker can record the sound of handwriting with a microphone, and it is
possible that the content of handwriting can be recovered. To expose this danger, we explore
the possibility of eavesdropping on handwriting based on the audio signals. Although hand-
writing on desks has been considered as a new text entry method, the previous approaches
are not applicable for the eavesdropping attack. The methods in [31] and [1] enable users
to write on surfaces by using smartphones as pens or by wearing smartwatches on wrists.
However, these methods assume that users have direct contact with some mobile devices,
and thus cannot be used for attack because attackers usually have no access to victims’ de-
vices. While Soundwrite [27] can recognize handwritten words based on audio signals, once
the system has been trained, its performance highly depends on the location of handwriting,
which makes eavesdropping attack impossible.
To reveal the capacity of the audio-based side-channel attack on handwriting, in these
works [32, 33], I present WritingHacker, an audio-based eavesdropping proof-of-concept sys-
tem which eavesdrops on handwriting via mobile devices. I show that, by keeping a mobile
device touching the desk which is used by the victim, the attacker can record the sound of
the victim’s handwriting. Then the system can provide a word-level estimate for the content
of the handwriting by recognizing the unique patterns of each letter. WritingHacker requires
no direct contact with the victim, and is insensitive to the writing position. The experiment
results reveal the danger of privacy leakage through the sound of handwriting.
1.3.4 Indoor Walking Tracking Using Smart Shoes
Indoor walking tracking and localization have been popular research areas. Many of the
previous approaches are based on wireless anchors [34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. For
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instance, Wi-Fi access points generate specific signal strength distributions in indoor space,
and mobile devices such as cellphones measure the signal strength to locate themselves
[44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49]. However, the anchors need to be pre-installed, and site surveys are
usually necessary, which leads to extra cost. To solve this problem, some previous works
proposed inertial sensor-based methods [50, 6, 51]. The accelerometers, gyroscopes and
compasses in cellphones or Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) are used to measure the
motion of users and thus estimate the walking paths. However, the electronic compasses can
be interfered by magnetic field changes [52, 53, 54], especially for the scenarios where the
magnetic field changes significantly [55, 56, 57].
In recent years, the rapid evolution of mobile sensing technology has triggered the rise of
smart shoes [22, 21, 58], the devices that can measure the motion of users’ feet and analyze
their activities. One typical design of smart shoes is based on force or piezoelectric sensors
[22, 59]. In contrast with the previous approaches, in this work [60], I explore the capability
of smart shoes, and prove that it is possible to track the walking paths of users in indoor
spaces based on the force changes in shoes. I present ShoesLoc, an indoor walking path
tracking method based on in-shoe force sensors. ShoesLoc eliminates the cost of the anchor
installation and site survey. Moreover, the in-shoe force sensors are hardly interfered by
magnetic field changes. Compared with traditional indoor tracking technologies, ShoesLoc
is more effective because it does not require the installation of wireless anchors, and has good
robustness to environment changes such as the magnetic interference. The extra contexts
needed are the user’s training data and the floor map of the walking region, which are
available to the application with low cost.
1.3.5 Victim Localization through Force Sensors in Smart Shoes
After introducing ShoesLoc, I consider the case that the force data from smart shoes
are leaked to attackers. While the past few years have witnessed the rise of smart shoes,
people are still not aware of the possible privacy leakage from smart shoes. It is necessary
to explore the possibility of locating an indoor victim based on the force signals leaked
from smart shoes. Some previous works have shown the capability of in-shoe IMUs for
indoor walking path tracking [61, 62, 63]. However, they implicitly require the location and
the structure of the building where the user is walking in, which makes these approaches
inapplicable to the attack scenario, because the attacker usually does not know where the
building is.
My work [64] is based on the assumption that the attacker has got the force data by
hacking the user’s device or cloud servers. I present ShoesHacker, an attack scheme that
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reconstructs the corridor map of the building that the victim walks in based on force data
only. The corridor map enables the attacker to recognize the building, and thus locate the
victim on a global map. ShoesHacker requires no training data from the victim, and needs
no knowledge about the building structure. This work reveals the danger of the location
privacy leakage through the foot force data.
1.4 THESIS ORGANIZATION
In the following chapters, I will introduce the MSAA framework and the technique details
of each of the four aforementioned works. To be more specific,
• In Chapter 2, to provide a guideline that help investigate the two faces of mobile
sensing, I present the MSAA framework, which shows the relationship between mobile
sensing applications and attacks, and how we can find the gaps in the current mobile
sensing research.
• In Chapter 3, to address the “fat finger” problem of tiny mobile devices, I propose an
audio-based handwriting input scheme named TableWrite, which allows users to input
words to mobile devices by writing on tables with their fingers.
• In Chapter 4, I investigate the case that the audio-based handwriting input scheme is
maliciously used by attackers. To show the danger of the privacy leakage through the
sound of handwriting, I propose an eavesdropping attack method called WritingHacker,
which recognizes the content of the victim’s handwriting based on its audio signal.
• In Chapter 5, to investigate the capability of smart shoes for indoor user tracking, I
design ShoesLoc, an indoor walking path tracking method which is based on in-shoe
force sensors.
• In Chapter 6, to expose the danger of the location leakage through foot force data, I
develop an attack method based on in-shoe force sensors, named ShoesHacker. Shoe-
sHacker can reconstruct the corridor map of the building that the victim walks in, and
even locate the building and the victim on a global map.
Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude the thesis and provide some future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2: MOBILE SENSING APPLICATION-ATTACK FRAMEWORK
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Reveal defects and improve effectiveness





Figure 2.1: Structure of the mobile sensing application-attack framework.
In this chapter, we present the MSAA framework, a general model that shows the con-
nection between the two faces of mobile sensing.
2.1 FRAMEWORK STRUCTURE
The structure of MSAA is illustrated in Figure 2.1. It contains the part of mobile sensing
application and the part of mobile sensing attack.
2.1.1 Structure of Mobile Sensing Application
As shown in Figure 2.1, a typical mobile sensing application contains three components,
i.e., sensors, sensing algorithm, and result presentation. The environment changes or user
activities generate or modulate certain signals, which contain the valuable information. The
signals are received and measured by the sensors embedded in mobile devices. The sensors
output raw data, and the devices process the data locally or upload them to servers, de-
pending on the application scenario. The raw data could also be partially processed locally
before being uploaded. The sensing algorithm, running on mobile devices or servers, extracts
the information of interest. Finally, the information is presented to the user or the service
provider.
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Besides the signal source, the user or environment context is another important informa-
tion source. The contextual information can be the prior knowledge about the user’s habits
or the settings of the application environment, which are critical for the sensing algorithm
design. One typical type of contextual information is the training data provided by the user.
The cost of collecting training data is usually low, but the data enable the system to apply
machine learning algorithms, which could significantly improve the performance. Another
typical type of contextual information is the data collected by the site survey in the appli-
cation environment. For example, many wireless signal fingerprint-based indoor localization
methods need offline site surveys to determine the fingerprint at each location. However,
since site surveys require a lot of labor, they should be avoided if possible. Therefore, it is
important to consider the trade-off between the contribution of the contextual information
and the cost of collecting it. Requiring too many contexts weakens the practicability of the
application.
The MSAA framework also includes the workflow of the effective system design. As shown
by the dashed lines in Figure 2.1, we first reveal and investigate the defects of the current
system. The defects can come from many aspects, such as low recognition accuracy, bad
robustness in certain situations, and high setup cost. We then explore different sensors and
algorithms to overcome the defects. Meanwhile, depending on the selected sensor, we should
also consider what kind of contextual information is needed. If the cost of getting the context
is low but the performance gain it brings is huge, the context should be assigned as an extra
input to the system. Otherwise, the context should not be required. With this constraint
on the contextual information, the design goal should be using less or cheaper sensors to
achieve better performance or more functionalities. For example, many handwriting input
methods require large touch screens or cameras, which are expensive for tiny mobile devices.
In TableWrite, we use microphones as sensors instead to implement an input method, which
significantly lowers the sensor cost. In ShoesLoc, we design new sensing algorithms to give
force sensors the new functionality of indoor walking path tracking.
2.1.2 Structure of Mobile Sensing Attack
Unfortunately, the nature of the mobile sensing strategies provides a large attack surface
to attackers. If not well protected, the user information could leak from the signal source,
the raw data, and the processed (or partially-processed) data. The structure of a typical
mobile sensing attack is similar to that of an application, but the attack can start from any
data leakage point.
If the attacker has physical access to the signal source, the attacker’s mobile sensors can
9
directly record the signal. For example, if a microphone is deployed near to the victim,
the attacker can record the voice of the victim, and launch the voice impersonation attack
[65, 66, 67].
In more common cases, the attacker gets the permission of the sensor usage in the victim’s
device via malware, and receives the raw sensor data. If the raw data are stored in cloud
servers, cyber attacks can also cause date leakages. Then, the attacker runs the sensing
algorithm, which extracts the victim’s private information. Many attack strategies have
been proposed based on the raw data leakage, such as recognizing the input to a nearby
keyboard based on the accelerometer output of a cellphone [68], and detecting the victim’s
age group based on the motion sensor readings when the victim is holding and touching a
smartphone [69].
It is also possible that the attacker gets the access to the processed data stored in the
device or the cloud. Even if the processed data do not directly contain the user information,
it is still possible that the attacker can extract other private information via side channels,
which is illustrated by the indirect privacy leakage in Figure 2.1. What leak through the
indirect privacy leakage are the user behavior patterns instead of the signal data. Therefore,
compared with the physical signal leakage and the raw data leakage, the indirect privacy
leakage exposes user information at a higher level. One typical example is inferring the driv-
ing trajectory of a vehicle by monitoring the audio on/off status of a cellphone, which reflects
the driving instructions played by navigation applications [70]. The driving instructions are
the processed data of the navigation applications, but they still contain the victim’s location
information that is targeted by attackers. If the leaked processed data already contain the
information of interest, the attack directly succeeds through the direct privacy leakage in
Figure 2.1. This is usually based on malware and cyber attacks, which are outside the scope
of mobile sensing.
Similar to the mobile sensing applications, attackers can also make use of the contextual
information. However, the availability of contexts is tightly constrained. For example, it is
extremely hard for attackers to directly get labeled training data from victims. To keep the
feasibility, attack designs should require as little contextual information as possible.
Besides the attack workflows shown in Figure 2.1, there are some other attack methods
such as spoofing, i.e., creating fake data or signals and injecting them into the mobile sensing
applications. Since these attacks focus more on violating system or network security instead
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Figure 2.2: The research on mobile sensing with respect to different mobile devices.
2.2 MSAA FRAMEWORK AS A RESEARCH GUIDELINE
The MSAA framework shows the two sides of mobile sensing. While mobile sensing
applications can benefit people, their data and algorithms could also be utilized by attackers.
For each mobile sensing technique, researchers should investigate both the two sides. Figure
2.2 illustrates the current research on mobile sensing with respect to different mobile devices.
It is clearly shown that, for each sensing application, there are corresponding attack strategies
that target on the same signal or user information type. Note that providing a complete
approach survey is out of our scope, and Figure 2.2 only gives some examples for illustration.
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, since the newly-commercialized sensors and devices keep
bringing new possibilities to mobile sensing techniques, there are always new research ap-
proaches that improve the previous designs. MSAA guides us to improve the effectiveness of
our designs by utilizing these new resources. For example, the previous motion sensor-based
walking path tracking systems can be interfered by magnetic field changes. To overcome
this defect and improve the robustness, in ShoesLoc we use the force sensors in the newly-
commercialized smart shoes, which have good resistance to the magnetic field interference.
Moreover, our algorithm design eliminates the site survey, which reduces the setup cost. To
achieve better tracking accuracy, we utilize the contexts of training data and floor maps.
The performance gain outweighs the context cost, because the training data can be directly
collected from users and the floor maps are usually available online. Therefore, ShoesLoc
can achieve better effectiveness compared with the previous approaches. MSAA reflects our
principle of designing effective mobile sensing systems, i.e., we reduce the cost and improve
the performance of current systems by exploring different sensors, various requirements for
user/environment contexts, and different sensing algorithms.
Figure 2.2 also shows the gaps left in the current mobile sensing research. For smartwatches
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and some other small mobile devices, researchers have proposed some handwriting input
methods that do not use any touch screen. However, to the best of our knowledge, currently
there is no work investigating the possibility of inferring the handwriting content. Therefore,
a gap exists in the research on the handwriting input, because the attack side shown in the
MSAA framework is not explored. Similarly, since smart shoes are newly commercialized
products, although there are smart shoe-based approaches such as indoor positioning and
floor plan reconstruction, the research on smart shoe-based attacks is still missing. The
threats that can be caused by the leakage of shoe sensor data have not been investigated.
The MSAA framework provides a research guideline that shows the connection between
the two sides of mobile sensing, and helps researchers find and close the gaps. For example,
for the audio signal of handwriting, while we have proposed TableWrite as a new input
method based on handwriting sound, we should also consider the case that the audio signal
is also received by the attacker, or the data recorded or processed by the user’s device are
leaked to the attacker. In this thesis, we focus on the case of the physical signal leakage,
and present WritingHacker to reveal the possible danger. Another example is for smart
shoes. By presenting ShoesLoc, we first show that the in-shoe force sensors are capable of
locating users. Then, following MSAA, we consider the case that the raw force data are
leaked to the attacker, and investigate if the attacker can locate the victim. Our approach,
named ShoesHacker, closes the gap of the attacks on smart shoes, and can be considered as
both a location inferring and a floor plan inferring approach. The discovery of these gaps
also reflects our principle of exploring information leakages, i.e., we break a sensing system
into basic components, and for each component we consider what user information could be
extracted if data are leaked.
There are still empty spaces left in the research field. For instance, while there are works
considering the gait spoofing based on cameras and on-hip accelerometers [71, 72], it is still
not clear that whether the data collected by smart shoes are sufficient for gait spoofing.
Filling these empty spaces is left for our future work.
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CHAPTER 3: TABLEWRITE: AUDIO BASED HANDWRITING INPUT
FOR TINY MOBILE DEVICES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The explosive development of tiny mobile devices (e.g., smart watches, smart rings) has
raised the “fat finger” problem: because of the shrinking device interfaces, it is hard to
efficiently input messages into these devices by keystroking. Although the voice input scheme
has been applied in many devices, it is sometimes inconvenient in quiet-kept scenarios such
as libraries and hospitals, and would also cause privacy leakage. Therefore, people need a
more convenient input method for tiny mobile devices.
To solve this problem, some previous works have proposed handwriting on tables as a new
text entry method for mobile devices. The approach in [1] uses smartwatches to track the
motion of users’ hands, and thus enables users to write on surfaces with fingers. However,
this scheme is not convenient for everyone because usually people do not wear watches on
their dominant hands. In [27], the authors leverage the embedded microphones in smart-
phones to record the sound of handwriting on tables and recognize the input text. However,
a user needs to train the system before each use, and once the system has been trained,
its performance highly depends on the location of handwriting. A comfortable and efficient
handwriting input scheme should not require users to carry devices with their dominant
hands, and should not require a training phase before each use. Also, the recognition accu-
racy should not highly depend on the location of handwriting.
In this chapter, we present TableWrite, an audio-based handwriting input scheme which
allows users to input words to mobile devices by writing on tables with their fingers. Once
trained, TableWrite does not require any retraining phase. Our method is based on the basic
assumption that the handwriting of users is print-style, instead of joined-up writing. We
consider this assumption reasonable because it is easy for users to write letters separately.
The main idea of our method is that, when a user wants to write on a surface with a
finger, he/she can keep a mobile device such as a smartwatch or a smartphone touching
the surface, so that the device can record the sound of the handwriting clearly. Based on
pre-collected training data, the device can recognize the words by extracting features from
the sound sequence and recognizing the unique patterns of each letter.
The main challenge is that, the training data should be collected only once. The existing
audio-based handwriting recognition methods require retraining before each use, because
the diversity of audio signal’s multipath propagation is highly impacted by the material of
surfaces and the location of handwriting. To solve this problem, we leverage the common
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patterns of people’s print-style writing. For instance, a user writes letter ‘F’ with three
strokes, and letter ‘O’ with one stroke, which is not impacted by the surface material or
the handwriting location. In TableWrite, based on the user’s writing habit, we classify
letters into clusters according to stroke numbers. For each cluster, we implement multiclass
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) to distinguish letters. To train the SVMs, the user needs
to provide the training data only once, and no retraining is needed before each use. Based
on the stroke number information, we further apply a dictionary filter to narrow down the
word search range and also provide the linguistic word-level correction. Moreover, inspired
by the gesture tracking technique, we apply an audio signal reflection based method to track
the motion of the user’s hand, which provides valuable features if the relative angle between
the device and the handwriting is roughly consistent.
The main contributions of our work are:
• We design a new audio-based handwriting input method that does not require any
retraining phase.
• To solve the lack of retraining data, we use the stroke number as a common handwriting
pattern, and apply the word filtering and the hand motion tracking technique to further
improve the recognition accuracy.
• We implement a prototype system and conduct evaluations. Experiments confirm that
TableWrite achieves good accuracy while providing better convenience.
In the rest of this chapter, we first introduce the related work in Section 3.2. Then, we
present an overview of the system architecture in Section 3.3. Then we successively introduce
the methods used by TableWrite in Section 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. We evaluate the performance of
TableWrite in Section 3.7, have further discussion in Section 3.8, and conclude this chapter
in Section 3.9.
3.2 RELATED WORK
Handwriting recognition: The automatic handwriting recognition techniques can be clas-
sified as offline and online recognition [73]. The former is usually based on the images of
handwriting, and the latter also utilizes sensor data such as stylus positions and temporal
information during the writing [73, 74].
In this work, we do not apply the image-based recognition techniques such as [28, 29],
because not all the mobile devices are equipped with large touch screens or computational-
expensive cameras. In contrast, microphones and speakers have been widely embedded
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in mobile devices. Therefore, we utilize microphones and speakers to realize handwriting
recognition, so that our technique can be easily applied to commercial mobile devices.
Handwriting on tables as an input method: There have been some works focusing on
enabling handwriting on tables to be a new text entry method for mobile devices. The
system named GyroPen in [31] enables users to use smartphones as pens to write on tables,
and uses gyroscopes and accelerometers to track the trajectories. This method is not suitable
for other mobile devices such as smartwatches because it requires users to hold their devices
in hands. The system in [1] enables a user to write on surfaces with fingers. A smartwatch
worn on the user’s wrist records the accelerometer signals of user’s hand, which can be
utilized to recognize the user’s handwriting with the algorithm of gesture recognition. Some
other approaches also recognize handwriting gestures with smartwatches [75, 76]. However,
these approaches require users to wear watches on their dominant hands. Using the system
from [27], after executing a training phase, a user can write with a finger on a table, and the
microphone in a smartphone records the sound of handwriting. However, once the location
of the smartphone is changed, the training phase must be repeated, which is inconvenient
for users.
In this work, we focus on a more practical case, where users do not need to hold or wear
the mobile device by their dominant hands. The training data should be collected only once,
and the method’s performance should not be highly impacted by the surface material or the
writing location.
3.3 TABLEWRITE OVERVIEW
In this section, we first describe the basic assumptions of our design, and then give an
overview of the system architecture and the workflow of our method.
3.3.1 Basic Assumptions
Our system is designed based on the basic assumption that the user’s handwriting is print-
style, instead of joined-up writing. We consider this assumption reasonable, because most
handwriting input methods encourage users to write in print style for higher accuracy. We
recognize handwriting in units of words and focus on the word-level recognition. With our
input method, for each written word, the device can display a list of candidates for the user
to select. We notice that there are two different ways to write with fingers: using fingernail
or finger pulp. In this work we require users to write with their fingernails to generate
stronger audio signals. During the writing, the relative angle between the device and the
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user’s writing hand should be roughly similar to that during the training data collection.
This requirement does not lead to extra user efforts, because people’s writing poses are
usually constant due to their writing habits.
Except the user’s writing hand, the distance from the device to the other moving objects
should be at least longer than 40 cm. Nearby moving objects could interfere parts of our
system, but TableWrite can still achieve good performance, as will be discussed in Section
3.8.1. The noise level of the environment cannot be too high, otherwise the handwriting
signal is masked by the noise. We focus on the typical writing scenarios such as meeting
rooms, where the average noise level is usually lower than 50 dB [77].
3.3.2 System Architecture
Recorder






















Figure 3.1: System architecture.
As shown in Figure 3.1, our system mainly consists of the following components.
Speaker and recorder : The speaker plays continuous wave signals with high frequencies (17-
19.45 kHz), which is nearly inaudible to humans. The recorder receives the signal reflected
by the user’s hand and the sound of handwriting with the embedded microphone, and sends
the sound stream to the word detector and the hand motion tracker.
Word detector : It receives the sound stream and extracts the sound fragment and the
stroke number for each letter in a word. The results are sent to the word recognizer. The
hand motion tracker also receives the start and end time point for each letter from this
component.
Hand motion tracker : By analyzing the reflected audio signal, it tracks the tiny distance
change between the user’s finger and the device. The curve of the distance change for each
letter is stored as a motion fragment, which is sent to the word recognizer.
Word recognizer : It first finds all the candidate words from a dictionary based on the
stroke information. Then, it calculates the similarity between the recorded fragments and
each candidate word. The best matches are output.
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Before the first time the system can be used, the user should provide labeled training data.
The training data include the sound and motion fragments and the number of strokes for
each letter, which are used to train the SVMs. Since the training phase is conducted only
once, it does not impact user experience. To maintain the performance of the hand motion
tracker, the relative angle between the device and the hand during use should be similar to
that during the training phase. We consider it reasonable because it is easy for the user to
keep such angle roughly consistent, e.g., always put the cellphone vertically to the line of
handwriting.
In this chapter, we take the capital letters ‘A’-‘Z’ as examples to show how TableWrite
works. However, our technique can be easily applied to other characters. Next we introduce
the main components in detail, respectively.
3.4 WORD DETECTOR
The design of the word detector is based on signal processing in time domain, which
consists of two steps, namely stroke detection and letter detection. First, we introduce the
definition of a stroke and the concept of letter clusters.
3.4.1 Definition of Stroke and Letter Cluster
Stroke: In our work, we define a stroke as a mark made by a writing instrument with a
single touch to a surface. This means that we consider the letter ‘B’ as a two-stroke letter,
even if it has multiple turning points.
Letter Clusters: Based on our basic assumption about print-style writing, we divide the
capital letters into three clusters according to the stroke number:
C1 = {‘C’, ‘G’, ‘L’, ‘M’, ‘O’, ‘S’, ‘U’, ‘V’, ‘W’, ‘Z’},
C2 = {‘B’, ‘D’, ‘J’, ‘K’, ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’, ‘T’, ‘X’},
C3 = {‘A’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘H’, ‘I’, ‘N’, ‘Y’}.
Thus each letter in cluster Cu has u strokes (u = 1, 2, 3). Note that the clusters can be
adjusted based on the writing habits of different users.
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3.4.2 Stroke Detection
Firstly, to filter out the signal generated by the speaker and reflected by the hand from
the sound stream, we use a FIR (Finite Impulse Response) low pass filter with the passband
frequency of 4 kHz and the stopband frequency of 6 kHz. Then, we detect each stroke in
the continuous sound stream. A naive method is setting a constant threshold and once the
sound signal magnitude or instantaneous power exceeds the threshold, a stroke is detected.
However, since noise levels are usually different in different environments, and the average
noise power varies over time, it is hard to assign such a threshold. We use a method similar
to the Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) algorithm [78] to solve this problem.
Let us assume that the noise power follows Gaussian distribution. Its average power and
standard deviation at time t are denoted by µ(t) and σ(t). We denote the amplitude of the
received audio signal by a discrete time series x(t), and use a sliding window of size W to



























(|x(k)|2 − A(t))2. (3.4)
A potential start point of a stroke is detected if
|x(t)|2 > µ(t) + α1σ(t), (3.5)
and a potential end point of a stroke is detected if
|x(t)|2 < α2µ̄, (3.6)
where α1 and α2 are two constant parameters. µ̄ is the average noise power when there is no
input. It can be updated by measuring the average noise power between each two adjacent
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detected letters. The reason why we do not use |x(t)|2 > α2µ̄ for start point detection is
that it is impossible to measure µ̄ if the start point has not been detected.
A stroke is recognized if the interval between the potential start and end point is longer
than a constant threshold β1, as shown in Figure 3.2(a). In this way we avoid the impact
of burst noise. If the interval between two detected strokes is shorter than another constant







Figure 3.2: Example for letter detection.
3.4.3 Letter Detection
The second step is to extract the sound fragment for each letter. A stroke’s start point
is also a letter’s start point if it is the first start point after the end point of the previous
letter. If there is no stroke detected in constant duration β3 after the end point of a stroke,
the end point is also the end point of the letter. One example is shown in Figure 3.2(b).
Then the measured sound signal between the start and end point of the letter is stored
as a sound fragment. Assume that the word written by the user has N letters. We use sk
to denote the stroke number of the kth letter in the word. For example, word “SEA” has
N = 3, and s1 = 1 for letter ‘S’∈ C1. Then {sk|k ∈ [1, N ]} and the sound fragments are
passed to the word recognizer. The start and end time point for each letter is also sent to
the hand motion tracker to help crop the motion fragment for each letter.
3.5 HAND MOTION TRACKER
The recent development in device-free gesture tracking technique [80, 81, 82] shows that
it is possible to recognize the content of handwriting via the motion trajectory of the user’s
hand. In [83], a device-free gesture tracking scheme named LLAP (Low-Latency Acoustic
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Phase) utilizes a speaker to generate an audio signal, and tracks the motion of a user’s hand
by calculating the phase shift of the signal reflected by the hand. It is possible to use this
scheme to track a user’s hand motion and thus recognize the handwriting. However, at
least two microphones are needed to track the handwriting on a 2-D surface. Many devices
such as smartwatches are equipped with only one microphone, and thus do not have such
redundancy. Therefore, to ensure the wide applicability of TableWrite, only one microphone
can be used. We apply LLAP only to track the 1-D distance change between the device
and the hand, and will show that this information still helps to enhance the performance of
TableWrite.
A speaker on the device is used to generate continuous wave signal with a certain frequency.
When the wave is reflected by the hand, the motion of the hand causes a continuous phase
shift. Thus, the accumulated phase shift of the reflected signal is related to the distance
that the hand has moved by. Note that the sound of handwriting can be filtered out with
CIC (Cascaded Integrator Comb) filters. We use the microphone to receive the reflected
signal, and measure this distance change. During the implementation, multiple frequencies
are synchronously used to mitigate the multi-path effect. We use 17-19.45 kHz with the
interval 350 Hz to avoid audible noises. The sampling rate is 48 kHz. Please refer to [83] for
details.
Since the start and end points of each letter have been determined by the word detector,
we can easily crop the curve of distance change for each letter from the continuous measured
result. Figure 3.3 shows the example of hand tracking results for ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘N’. The three
letters are distinguishable based on the cropped curves. The cropped curve for each letter




















































(b) Example for ‘C’.
























(c) Example for ‘N’.
Figure 3.3: Examples for motion fragments.
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3.6 WORD RECOGNIZER
This component finds candidate words based on the information of stroke number. Then
it extracts the features of the sound and motion fragments for each letter, and recognizes
the whole word according to the features, the trained SVMs, and the candidate word list.
3.6.1 Dictionary Filter
One of the key design points of TableWrite is reducing the size of candidate word set for
the word classifier. We use a dictionary database to store the commonly used words and
a filter to extract the validated words whose stroke numbers match with the input set of
stroke numbers {sk}.
Specifically, the dictionary filter receives a set of stroke numbers {sk} from the word
detector. Then it finds all the words that match with {sk} from the dictionary. The length
of a matched word should be N , and the stroke number of the kth letter should be sk. For
instance, if {s1 = 1, s2 = 3, s3 = 3}, the words extracted from the dictionary should be
{“SHE”, “SEE”, ...}, which contain the most possible word written by the user. All the
extracted words consist the candidate word list.
The dictionary used by the dictionary filter can be scenario-dependent. For instance, for a
doctor working in a hospital, the dictionary can contains more professional medicine-related
words. We will evaluate the performance of TableWrite with different dictionaries in Section
3.7.
3.6.2 Feature Extraction
Feature Extraction for Sound Fragments
For each sound fragment, we extract features mainly from frequency domain. Even if
the features in frequency domain are usually impacted by the locations of handwriting, our
experiments will prove that they still benefit the letter recognition. For each sound fragment,
we calculate the FFT coefficients F (ω), ω ∈ [0, ω0], and extract the following features, which
are often used in audio classification [84]:

















• Pitch Frequency: ωP = arg max
ω∈[0,ω0]
F (ω).
• Number of Large Frequency Peaks: the number of the frequency peaks whose values are
larger than γ3 maxω F (ω), denoted by nP . γ3 is a constant threshold and 0 < γ3 < 1.
We set γ3 = 0.65.
• Mel Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients (MFCCs): we firstly divide each sound fragment
into frames with length Wf . Two adjacent frames have overlap Wo. The number of
cepstrum coefficients for each frame is denoted by Nc. Thus, for each frame i =









mij, j = 1, ..., Nc. (3.9)
In our prototype, the sampling rate of audio signal is 48 kHz. We set Wf = 128,
Wo = 48 and Nc = 12.
We denote the features for each sound fragment by:
SF = [ωC , ωB, ωP , nP ,m1, ...,mNc ]. (3.10)
The sound fragment based feature vector for the kth letter in the input word is denoted by
SFk.
Feature Extraction for Motion Fragments
Different from sound fragments, motion fragments do not contain periodic signal, and
thus spectrum analysis is not applicable. Moreover, the absolute distance change in the
motion fragment cannot be used as a feature because it varies with the handwriting’s size.
Therefore, we extract the following features mainly based on the relative changes among
the peaks/valleys in the curves. Note that the curves have been smoothed with the moving
average window with size 30 ms, and the start point’s altitude of the curve is set to be 0.
• Number of peaks/valleys in the curves. The minimum distance between two peaks/valleys
is 30 ms, so that smaller peaks/valleys are ignored.
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• The altitude of the lowest valley divided by that of the highest peak.
• The altitude of the second highest/lowest peak/valley divided by that of the high-
est/lowest peak/valley. If there is only one peak/valley, the output is 0.
• Relative time point of the highest/lowest peak/valley. The time length of the curve is
resized to 1. The output falls in [0,1].
• Relative time point of the second highest/lowest peak/valley. If there is only one
peak/valley, the output is the same with the previous feature.
• Index of the highest/lowest peak/valley. The peaks/valleys are arranged in chronolog-
ical order.
• Index of the second highest/lowest peak/valley. If there is only one peak/valley, the
output is the same with the previous feature.
For the kth letter in the input word, we denote the features extracted from its mo-
tion fragment by MFk. Therefore, for a word with N letters, the kth letter is labeled
by {sk, SFk,MFk}. In our work, we set the stroke number sk ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Recall that sk has
been determined by the input detector.
3.6.3 Word Classifier
The word classification first evaluates the possibility for each input letter to be a given
letter, base on which it selects the final outputs from the candidate word list.
The algorithm is based on multi-class SVMs. Recall that we have divided all letters into
clusters Cu (u = 1, 2, 3). For each cluster, we use a set of SVMs to distinguish letter i and
j, denoted by SVMuij, where i, j ∈ Cu and i < j in alphabetical order. In the training phase,
we collect a set of training sound and motion fragments for each letter in {‘A’, ..., ‘Z’}, and
extract their features. Then, we train each SVMuij with the features of letter i and j.
In the using phase, for each input letter with stroke number sk, we input {SFk,MFk} to
each SVMskij where i, j ∈ Csk and i < j. We use pk(l) to indicate the probability for the kth
letter in the input word to be a given letter l in {‘A’, ..., ‘Z’}. According to the classification
result of each SVMskij , pk(i) or pk(j) is increased by 1.
For instance, if an input letter has 3 strokes, we pick each pair of letters in C3 and run
the corresponding SVM. E.g., we first pick up ‘A’ and ‘E’, and run SVM3AE. If the letter
is classified as ‘A’, we increase pk(A) by 1, otherwise pk(E) is increase by 1. After we have
picked up all the pairs of letters in C3, pk(A), ..., pk(Z) indicates the number of times that
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letter ‘A’,...,‘Z’ has won the classifications. Note that in this example, for all the letters l in
C1 and C2, pk(l) = 0.
To eliminate the impact of different cluster sizes, after all the classifications for each letter,
we calculate p̂k(l) = pk(l)/(size(Csk)− 1). Then p̂k(l) indicates the degree to which the kth
letter in the input word matches letter l.
Based on p̂k(l), we calculate the weight of each candidate word and output the best
matches as the recognition results. Assume that there are M words in the candidate word






k ),m ∈ [1,M ], (3.11)
where lmk denotes the kth letter in the mth candidate word. Therefore, Pm denotes the
probability for the mth candidate word to be the input word. Then, we select the top-K
candidate words with the highest Pm as the final outputs. K is a configurable value, and
the output words can be displayed on the device’s screen for users to choose.
3.7 MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our prototype system. We implement
the speaker, the recorder and the word detector on a commercial Android smartphone, and
implement the other components on a laptop. Note that our scheme can be easily applied
to tiny mobile devices equipped with speakers and microphones. The sampling rate of
microphone is 48 kHz, and the format of audio data is PCM 16 bit per sample. During the
tests we use three separate dictionaries. For daily life, we use the top-2000 and top-5000
commonly used words [85]. For clinic scenario, we extract the top-9000 words in the MIMIC
II Clinical Database [86]. We set W = 200, α1 = 16, α2 = 1, β1 = 45 ms, β2 = 68 ms, and
β3 = 227 ms.
We set our test environment in a laboratory with low near-field noise. Nine volunteers
are invited to take the tests. Each of them writes words on a wooden desk with one finger
(using fingernail). The range of characters is ‘A’-‘Z’. We place the smartphone on the same
desk. The distance between the smartphone and the handwriting is around 20-30 cm, and
the relative angle between them is roughly fixed during the test. To collect training data,
we require each volunteer to write each letter in print style for 10 times, the signals of which
are used to train the word classifier for each volunteer.
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3.7.1 Performance of Word Recognition
In this subsection, we evaluate the accuracy of the final output of TableWrite. We conduct
the test for each dictionary. In each test, each of our volunteers writes 1000 words randomly
selected from the dictionary. We select test words with two different strategies. With
frequency-based selection, we assign each word in the dictionary a weight, which is the word’s
frequency of appearance. The probability for a word to be selected is equal to its weight
divided by the sum of all the weights in the dictionary. With uniform selection, we select
test words following uniform distribution. Following each strategy, we collect 9000 samples
during each test. The results are shown in Figure 3.4. The curves show how the probability
of correct recognition changes with the number of returned candidate words (horizontal
axis), i.e., the rank-k accuracy represents the probability that the correct recognition result
is included in the top-k best matches returned by TableWrite.

























2000 daily words, Frequency-based selection
2000 daily words, Uniform selection
5000 daily words, Frequency-based selection
5000 daily words, Uniform selection
9000 medicine-related words, Frequency-based selection
9000 medicine-related words, Uniform selection
Figure 3.4: Accuracy of word recognition.
The results of experiments show that, under the condition of print-style writing and low
near-field noise, the word recognizer of our system achieves an accuracy of 90.7%-93.6%
for the frequency-based word selection, and 94.5%-95.9% for the uniform word selection.
It is also shown that, for all the test cases, it is highly possible (> 99%) that the correct
recognition results are included in the top-5 returned candidate words. This confirms the
practicability of TableWrite as an input method. Moreover, the performance of TableWrite
is consistent for the dictionary of medicine-related words, which shows that TableWrite also
works well in specific scenarios, e.g., for doctors in hospitals.
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3.7.2 Contribution of Different Components
To better understand the contribution of the dictionary filter, the word classifier and
the hand motion tracker, we analyze the change of the recognition accuracy when different
components are disabled. In Case 1, we use dictionary filter only and the recognition result
is selected from the candidate word list uniform-randomly, which rules out the contribution
of hand motion tracker and the word classifier. In Case 2, the word classifier (multi-class
SVMs) is also applied, but only the features extracted from sound fragments are used. In
Case 3, the features extracted from motion fragments are further used. The same data from
the previous test are used, and we consider both the frequency-based word selection and the
uniform word selection. The results are shown in Figure 3.5(a) and 3.5(b).
The results of Case 1 show that, since the dictionary filter narrows the space of candidate
words, over 37% of written words can be correctly recognized even without any machine
learning method. The results of Case 2 and 3 show the improvement made by the SVMs
and the hand motion tracker, successively. Therefore, the contribution made by each of
























Dictionary filter only (Case 1)
Dictionary filter + SVM (Case 2)
Dictionary filter + SVM + hand motion tracker (Case 3)
Top-2000 daily words Top-5000 daily words Top-9000 medicine-
related words
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Dictionary filter only (Case 1)
Dictionary filter + SVM (Case 2)
Dictionary filter + SVM + hand motion tracker (Case 3)
Top-2000 daily words Top-5000 daily words Top-9000 medicine-
related words
Dictionary Database
(b) Recognition accuracy with different compo-
nents (uniform selection).
Figure 3.5: Recognition accuracy with different components.
3.8 DISCUSSION
3.8.1 Limitations of TableWrite
While we have designed various methods to improve the performance of TableWrite, there
are still some limitations. When the user is writing with TableWrite, the hand motion
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tracker can be interfered by nearby moving objects, especially when the distance to the
moving object is less than 40 cm, based on our test results. The current solution is that,
when nearby moving objects (such as walking people) exist, the user can disable the hand
motion tracker, which does not stop TableWrite from working. The experiment results in
Section 3.7.2 show that the recognition accuracy still achieves 80% in this case.
On the other hand, if the background audio noise is too strong, it is hard to distinguish the
handwriting signal and the noise. While it is possible to segregate the handwriting sound by
using multiple microphones if the number of noise sources is limited [87], defending against
noise is still a challenging problem for all the audio-based approaches. We leave this problem
for our future work.
3.8.2 Possible Ways to Improve Accuracy
There are still possible ways to further improve the performance of TableWrite. For
instance, we can apply the semantic check when the user writes a sentence instead of a
single word. Since TableWrite returns an ordered candidate list for each input word, it is
easy to apply the syntactic correction and select the best candidate words that compose a
meaningful sentence.
Another promising way is applying the deep learning method. With enough training data,
we can train a deep learning model that works for everyone, and thus eliminate the training
phase and probably achieve a higher accuracy. However, running the model on tiny mobile
devices is expensive, and would also hurt the realtime performance.
3.9 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we present TableWrite, an audio-based handwriting input scheme which
allows users to input words to mobile devices by writing on tables. We designed the com-
ponents of word detector, hand motion tracker and word recognizer, which enable mobile
devices to recognize users’ handwriting. The experimental results show that, the accuracy
of word recognition is higher than 90%, which shows the effectiveness of TableWrite.
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CHAPTER 4: WRITINGHACKER: AUDIO BASED EAVESDROPPING OF
HANDWRITING VIA MOBILE DEVICES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
It has been proven that the sound of typing keyboards leaks information, which implies
the possibility of acoustic side-channel attacks [88, 89, 90, 91]. However, it has not yet been
recognized that the sound of handwriting also leaks information. People’s writing habits
follow some common patterns (e.g., stroke number), which make audio-based handwriting
recognition possible. The rapid evolution of mobile terminals compounds the danger of
audio-based eavesdropping of handwriting in public environments. For instance, when a
person is filling out privacy-related forms on a desk in medical environments such as hos-
pitals or clinics, an attacker can record the sound of handwriting with a smartphone, and
recover the content of handwriting. To expose this danger, in this chapter we investigate
the possibility of eavesdropping on handwriting via mobile devices based on audio signal
processing and machine learning.
Although handwriting on desks has been considered as a new text entry method for small
mobile devices, this technique is not applicable for the eavesdropping attack. The methods
in [31] and [1] enable users to write on surfaces by using smartphones as pens or by wearing
smartwatches on wrists. However, these methods assume that users have direct contact with
some mobile devices, and thus cannot be used for attack because attackers usually have
no access to victims’ devices. In [27], the authors leverage the embedded microphone in
commercial smartphones to record the sound of handwriting on surfaces and recognize the
input text. However, once the system has been trained, its performance highly depends on
the location of handwriting, which makes eavesdropping attack impossible. In this chapter,
we investigate the capacity of audio-based side-channel attack under the condition that the
attacker’s mobile device has no direct contact with the victim, and the performance of the
attack does not highly depend on the handwriting location.
In this chapter, we present WritingHacker, an audio-based eavesdropping proof-of-concept
system which eavesdrops on handwriting via mobile devices. Our method is based on the ba-
sic assumption that the handwriting of victims is print-style, which means that we currently
ignore the impact of joined-up writing. We consider this assumption reasonable because
most of privacy-related forms require print-style writing [92].
The main idea of our attack method is that, by keeping a mobile device such as a smart-
phone touching the desk which is used by a victim, an attacker can record the sound of the
victim’s handwriting. After regaining the device, the attacker can reconstruct the words
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that the victim has written by extracting features from the sound sequence and recognizing
the unique patterns of each letter.
The main challenge is that, in the scenarios of attack, labeled training data from victims
are always unavailable. Moreover, the performance of existing audio-based handwriting
recognition methods highly depends on the location of handwriting, which can hardly be
controlled by the attacker. We show that, using WritingHacker, an attacker can leverage the
common patterns of people’s print-style handwriting, which are not affected by the afore-
mentioned factors. For instance, different letters sometimes have different stroke numbers.
Letter ‘A’ usually has three strokes, while letter ‘C’ has only one stroke, which makes it
easy to distinguish between these two letters even if victims’ training data are unavailable.
Meanwhile, the stroke number for each letter is not impacted by handwriting locations. In
WritingHacker, we classify all the letters into different clusters according to their stroke
numbers, and implement a Support Vector Machine (SVM) for each cluster to distinguish
the in-cluster letters. To train the SVMs, the attacker can collect training data from other
people instead of the victims. To provide the linguistic word-level correction and narrow
down the word search range, we further apply a dictionary filter, which is also based on
letter clustering. Moreover, we design the algorithm of letter time length based offsetting
(LTLO) to utilize the time length diversity among the letters written by the victim. Fur-
thermore, inspired by the gesture tracking technique, we also apply an audio signal reflection
based method to track the motion of the victim’s hand, which provides valuable features if
the relative position between the device and the handwriting is known by the attacker.
The main contributions of our work are:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the possibility of eaves-
dropping on handwriting based on audio signals.
• To solve the lack of training data from victims and reduce the impacts of diverse writing
locations, we propose to use the stroke number as a common handwriting pattern, and
apply the method of letter clustering.
• We design the methods of dictionary filtering and LTLO, and apply the hand motion
tracking technique, which significantly improve the recognition accuracy.
• We implement a prototype system on Android-laptop platform and conduct evalua-
tions. Experiments confirm that privacy leakage through eavesdropping on handwrit-
ing is highly probable under certain conditions such as print-style writing and low
near-field noise.
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WritingHacker is still a proof-of-concept system based on our basic assumption. However,
it sheds light on a new threat to people’s privacy caused by mobile devices.
We organize the rest of this chapter as follows. After introducing related work in Section
4.2, we present an overview of the system architecture and the attack method in Section 4.3.
Then we successively introduce the methods and algorithms used by the system components
in Section 4.4-4.7. We include the implementation details and performance evaluation of
WritingHacker in Section 4.8 and 4.9. We discuss the experiment results in Section 4.10,
compare WritingHacker and TableWrite in Section 4.11, and then conclude this chapter in
Section 4.12.
4.2 RELATED WORK
Leakage of privacy via text entry methods: The topic about the leakage of privacy via text
entry methods has become popular in recent years. Many existing eavesdropping attacks
of text entries focus on keyboards, which are the most common input tools for electronic
equipments. Besides the approaches based on video of typing sessions [93] or timing infor-
mation of key presses [94], the other methods are usually based on audio or acceleration
signal processing.
By extending the technique of human voice recognition, attackers can recognize the keys
that a victim has pressed by eavesdropping on keystrokes. Asonov et al. firstly showed
that keyboards are vulnerable to attacks based on differentiating the sound emanated by
different keys [88]. In [89], Zhuang et al. presented an audio-based attack method which
combines standard machine learning and speech recognition techniques. Berger et al. in
[90] presented a dictionary attack which can reconstruct a single typed word from audio
signals with a dictionary of words. For the acceleration-based eavesdropping, Marquardt
et al. revealed that an application with access to accelerometer readings on a smartphone
can recover text entered on a nearby keyboard [68]. However, the audio/acceleration signals
of handwriting are much more diverse compared with those of keystrokes. For instance,
the keyboard audio signal for each keystroke usually contains a press region and a release
region [91]. Thus it is easier to select appropriate features for machine learning algorithms
to compare different keystrokes. For the case of handwriting, the acoustic signals of different
strokes vary with people. Thus the previous approaches cannot be applied to our scenario.
The universalization of smart mobile devices is also increasing the risk of privacy leakage.
For example, Wang et al. has shown the danger that the motion sensors in smartwatches
can leak information about what the user is typing [24]. However, this approach requires
the direct contact between victims and mobile devices, which is not practical in the scenario
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of eavesdropping attack.
In our work, WritingHacker eavesdrops on handwriting based on audio signal process-
ing, because compared with acceleration signals, audio signals are less influenced by the
propagation distance in solid media such as desks.
Handwriting Recognition: The techniques for automatic handwriting recognition (HWR)
can be classified as online and offline case [73]. Offline recognition usually processes images
of handwriting only, whereas online recognition can further utilize rich sensor data such as
stylus positions and temporal information during the writing process [73, 74].
In this work we focus on audio signal based attack, and thus do not apply the image-based
offline recognition techniques such as Optical Character Recognition (OCR) [95]. For the
online case, multiple sensors can be used to improve recognition accuracy. In [96], Nakai
et al. used pen pressure as a feature based on the observation that the pressure represents
pen ups and downs as well as the temporal pattern of handwriting in a continuous manner.
In [97, 98, 99], motion sensors embedded in pens or Micro Electro Mechanical Systems
were also utilized to sense the motion produced by written characters. Different from these
approaches, we mainly utilize the widely installed microphones in mobile devices to recognize
handwriting.
Handwriting on desks as an input method: Since handwriting is a convenient input method
other than keystroking, there have been some works focusing on enabling handwriting on
desks to be a new text entry method for small mobile devices. The system named GyroPen
in [31] enables users to use their smartphones as pens to write on desks by using embedded
gyroscopes and accelerometers. The system in [1] enables a user to write on surfaces with
fingers. A smartwatch worn on the user’s wrist records the accelerometer signals of user’s
hand, which can be utilized to recognize the user’s handwriting with the algorithm of gesture
recognition. However, these approaches are not suitable for attack because they require users
to have direct contact with mobile devices.
Using the system from [27], after executing a training phase, a user can write with a finger
on surfaces, and the microphone in a smartphone records the sound of handwriting. However,
once the location of the smartphone is changed, the training phase must be repeated. Since
the training data from victims are usually unavailable in practice, this system cannot be
used for eavesdropping attack.
In [83], a device-free gesture tracking scheme named LLAP (Low-Latency Acoustic Phase)
utilizes a speaker to generate an audio signal, and tracks the motion of a user’s hand by
calculating the phase shift of the signal reflected by the hand. It is possible to use this
scheme to track a victim’s hand motion and thus recognize the handwriting. However, this
scheme only works in a limited distance (< 35 cm) and thus cannot be applied to all the
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attack scenarios. We apply LLAP only to enhance the performance of WritingHacker under
certain conditions.
In this chapter, we focus on a more practical case where the attacker’ mobile device has
no direct contact with the victim, and the attacker has no control on the distance or relative
angle between the device and the victim’s handwriting.
4.3 WRITINGHACKER OVERVIEW
In this section, we first describe our basic assumptions, and then have an overview of the
system architecture and the workflow of our attack method.
4.3.1 Basic Assumptions
As mentioned before, our attack method is based on the basic assumption that the hand-
writing of the victim is print-style. We consider this assumption reasonable because print-
style writing is commonly required by important privacy-related forms. Based on the ob-
servation that people often write separate words instead of sentences when filling out forms,
currently we mainly focus on the word-level recognition.
During the attack, we do not assume that the attacker has any knowledge about the pen
type, the desk material, or the approximate relative angle between the eavesdropping device
and the handwriting. However, as will be shown during the evaluation, better performance
can be achieved if these details are known. It is easy for the attacker to get this informa-
tion if the victim is writing in a public place. The moving objects within 40 cm from the
eavesdropping device, except the victim’s writing hand, could interfere the hand tracking of
WritingHacker. In this case, as will be discussed in Section 4.5, the attacker can close the
hand tracking function to avoid the interference, and our method can still achieve good ac-
curacy. Moreover, we currently focus on the attack scenarios where the average background
noise is not too strong (< 50 dB), which is common in the waiting rooms and meeting rooms
[77].
4.3.2 System Architecture
As shown in Figure 4.1, our system mainly consists of the following components.
Speaker, recorder and accelerometer : The speaker continuously plays a continuous wave
signal with high frequencies, which is nearly inaudible to humans. The recorder records



































Figure 4.1: System Architecture of WritingHacker.
microphone, and sends the recorded signal to the input detector and the hand motion tracker
in stream. The output of the accelerometer is used to combat near-field noise.
Input detector : This component receives the sound stream and extracts the sound fragment
for each letter. The subcomponent of stroke detection detects each stroke of handwriting,
and the letter detection subcomponent detects and extracts sound fragments, each of which
contains the audio signal for a single letter. The sound fragments together with the number
of strokes for each letter are sent to the word recognizer, while the number of strokes is also
passed to the dictionary filter to narrow word search range. The hand motion tracker also
receives the start and end time point for each letter from this component.
Hand motion tracker : It is an optional component. By analyzing the reflected audio
signal, it tracks the tiny distance change between the victim’s hand/pen and the device.
The curve of the distance change for each letter is stored as a motion fragment, which is sent
to the word recognizer.
Dictionary filter : The input to this component includes the number of strokes for each
letter in each word. The filter reads the dictionary database and provides a list of candidate
words.
Word recognizer : This component calculates the similarity between the recorded sound
fragments and each word in the candidate list. The best match is the recognition result. The
feature extraction subcomponent extracts the features for each letter, and the subcomponent
of LTLO provides an offset for each candidate word. Finally, the word classifier recognizes
each word using machine learning algorithms.
4.3.3 Attack Method
Our attack method consists of the following phases.
Phase 1 (Eavesdropping): To commit the handwriting eavesdropping without being no-
ticed, an attacker can leave the mobile device on the desk where a victim is writing on a piece
of paper, which does not violate non-direct-contact. The speaker in the device generates a
nearly-inaudible audio signal. The recorder records the reflected signal and the sound of
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the victim’s handwriting via the microphone. Then the attacker gets the device back. Note
that the mobile device is not necessarily a cellphone. Some tiny devices, or even wireless
controlled microphones and speakers can also be used for the attack.
Phase 2 (Training Data Collection): The attacker needs to hire some other people instead
of the victim to collect labeled training data. The training data should include the sound
stream and the number of strokes for each character (e.g., ‘A’-‘Z’) from different people’s
handwriting. We assume that it is easy for the attacker to collect enough training data.
The data are used to train the word classifier. Note that Phase 2 can be executed ahead
of Phase 1. However, to achieve better performance, the attacker can execute Phase 1 first,
and during Phase 2 the attacker can use the same type of pen and material of desk as those
used by the victim in Phase 1. If the attacker knows the approximate relative angle between
the device and the handwriting, the same angle should be followed in this phase.
Phase 3 (Recognition): The stored sound stream is processed by the rest of Writing-
Hacker’s components, and then the attacker gets the estimate for the victim’s handwriting.
If the approximate relative angle between the device and the handwriting is unknown, the
distance between them is larger than 35 cm, or there are other moving objects around the
victim, the component of hand motion tracker should be disabled. Note that phase 2 and
phase 3 are offline phases.
In this work, we take the capital letters ‘A’-‘Z’ as examples to show how WritingHacker
works. However, our technique can be easily applied to other characters.
Next, we introduce the algorithms of the four main components (input detector, hand
motion tracker, dictionary filter and word recognizer) in detail respectively.
4.4 INPUT DETECTION
The method used by the word detector is based on signal processing in time domain.
In the previous chapter, we proposed an input detection method for finger-based writing.
In this chapter, we apply a similar design for pen-based writing, which consists of stroke
detection and letter detection. The definition of stroke in Section 3.4.1 is still applied here.
4.4.1 Letter Clusters
In this chapter, we keep using the three letter clusters defined in Section 3.4.1. Each letter
in cluster Cu has u strokes (u = 1, 2, 3). The concept of clusters helps narrow the word
search range in the dictionary filter and reduce the number of classes in the word classifier.
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We admit that due to people’s different writing habits, for some people it is possible that
some letters should be classified into different clusters. For instance, some people write
letter ‘J’ with one stroke instead of two strokes. Sometimes the stroke order of the same
letter would also vary with people. However, based on our basic assumption that victims’
handwriting is print-style, we observe that people’s print-style writing has limited variety,
and the stroke order of the same letter written by a victim usually does not change. For
instance, while there are two ways to write letter ‘J’, there is usually only one way to write
letter ‘X’. Thus the attacker can adjust the clusters and their corresponding training data
by traversing different print writing styles to find the most reasonable guess for the attack
scenario. Therefore we leave it to our future work to rule out the impact of the stroke
number’s diversity.
4.4.2 Stroke Detection
Similar to TableWrite, we first use a FIR low pass filter to eliminate the signal generated by
the speaker and the signal reflected by the hand. The passband is 4 kHz and the stopband
is 6 kHz. Then, we apply the modified version of CFAR algorithm [78] to combat the
background noise and detect each stroke in the continuous sound stream.
Assume that the noise power follows Gaussian distribution. We denote its average power
and standard deviation at time t by µ(t) and σ(t), and denote the audio signal by a time







|x(k)|2 + (1− 1
W
)µ(t− 1). (4.1)
The standard deviation σ(t) can be calculated similarly.
A potential start point of a stroke is detected if
|x(t)|2 > µ(t) + γ1σ(t), (4.2)
and a potential end point of a stroke is detected if
|x(t)|2 < γ2µ̄, (4.3)
where γ1 and γ2 are two constant parameters that are independent of noise levels. µ̄ is the
average noise power when there is no input. The initial value of µ̄ is measured during the
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very beginning of recording before the first stroke appears. Then we update it by measuring
the average noise power between each two adjacent detected letters.
A stroke is detected if the time interval between the potential start and end point is longer
than a constant threshold Γ1, as shown in Figure 4.2(a). In this way the impact of burst
noise can be avoided. If the time interval between two detected strokes is shorter than Γ
′
1,



























Figure 4.2: Example for input detection.
Impact of multiple turning points: Sometimes a stroke with multiple turning points would
show similar features as a multi-stroke letter. One example is shown in Figure 4.3(a).
According to our definition of a stroke, the letter ‘M’ contains one stroke. Due to the
turning points included in the stroke, it looks like that the single fragment contains three
strokes. However, by comparing its signal with that of the real three-stroke letter ‘A’ in
Figure 4.3(b), it is easy to find that the time interval between each two adjacent “strokes” in
‘M’ is much shorter than that in ‘A’. Thus the threshold Γ
′
1 can help to rule out the impact
of false strokes. In this case, since both the two time intervals in ‘M’ are shorter than Γ
′
1,







































Figure 4.3: Comparison between a multi-turning-point stroke and a multi-stroke letter.
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4.4.3 Letter Detection
After each stroke has been detected, this subcomponent extracts the sound fragment for
each letter. The start point of a letter is declared if it is the first start point of a stroke after
the end point of the previous letter. The end point of a letter is declared if there is no stroke
detected in constant duration Γ2 after the end point of a stroke. Then the end point of this
stroke is the end point of the letter. One example is shown in Figure 4.2(b).
Then the measured sound signal between the start and end point of the letter is output
and stored as a single fragment. The fragments detected will be further processed by the
feature extraction subcomponent. We use sk to denote the number of strokes for the kth
letter in a word with Nletter letters. For example, word “VITAMIN” has Nletter = 7, and
s1 = 1 for letter ‘V’∈ C1. Then {sk|k ∈ [1, Nletter]} is passed to the dictionary filter and the
word classifier, which will help to select proper word clusters and narrow word search range.
The start and end time point for each letter is also sent to the hand motion tracker to help
crop the measurement result for each letter.
4.4.4 Usage of Accelerometer
To combat the impact of near-field noise, we use a technique similar to [79]. When reading
the sound sequence from the recorder, the input detector also reads the measured acceleration
magnitude from the embedded accelerometer. If a possible letter is detected but the average
acceleration in a window Wa around the start point of the letter is lower than a threshold
Γaā, the letter is ignored. Γa is a constant value and ā is the average acceleration when
there is no letter input. The intuition is that, although accelerometers can be impacted by
voices [100, 101, 102], the acceleration signal generated by the shaking table surface during
the writing is stronger than that caused by the noise. Thus, by setting Γa appropriately, we
can distinguish the two signals, and the input detector accordingly only records the sound
generated by handwriting. In this way, the impact of near-field burst noise is partly avoided.
However, frequent burst noise would still lead to the missing of letters and how to rule out
its impact is still an open question. We leave this problem for our future work.
4.5 HAND MOTION TRACKING
In Section 3.5, we have shown that the device-free gesture tracking technique can help
distinguish the written letters. It is also possible that the attacker can recognize the content
of handwriting via the motion trajectory of the victim’s hand. The challenge is that, the
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nature of device-free tracking makes it hard for the device to determine which body part it
is tracking, especially for the attack scenario. Thus, it suffers low accuracy when tracking
the whole trajectory of the victim’s hand. However, during our experiments we find that,
in the short time slot of writing a single letter in a word, the other body parts of the victim
usually do not move a lot. Therefore, the short-term tracking result for a single letter can
still correctly reflect the tiny motion of the victim’s hand and pen, and thus helps to improve
the performance of handwriting recognition.
The LLAP-based hand motion tracking method in Section 3.5 is also applied in Writ-
ingHacker, and we can get a motion fragment for each input letter. However, due to the
weaker reflected signals, LLAP does not work well if the distance between the device and
the handwriting is larger than 35 cm. Also, if there are nearby moving objects around the
victim, the hand motion tracker should be disabled. However, WritingHacker still achieves a
good performance in this case, which will be shown in Section 4.10.1. Moreover, even if the
precise relative angle between the device and the handwriting is unknown, a good accuracy
is still maintained if the angle error is within ±45◦, which will be shown in Section 4.9.7.
4.6 DICTIONARY FILTERING
In WritingHacker, we apply the same dictionary filter as in Section 3.6.1. However, it is
more important for the dictionary database to be scenario-specialized, which is worth further
discussion.
4.6.1 Scenario-Specialized Dictionary Database
It has been shown that the frequency of commonly used words follows Zipf’s law [103],
which implies that we can narrow our word search range to the most commonly used words.
We can further specialize our dictionary database according to the attack scenarios. For
illustration, we obtain the top 5000 most common words in Intensive Care Units (ICUs)
by analyzing the statistical data from the MIMIC II Clinical Database [86], which contains
notes and reports from approximately 32000 ICU patient admissions. As shown in Figure
4.4, the frequency of words still follows Zipf’s law even under such a specialized scenario.
We observe that the ranks of words vary with scenarios. For instance, the frequency of the
word “vitamin” used in ICUs is much higher than that in daily life, which confirms the need
of scenario-specialized databases for the attack purpose.
In WritingHacker, once the attack scenario (e.g., in hospital) is determined, we use the

















































Figure 4.4: Comparison between top-5000 daily words and ICU words. Normalization has
been applied for comparison.
of the nature of our system design, the system performance does not highly depend on the
attack scenario. Instead, the accuracy of word recognizer is related to whether the dictionary
database is constructed properly. If the database is not specialized according to the attack
scenario or its size is too small, it is more likely that the words, written by the victim, are
not covered by the database. However, if the size of the database is too large, the rarely
used words would extend the word search range and thus impact recognition accuracy. We
will evaluate the impact of the database size during our experiments.
4.6.2 Generating Candidate Word List
The component of dictionary filter has access to the scenario-specialized dictionary database
and extracts candidate words according to the number of strokes for each letter in the word.
The strategy has been shown in Section 3.6.1. For example, for the received {s1 = 3, s2 =
2, s3 = 2, s4 = 1, s5 = 3}, the candidate words extracted from the top-5000 daily words
[85] are {“APPLE”, “APPLY”}, one of which is the most possible word that the victim has
written. The candidate word list is then passed to the word recognizer.
4.7 WORD RECOGNITION
The component of word recognizer extracts the features of the sound and motion fragments
for each letter, calculates the offset for each candidate word, and then recognizes the whole
word according to the features, the trained SVMs, the candidate word list, and the offsets.
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4.7.1 Feature Extraction
We use the same features introduced in Section 3.6.2. The features extracted from the
sound fragment of the kth letter in the input word is denoted by Fk, while those extracted
from the motion fragment is denoted by F ′k. Thus, for each input word, the kth letter gk is
labeled by {sk, Fk, F ′k}. Recall that sk ∈ {1, 2, 3} and it has been determined by the input
detector. If the hand motion tracker is disabled, F ′k is removed, which does not impact the
following word recognition.


























Figure 4.5: Average time length for each letter based on the data collected from volunteers.
Besides the extracted features, the various time length of different sound fragments can
also help to distinguish different letters. Figure 4.5 illustrates the average time length for
each letter based on the data from 10 volunteers. It is shown that the letters with more
strokes tend to have longer time length. Moreover, even if two letters have the same stroke
number, they would still have distinctly different time length. For instance, while both ‘E’
and ‘H’ have three strokes, ‘E’ has a longer time length because it contains one more turning
point in the strokes. This motivates us to consider the time length difference among letters.
However, because of people’s various writing speeds, it is unreliable to compare the letter
time length from victims and that from training data providers. Thus, the letter time length
cannot be used as an feature directly. Instead, we compare the time length differences among
the letters written by the victim only. In spite of people’s different writing speeds, these
differences are constant if the victim writes the word at a constant speed. We use these
differences as features, and compare them with those extracted from the training data.
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ALGORITHM 4.1: Letter Time Length based Offsetting
Input: dk, k ∈ [1, Nletter]; D(l), l ∈ L;Γd; W̃m = {g̃mk ∈ L|k ∈ [1, Nletter]}, m ∈ [1,M ];
Output: P̃m, m ∈ [1,M ];
// Define a function
1 Function fd(x, y) is
2 if x− y < −Γd then
3 return −1;





8 P̃m = 0, m ∈ [1,M ]; T testi,j = 0, i, j ∈ [1, Nletter]; Tmi,j = 0, m ∈ [1,M ], i, j ∈ [1, Nletter];
// Calculate time length difference tables for candidate words
9 foreach m ∈ [1,M ] do
10 foreach i, j ∈ [1, Nletter], i < j do





// Calculate time length difference table for test word
12 foreach i, j ∈ [1, Nletter], i < j do
13 T testi,j = fd(di, dj);
// Calculate offset for each candidate word
14 foreach m ∈ [1,M ] do
15 w = 0;
16 foreach i, j ∈ [1, Nletter], i < j do
17 w+ = |Tmi,j − T testi,j |;
18 P̃m = 1− w/[Nletter(Nletter − 1)];













Figure 4.6: An exmple for LTLO.
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The algorithm of LTLO is shown in Algorithm 4.1. We denote the time length of each
input letter by dk, and the average time length of letter l in the training data by D(l), which
has been shown in Figure 4.5. The candidate word list is denoted by {W̃m|m ∈ [1,M ]},
where M is the number of the candidate words. Γd is a constant threshold. During the
implementation we set Γd = 63 ms. We use the example in Figure 4.6 to illustrate the
algorithm. Assume that the input letters have strokes {s1 = 1, s2 = 3, s3 = 3}, and the
candidate words are {“CAN”, “SEA”}. For each candidate word, we calculate a time length
difference table (line 9-11), which denote the supposed time length differences among letters
if the candidate word were the correct answer. One more time length difference table is also
calculated based on the measured time length of each input letter (line 12-13). Then, we
compare the table of the input word with those of the candidate words, i.e., “CAN” and
“SEA”, and calculate the offset P̃m for each candidate word (line 14-18). As shown in Figure
4.6, since ‘A’ and ‘N’ have similar time length, and ‘E’ has a much longer time duration
compared with ‘A’, the tables of “CAN” and “SEA” are different. The result of comparison
shows that the table of “SEA” is more similar to that of the input word, and thus “SEA”
gets a larger offset.
4.7.3 Word Classifier
The function of word classifier consists of letter scoring and word selection. The former
step evaluates the possibility for each detected letter to be a given letter. The latter step
selects the most possible word according to the candidate word list, the offsets, and the
results of letter scoring.
Letter Scoring
The algorithm we use to score the detected letters is based on the multi-class SVM. Since
all letters have been divided into three clusters, we design specialized SVMs for each cluster.
In detail, for the cluster Cu (u = 1, 2, 3), we use a set of SVMs V
u
ij to distinguish the difference
between letter i and j, where i, j ∈ Cu and i < j in alphabetical order.
For each letter l ∈ L = {‘A’, ..., ‘Z’}, we collect a set of training sound fragments. Each set
should contain the data collected from multiple people’s handwriting, as well as the actual
written letters. For each sound fragment, we calculate its audio features as denoted by
Equation (3.10). Thus, we get the feature sets Tl, l ∈ L. Then we train each V uij (u = 1, 2, 3)
with the features Ti and Tj. Note that in this case i, j ∈ Cu ∩ L.
The steps of letter scoring are shown in Algorithm 4.2 (line 2-11). According to the sk of
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each input letter, the feature set {Fk, F ′k} is input to each V
sk
ij , where i, j ∈ Csk and i < j
(line 4). We use pk(l) to indicate the probability for gk to be a given letter l in L. According
to the classification result of V skij , pk(i) or pk(j) is increased (line 5-8). We eliminate the
impact of different cluster sizes in line 9-10. Note that if u 6= sk, p̃k(l) = 0 for all l ∈ Cu. In
line 11, we apply the stroke duration based correction to further improve accuracy.
ALGORITHM 4.2: Word Classification
Input: {sk, Fk, F ′k}, k ∈ [1, Nletter]; P̃m, m ∈ [1,M ]; V uij , i, j ∈ Cu, i < j, u = 1, 2, 3; Cu,
u = 1, 2, 3; W̃m = {g̃mk ∈ L|k ∈ [1, Nletter]}, m ∈ [1,M ];
Output: Ŵ ;
// Initialization
1 pk(l) = 0, l ∈ L, k ∈ [1, Nletter]; Ŵ = ∅;
// Letter Scoring
2 foreach k ∈ [1, Nletter] do
3 foreach i, j ∈ Csk , i < j do
4 Test {Fk, F ′k} with V
sk
ij ;




9 foreach k ∈ [1, Nletter], l ∈ L do
10 p̃k(l) = pk(l)/(size(Csk)− 1);
11 Execute stroke duration based correction;
// Word Selection






14 Ŵ = W̃m̂, where m̂ = arg max
m∈[1,M ]
{Pm + γdNletterP̃m};
15 If ties exist, break ties;
16 return Ŵ ;
Stroke Duration based Correction: Besides the patterns in letters’ various time lengths,
we find that some common patterns are also followed in the stroke level. For instance, the
time durations for some specific strokes are differentiable: the second stroke of ‘Q’ is much
shorter than the other strokes in the two-stroke letters. It is possible to recognize this pattern
without any machine learning algorithm. In our implementation we set a constant threshold
rQ. If the ratio between the time lengths of the first and the second stroke in a two-stroke
letter gk is larger than rQ, we increase the p̃k(‘Q’) by p∆. During the implementation we set
rQ = 3.3 and p∆ = 0.5.
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Word Selection
Because p̃k(l) indicates the degree to which the input gk matches letter l, it helps to select
the best estimate from the candidate word list.
The steps of word selection are also shown in Algorithm 4.2 (line 12-16). Recall that
we denote the candidate word list by {W̃m|m ∈ [1,M ]}, and the length of each candidate
word is equal to that of the input word. Then for each W̃m, we evaluate the probability
for it to be the input word by calculating Pm (line 12-13). Recall that we have calculated
P̃m as the offset based on letter time lengths. Then, we select the one with the highest
Pm + γdNletterP̃m as our final output (line 14), where γd controls the weight of the offset.
During the implementation we set γd = 100.
To break possible ties (line 15), for each candidate word in a tie, we calculate the number




1[g̃mk = arg max
l∈L
p̃k(l)]. (4.4)
Then we output the word with the largest Nm in the tie. If the tie still exists, we output
the candidate word with the highest frequency of use according to the statistical data in the
database.
4.8 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this section, we describe the implementation details of WritingHacker. Except for the
recorder, all components can be implemented either on smartphones or on other mobile
computers controlled by attackers. In our prototype, we implement the recorder and the
input detector on a smartphone, and implement the other components on a laptop.
4.8.1 Implementation of Recorder and Input Detector
We implement the recorder and the input detector on a commercial Android smartphone.
Its model is Galaxy S5 with Android 6.0.1 as its operating system. The smartphone is
equipped with 2.5 GHz CPU and 2 GB RAM.
Even though sometimes there are two built-in microphones on a smartphone, we use only
one of them to ensure that WritingHacker is implementable on most mobile devices such as
smartwatches. The sampling rate of microphone is 48 kHz, and the format of audio data is
PCM 16 bit per sample.
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The working mode of the accelerometer is SENSOR DELAY NORMAL. It has three out-
puts for three directions: ax(t), ay(t) and az(t). We calculate
a(t) =
√
ax(t)2 + ay(t)2 + az(t)2 (4.5)
as the amplitude of acceleration, and set Wa = 1000, Γa = 2.4.
The input detector reads the output of recorder in real time and buffers the sound frag-
ments. The original sound stream is also stored to be further processed by the hand motion
tracker. We set W = 200, γ1 = 16, γ2 = 1, Γ1 = 45 ms, Γ
′
1 = 68 ms, and Γ2 = 227 ms, which
are fine-tuned based on the performance of the input detector on a validation dataset.
4.8.2 Implementation of Hand Motion Tracker, Dictionary Filter and Word Recognizer
We have implemented the hand motion tracker, the dictionary filter and the word rec-
ognizer on a laptop (Thinkpad T430) using Java and Matlab script. The recorded sound
stream and the output of input detector are transmitted to the laptop once the attacker has
regained the smartphone.
For the dictionary filter, we implement three separate dictionary databases according to
different attack scenarios. For the scenario of daily life, we use the top-2000 and top-5000
commonly used word lists available in [85]. For clinic scenario, we extract all the words in
the MIMIC II Clinical Database [86], and then use the top-9000 words as our database. For
the word recognizer, we use the API of Spider [104] on Matlab to realize SVM. The features
of sound and motion fragments are calculated by Java.
4.9 MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our prototype system by conducting ex-
periments on our testbed in a controlled environment. We set our test environment in one
laboratory, where the near-field noise is low and there is no nearby moving object. The
range of characters is ‘A’-‘Z’. Twenty two volunteers #1-22 are recruited in a university
department. Eleven of them (#1,3,5,7,...,21) are male and eleven of them (#2,4,6,8,...,22)
are female. For the experiments in Section 4.9.2-4.9.4, we collect the training data set for
the word classifier from two volunteers #1,2. Each volunteer writes each character in print
style for 10 times. Thus, for each character the size of training data is 20. Except in Section
4.9.6, we use the same type of ballpoint pens (0.5 mm) during the tests. We will evaluate the
impacts of different pen sizes in Section 4.9.6. The handwriting is on a paper with standard
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A4 size (210 mm ×297 mm) on a wooden desk. We place the smartphone on the same
desk. Except in Section 4.9.6, the distance between the smartphone and the handwriting is
around 20-30 cm. The relative angle between them is roughly fixed during the tests. We
will measure the impacts of relative angle changes in Section 4.9.7. We train SVMs in the
character spaces of C1 - C3, respectively. The volunteers (#1-22) in the following tests are
required to follow the same letter clusters (C1 - C3). However, before the test they were not
aware that their data are used for testing an eavesdropping system.
4.9.1 Performance of Input Detector
In this subsection we evaluate the performance of input detector. Ten volunteers #3-
12 write characters ‘A’-‘Z’ repeatedly on the paper. Each volunteer repeats writing each
letter by 40 times. The other settings are the same as those in the training phase. To
compare the intercepted sound fragments with the original sound sequences, the recorder
is configured to store the original sound sequence in the smartphone’s storage. The total
number of the written characters is 10400. According to our results of the comparison
between the intercepted sound fragments and the actual sound sequences, the accuracy of
letter detection is 95.73%. The false positive rate is 2.80%, while the false negative rate is
1.47%.
The main cause of false positive is the near-field burst noise during the experiment. Even
though we have used the accelerometer to reduce its impact, the false positive still exists if
the near-field burst noise happens frequently. We find that if the user is knocking on the
desk while the near-field noise happens at the same time, the input detector would consider
it as the start point of a letter because the output of the accelerometer exceeds the threshold
Γaā and the duration of noise exceeds Γ1.
The cause of false negative is that sometimes the sound of the volunteers’ handwriting
is so weak that the input detector does not detect the start point. One simple solution is
making γ1 smaller. However, this would lead to a higher false positive rate. The parameter
γ1 controls the trade-off between the false positive rate and the false negative rate.
4.9.2 Performance of Normal SVM
Before we evaluate the accuracy of word recognizer, we first prove that applying the
normal SVM technique to our attack scenario directly can only achieve low accuracy. In this
subsection we evaluate the case where only normal SVM is applied to our system. To rule
out the benefits of letter clustering and dictionary filtering, all the letters are considered as
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in the same cluster, and we evaluate the accuracy of letter recognition only. The component
of hand motion tracking and LTLO are disabled, and thus the hand motion based features
are not used. Besides the features in Equation (3.10), the feature extraction also takes the
number of strokes as a normal feature for a single letter.
We firstly consider the common case where the attacker has no access to the labeled
training data from the victim. After the system has been trained with the training data
set from the two volunteers #1,2, we use the smartphone to record the handwriting of ten
other volunteers #13-22. During the test the three volunteers use a different wooden desk
from that used during the training stage. The range of characters is ‘A’-‘Z’. The volunteers
write each character in print style 20 times. The other settings are the same as those in the
training stage.
To show the impacts of the unavailability of victims’ training data and the changing
writing locations, we also consider the case where the labeled training data from the victim
are available. In the training stage, we collect the training data from the ten volunteers
#13-22 individually. Each letter in ‘A’-‘Z’ is repeated 20 times. During the training, the
locations of smartphone and handwriting are fixed. In the test stage we design two test
cases. In both cases, each volunteer writes letter ‘A’-‘Z’ 20 times. However, in Case 1, the
handwriting locations are randomly distributed within 30 cm from the smartphone on a
different desk. In Case 2, the handwriting is at exactly the same location on the same desk
as that in the training stage.
Training data from victims unavailable with different writing locations


















Training data from victims available with different writing locations (Case 1)
Training data from victims available with same writing locations (Case 2)
Figure 4.7: Accuracy of recognition for letters ‘A’-‘Z’ using SVM only.
We calculate the average accuracy of letter recognition for all cases. The results are shown
in Figure 4.7. When the training data from the victims are unavailable, the average accuracy
is 21.58%. The average accuracies for Case 1 and Case 2 are 39.58% and 67.33%, respectively.
In Case 2, since the writing locations are fixed on the same desk, the multi-path effect in
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handwriting sounds’ propagation is eliminated, which leads to the relatively high accuracy.
In Case 1, even if the training data from the victims are still available, the change of writing
surfaces and locations causes the mismatch between the training data and the test data.
Although we have avoided using the amplitude-related features during feature extraction,
the multi-path effect impacts the other features such as bandwidth and pitch frequency.
Since attackers can hardly detect the accurate writing locations of victims, it is hard to rule
out this negative effect.
It is obvious that when the labeled data from victims are not available, the average
accuracy drops significantly. Since the training and test data are collected from different
people, victims’ various writing habits and changing writing locations lead to this drop.
Even if the word-level semantic analysis can be applied to exclude some obviously-wrong
letter recognition results, it is still hard to hit the real written word because of this low
letter recognition accuracy. Thus we prove that using normal SVM technique only cannot
achieve our design goals, and it is necessary to apply our newly designed methods.
4.9.3 Performance of Word Recognizer
In this subsection we evaluate the accuracy of the final output of WritingHacker. We
continue to use the training data collected from the two volunteers #1,2. For the dictionary
database, we use three different sets of words: top-2000 commonly used daily words, top-
5000 commonly used daily words, and top-9000 commonly used medicine-related words from
the MIMIC II Clinic database.
We repeat the test for each individual database. In each test, each of our 20 volunteers #3-
22 writes 1000 words selected from the database. For each word in the database, we assign
its frequency of appearance as its weight. To select a word for test, we randomly select a
word from the weighted database, i.e, the probability for a word to be selected is equal to
its appearance frequency divided by the sum of all the frequency values in the database.
Following this rule, during each test we collect 20000 samples. The results are shown in
Figure 4.8. The error bars show the second highest and the second lowest accuracy among
the 20 test results of the 20 volunteers. We also repeat the tests for the case that words
are selected from the databases following uniform distribution. Furthermore, we collect 20
training data for each letter from each volunteer in #3-22, and evaluated the accuracy when
the training data from victims are available. The selection of test words in this case also
follows uniform distribution. The results are also included in Figure 4.8.
The results of experiments show that, under the condition of print-style writing, low near-

































Figure 4.8: Accuracy of recognition for different databases.
accuracy of 55%-71% for the frequency-based word selection, and 69%-87% for the uniform
word selection. Moreover, the results for the medicine-related words confirm that Writing-
Hacker can work well in specific attack scenarios such as clinics or hospitals. It can also
be seen that the accuracy achieved when we apply frequency-based word selection is lower
than that when words are uniformly selected. The reason is that the words used at a higher
frequency are usually shorter, which enlarges the average size of candidate word lists in the
case of frequency-based word selection and thus reduces the average accuracy. Usually, a
victim only writes a few words in a privacy-related form, and the short function words such
as ‘the’ are often omitted. Thus in the real case a higher accuracy should be achieved,
which is confirmed by the test result that the recognition accuracy for the MIMIC II Clinic
Database is higher than that for the daily words.
The system achieves high accuracy when the training data from the victim are available,
which implies the possibility for a new input method. We discuss this in the next section.
4.9.4 Contribution of Different Components
To better understand the contribution of the dictionary filter, the word classifier, LTLO
and the hand motion tracker, we analyze the change of the recognition accuracy when
different components or subcomponents are disabled. In Case 1, we use dictionary filter only
and the final recognition result is selected from the candidate word list uniform-randomly,
which rules out the contribution of hand motion tracker and the word recognizer. In Case 2,
the multi-class SVMs are also applied, and only the features extracted from sound fragments
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are used. In Case 3, LTLO is also applied. In Case 4, the features extracted from motion
fragments are further used. The same data from the previous test are used, and we consider
both the frequency-based word selection and the uniform word selection. The results are
shown in Figure 4.9(a) and 4.9(b).
Dictionary filter only (Case 1)
Dictionary filter + SVM (Case 2)
Dictionary filter + SVM + offsetting (Case 3)

























































Figure 4.9: Accuracy of recognition when different components and subcomponents are used.
The results of Case 1 show that, since the dictionary filter narrows the space of candidate
words, over 38% of written words can be correctly recognized even without any machine
learning method. The results of Case 2, 3 and 4 show the improvement made by the multi-
class SVMs, LTLO and the hand motion tracker, successively. Therefore, the contribution
made by each of our methods is confirmed.
During the previous tests we assume that the words for test are included in the dictionary
database. In the real case, it is possible that the written word does not hit the database.
Although Zipf’s law ensures that the hit rate would be high enough if the size of database
is sufficiently large, we still design a test to evaluate the impact of the dictionary database’s
size in the following subsection.
4.9.5 Impacts of Dictionary Database Size
The size of the dictionary database controls the trade-off between the hit rate and the
recognition accuracy under the condition that the word has hit the database. A larger
database size implies that the word written by the victim is covered by the database with
higher probability. However, this increases the space of candidate words for word recognizer
and thus would reduce the accuracy even if the word has hit the database. On the other
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hand, if the database is too small, it is highly probable that the word written by the victim
does not exist in the database, which leads to the failure of recognition directly. Fortunately,
since the frequency distribution of commonly used words follows Zipf’s law, it is possible for
attackers to maintain a relatively small database while achieving an acceptable accuracy.
To evaluate the impact of dictionary database size, we use the top-9000 commonly used
medicine-related words as a baseline database, and change the size of the dictionary database
from top 1000 to 9000 with step 500. Similar to the previous tests, we assign the frequency
of appearance as a word’s weight in the baseline database. The words for test are randomly
selected from the weighted baseline database, where the probability for a word to be selected
is proportional to its appearance frequency. If the selected word is not covered by the
dictionary database, the recognition for this word fails. Otherwise, it is recognized with the
dictionary database. We collect training data from volunteers #13,14 following the same
method used in the previous tests, and collect 10000 test samples from volunteers #3-12 for
each size of the dictionary database.
Figure 4.10 shows the average accuracy when the size of dictionary database varies. We
also draw the theoretical hit rate as well as the recognition accuracy when only the dictionary
filter is used, i.e., the output is uniform-randomly selected from the candidate word list.
When the size of the dictionary database is much smaller than that of the baseline database,
the enlargement of database size significantly increases the hit rate, and thus improves
recognition accuracy. However, when the database’s size is large enough, because of the
Zipf’s distribution of word usage, the growth rate of the hit rate is much lower. Meanwhile,
the increased database size enlarges the candidate word lists, which in turn reduces the
recognition accuracy. This effect can be clearly observed in the case where only the dictionary
filter is used: the accuracy drops when the database size is larger than 7500 - 8000. The
usage of SVM, LTLO and hand motion tracker slows this drop. However, the slow-increasing
hit rate makes the average recognition accuracy no longer increase significantly.
These results imply that it is unnecessary for the attacker to collect all the possible words
for the specialized attack scenario. When the size of the dictionary database has been large
enough, collecting more rarely used words does not help a lot. These results also confirm that
even though our previous experiment uses subsets of English words only, the experiment still
reflects the performance of WritingHacker in the real-word case because the top commonly
used words have been covered by the dictionary databases.
51
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000





























Word recognition with dictionary filter only
Theoretical hit rate
0.75
Figure 4.10: Accuracy of recognition when
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Wooden desk (0.5mm pen)
Plastic desk (0.5mm pen)
Wooden desk (1.0mm pen)
Plastic desk (1.0mm pen)
Figure 4.11: Average accuracy of recognition
when distance, desk material and pen size
change.
4.9.6 Impacts of Distance, Surface Material and Pen Size
One common concern about our attack method is the impact of the distance between the
attacker’s device and the victim’s handwriting. To avoid being noticed by the victim, it is
possible that the attacker can only deploy the device such as the smartphone far away from
the victim. The hand motion tracker does not work well in this case due to weak reflected
signals. In this subsection we prove that WritingHacker still maintains a good performance
even for a much longer distance between the device and the handwriting. Moreover, we also
evaluate the performance of WritingHacker when a different pen size (1.0 mm) is used.
During the test we change the distance between the smartphone and the volunteer’ hand-
writing from 40 cm to 200 cm with step 40 cm. Since the hand motion tracker does not work
well when the distance is larger than 35 cm, the hand motion tracker is disabled. For each
test ten volunteers #13-22 write 1000 words which are randomly and uniformly selected from
the top-2000 commonly used daily words. The training data come from volunteers #3,4,
which are collected following the same method used in the previous tests. We repeat the
test on two desks with different materials: wood and plastics. To evaluate the impacts of
different pen sizes, we also require that the volunteers use 1.0 mm ballpoint pens and repeat
the training and tests.
The experimental results in Figure 4.11 show that, although the accuracy drops slightly
due to the disabled hand motion tracker, WritingHacker still keeps a recognition accuracy
higher than 61% in all the cases even from 200 cm away. Moreover, within the range of
40-200 cm, the accuracy only decreases slightly. This is caused by the truth that acoustic
waves propagating along surfaces follow a lower attenuation rate, and thus the handwriting
signals received by the smartphone through the desks are still identifiable. The comparable
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Figure 4.12: Average accuracy of recognition






























Frequency−based selection Victim’s training data available
Figure 4.13: Accuracy of recognition for
lowercase letters.
results for the wooden/plastic desks and the 0.5 mm/1.0 mm pens imply that it is possible for
WritingHacker to maintain performance on different types of surface materials and different
pen sizes.
4.9.7 Impacts of Relative Angle Changes
In the previous experiments, the relative angle between the device and the handwriting is
roughly fixed during training and tests. In this subsection, we relax this requirement, and
evaluate WritingHacker’s performance when the relative angle during tests is different from
that during training.
During the tests, we change the relative angle from −90◦ to 90◦ with the interval of 22.5◦,
where 0◦ means that the relative angle is the same as that during training. The distance
between the device and the handwriting is still around 20-30 cm. For each angle, each of the
volunteers #3-12 writes 100 words that are uniformly selected from the top-2000 commonly
used daily words. The training data are the same with those used in Section 4.9.5.
We calculate the average word recognition accuracy for each pair of symmetric angles,
and the results are shown in Figure 4.12. When the angle difference is within ±45◦, the
performance of WritingHacker is barely impacted. When the angle difference is larger than
±67.5◦, the angle error cancels the contribution of the hand motion tracker, which should be
disabled in this case. Therefore, even if the precise relative angle is unknown to the attacker,
as long as the difference between the true angle and the attacker’s estimated angle is within
±45◦, the accuracy is not obviously impacted.
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4.9.8 Performance for Lowercase Letters
The previous experiments are conducted with capital letters. In this subsection, we eval-
uate the performance of WritingHacker with lowercase letters, which are divided into two
clusters:
C1={‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘e’, ‘g’, ‘h’, ‘l’, ‘m’, ‘n’, ‘o’, ‘q’, ‘r’, ‘s’, ‘u’, ‘v’, ‘w’, ‘y’, ‘z’},
C2 = {‘d’, ‘f’, ‘i’, ‘j’, ‘k’, ‘p’, ‘t’, ‘x’}.
We collect new training data from volunteers #5,6 and test data from volunteers #13-22,
following the same method in Section 4.9.3. The results are shown in Figure 4.13.
The results show that, the accuracy is 50%-68% for the frequency-based word selection,
and 72%-77% for the uniform word selection. Therefore, it is shown that WritingHacker
still maintains a good performance for lowercase letters. The slight decrease in accuracy is
caused by the truth that, the stroke number diversity of lowercase letters is lower than that
of capital letters, which increases the candidate word search range.
4.10 DISCUSSION
4.10.1 Impacts of Nearby Moving Objects and Unknown Relative Position
To use the hand motion tracker, the approximate relative angle between the device and
the handwriting should be known to the attacker, and the distance between them should
be shorter than 35 cm. Otherwise, the hand motion tracker does not benefit the system
performance. If there are other moving objects around the victim during the attack, the
motion tracking accuracy would also be impacted. In these case, the hand motion tracker
should be disabled. However, the results of Case 3 in Figure 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) show that,
even if we do not use the hand motion tracker, WritingHacker can still achieve the accuracy
around 60% and 70% for different word selection methods. Therefore, WritingHacker can
still maintain a good accuracy even if there are nearby moving objects and the relative
position between the device and the handwriting is unknown.
4.10.2 Possible Ways to Improve Accuracy
In our work we propose a general attack method for unspecified writing scenarios. There
are still several possible ways to further improve the performance of our method by taking
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the writing constraints into account. For instance, WritingHacker can provide a list of
candidates (such as second/third-most-probable words) for each recognized word to help
human observation. If a word from the handwriting on the form “Medical History” is
recognized as “ANYWAY”, and the second-most-probable word is “ANEMIA”, it is easy for
the attacker to correct the result by using the second candidate word.
Currently, we mainly focus on the word-level handwriting recognition, because people often
write separate words instead of sentences when filling out forms. However, the sentence-level
recognition is still applicable in the scenarios where victims write whole sentences. Attackers
can further correct the recognized results based on sentence-level semantic laws and human
observation. The candidate words can also help in this case.
4.10.3 Defending Against Attack
To defend against the eavesdropping attack proposed in this chapter, a potential victim
should check the desk for suspicious devices such as smartphones or detectaphones. Writing
in a noisy environment can significantly increase the difficulty of eavesdropping. However, it
is still possible to segregate the sound of handwriting by using multiple microphones [87]. If
possible, the potential victim should also avoid print-style writing and use joined-up writing,
which invalidates the stroke detector.
Contrary to intuition, writing on a stack of paper is not an effective way to resist the
eavesdropping attack. With the same experiment setting as in Section 4.9.3, we require
the volunteers to write on a paper stack of 3 cm in thickness, and the words for test are
uniform-randomly selected from the top-2000 commonly used daily words. The audio signals
received by the microphone are still strong enough, and the recognition accuracy achieves
73%. This is because the attenuation rate of audio signals in solid media is low, and even
the 3 cm paper stack can hardly block the signals.
4.10.4 Limitations of WritingHacker
As shown by the experiment settings, currently WritingHacker only works under controlled
environments. We focus on the circumstance where victims follow certain print-style writing,
and the near-field noise is low. In our evaluation, we collect data from 22 volunteers, which
seems to be a relatively small subject population, because a larger subject population would
lead to a greater diversity of writing habits. Thus, WritingHacker is still a proof-of-concept
system. However, WritingHacker has revealed the danger of a new audio-based attack on
handwriting, which is the main purpose of our work. It is our future work to design a fully
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functional system and conduct experiments with a larger group of subjects.
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Figure 4.14: Relationship between the available handwriting information and the handwrit-
ing recognition accuracy.
While TableWrite and WritingHacker are designed for different scenarios, they focus on
similar signal sources and thus share some common designs. Regardless of the difference
between the pen and the finger writing, TableWrite and WritingHacker together show how
the handwriting recognition rate shifts with the various information known to the system.
As illustrated in Figure 4.14, a higher recognition accuracy can be achieved when more
information about the handwriting is available. WritingHacker focuses on the case where no
training data are available from the victim. By recognizing the stroke number and utilizing
the dictionary knowledge, we can achieve an accuracy around 50%. When more information
such as other people’s training data and hand tracking results are available, the recognition
rate keeps increasing and can reach 70%. TableWrite considers the case where the training
data can be directly collected from the user. The accuracy can be higher than 90% if the
hand motion tracker is also trained by the user. Thus, Figure 4.14 illustrates the amount of
information needed to restore the handwriting content.
On the other hand, the different application and attack scenarios make the designs of
TableWrite and WritingHacker differ. Working as an input method, TableWrite can be fully
configured by users. Users can control the writing settings such as the dictionary used, and
the relative position between the device and the writing hand. Compared with TableWrite,
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WritingHacker needs to handle more complex situations because the attacker has no control
on the victim. For example, depending on different writing scenarios, we need to consider the
impacts of different dictionary types and sizes. Since the user’s writing position is previously
unknown, we also consider in which situation the hand motion tracker should be disabled.
Due to the lack of the victim’s training data, the word recognition rate drops, and we design
LTLO to improve the accuracy. These designs are not effective if applied to TableWrite,
where users have already controlled the unknown factors.
4.12 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we present WritingHacker, a prototype system which explores the possi-
bility of audio-based eavesdropping on handwriting via mobile devices. Based on the letter
clustering, we design the components of input detector, hand motion tracker, dictionary
filter and word recognizer, which enable mobile devices to record and recognize victims’
handwriting. WritingHacker makes it possible for an attacker to violate a victim’s privacy
by keeping a mobile device (e.g., a smartphone) touching the desk being used by the victim.
The experimental results show that, under certain conditions, the accuracy of word recog-
nition reaches around 70% - 80%, which reveals the danger of privacy leakage through the
sound of handwriting.
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CHAPTER 5: SHOESLOC: IN-SHOE FORCE SENSOR-BASED INDOOR
WALKING PATH TRACKING
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the rapid evolution of mobile sensing technology has triggered the rise of
smart shoes [22, 21, 58], the devices that can measure the motion of users’ feet and analyze
their activities. One typical design of smart shoes is based on force or piezoelectric sensors.
For instance, Nike+ sensors [59] are used to count the steps of runners, and Stridalyzer [22]
is a typical force mapping system that helps analyze the gaits of users. In this chapter, we
further explore the capability of in-shoe force sensors, and prove that it is possible to track
the walking paths of users in indoor spaces based on force changes in shoes.
Indoor tracking and localization have been popular research areas. Most of the previous
approaches are based on wireless anchors [34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. For instance,
Wi-Fi access points generate specific signal strength distributions in indoor space, and mobile
devices such as cellphones measure the signal strength to locate themselves [44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49]. However, the anchors need to be pre-installed, and site surveys are usually necessary,
which lead to extra cost. In some large-scale indoor spaces such as shopping malls and
airports, the number of Wi-Fi access points that cover each location is often limited, because
they are deployed to provide network access instead of localization service [105]. Moreover,
in many cases such as power outage, the anchors do not work. To solve these problems,
some previous works proposed inertial sensor-based methods [50, 6, 51]. The accelerometers,
gyroscopes and compasses in cellphones or Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) are used to
measure the motion of users and thus estimate the walking paths. However, the electronic
compasses can be interfered by magnetic field changes [52, 53, 54], especially for the scenarios
where the magnetic field changes significantly [55, 56], such as in manufacturing plants [57].
In contrast with the previous approaches, if we use force sensors alone to locate users, the
cost of the anchor installation and site survey can be eliminated. Moreover, the in-shoe force
sensors are hardly interfered by magnetic field changes.
In this chapter, we present ShoesLoc, an indoor walking path tracking method which is
based on in-shoe force sensors. The main idea is that, based on the signals from the force
sensors deployed in insoles, we estimate the walking direction change and the stride length
of each step made by the user. We then combine this information with the constraint of
barriers on floor maps to determine the walking path and the current position of the user.
The main challenge is that, without the compass, the walking direction of the user is
unknown, which makes it hard to track the walking trajectory. To solve this problem,
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ShoesLoc estimates the relative angle change of the walking direction instead. We extract
features from the force signals, and train a Support Vector Machine (SVM) regression model
to estimate the direction change made by each step of the user. Then, by accumulating the
direction changes of the steps, we can track the change of the user’s heading direction. The
stride length of each step can also be estimated in a similar way. To further determine the
absolute walking path of the user, we apply a particle filter to utilize the constraint of the
barriers on floor maps. The wrong walking trajectories that go across barriers such as walls
are eliminated in this way.
Moreover, based on the observation that a long straight walking trajectory must be parallel
to one of the straight hallways on the map, we propose the direction correction algorithm to
improve the performance of the particle filter, which reduces the cumulative direction error
and the computation time. Furthermore, to handle the common case that carrying handbags
or backpacks changes the force distribution in shoes, we propose the weight normalization
method to normalize the force data, and thus reduce the impact of carrying bags.
The main contributions of our work are:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore the possibility of using in-shoe
force sensors to track the walking paths of users, which has low deployment cost and
is resistant to magnetic field changes.
• To address the major challenge of estimating walking trajectories without inertial
sensors, we design the direction change and stride length estimation methods based on
force signals, and apply the particle filter to determine walking paths.
• We propose the direction correction algorithm to further improve the performance of
the particle filter. We also propose the weight normalization method to handle the
impact of handbags and backpacks.
• We implement a prototype system and conduct extensive evaluations. Experimental
results show that ShoesLoc can achieve the average location error of 0.9-1.3 m.
Besides being used as a new user tracking technique for smart shoes, ShoesLoc is also
specifically effective for the scenarios where the anchors for localization are not available
or the magnetic interference is non-negligible, such as in power outages or in the radiology
departments of hospitals.
We organize the rest of this chapter as follows. After introducing the related work in
Section 5.2, we present an overview of ShoesLoc’s framework in Section 5.3. Then, we
successively introduce the methodologies and algorithms used by the system components
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in Section 5.4-5.7. In Section 5.8 and 5.9, we evaluate the performance of ShoesLoc with
comprehensive experiments. We have further discussion in Section 5.10, and conclude this
chapter in Section 5.11.
5.2 RELATED WORK
Indoor localization and tracking: The research on indoor user tracking is tightly related
to the indoor localization technology, and they have similar technical foundations. Multi-
ple technologies have been applied in the field of indoor localization. For instance, there
are systems based on radio frequency identification [106, 107], ultra-wideband transmission
[34, 35], Bluetooth [36, 37], ultrasonic [38, 39] and video signals [108]. However, these meth-
ods require the installation of anchors in indoor spaces to communicate with users’ devices
or generate specific signal distributions. Therefore, they do not work in the regions where
no anchors are deployed. The Wi-Fi received signal strength (RSS)-based localization tech-
nology solves this problem by using the widely installed Wi-Fi access points as the anchors
[44, 45, 46, 109]. However, there are cases where the access points are out of power or do
not work, such as in power outages. Moreover, a site survey is usually needed to learn the
RSS distribution on the whole floor, which leads to extra cost.
Compared with the indoor localization methods, the indoor tracking methods [40, 41, 42,
43] usually achieve a higher location accuracy because they can make better use of histor-
ical localization results by further applying techniques such as Kalman filters [47, 48, 49].
However, with the same fundamentals as the indoor localization technology, the previous in-
door tracking approaches suffer the same aforementioned problems. On the other hand, the
surveillance camera-based indoor tracking methods [110, 111] require the installation of cam-
eras, which are usually even more expensive than wireless anchors. Some other approaches
[112, 113] use cellphone cameras instead to provide indoor navigation services. However, the
use of cellphone cameras is energy-expensive and would also cause privacy issues.
In our work, ShoesLoc can work in a larger range of application scenarios because it uses
the force sensors in users’ shoes and does not require extra anchors or cameras. Moreover,
except the floor map, ShoesLoc does not require any site survey or wireless signal measure-
ments, which reduces the cost of the system setting up.
Motion sensor-based walking tracking: To eliminate the need of anchors, some previous
works proposed to use the inertial and magnetic sensors to measure the motion of users,
and thus track the walking trajectories. For instance, in [6], Zee used the motion sensors in
cellphones to estimate the walking direction and count the steps of users, which can be used
to recognize the walking paths if the floor map is available. In [51], based on the inertial
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sensors in cellphones, the algorithms for step detection, heading direction detection and step
length estimation are also proposed to construct the walking paths of users.
However, the accuracy of these approaches is usually impacted by the position or the
orientation of the phone carried by the user, which makes them impractical for real-life use
[7]. Some other previous works instead utilize the foot-mounted IMUs. For instance, in
[63], IMUs are used to measure the motion of users’ feet, based on which the system can
provide absolute positioning. In [61, 62], sensor tags are embedded into shoes, which can
perceive the user’s moving trace. However, the IMU-based approaches are usually vulnerable
to magnetic interference, because the electronic compasses can be impacted by magnetic
changes [52, 53, 54]. For example, in [6] it is shown that, the presence of magnetic materials
such as metal in buildings can disturb a compass’s perception of North, and the direction
error of compasses in an office building can be as high as 30◦. Thus, these approaches are
not applicable for the regions where the magnetic field changes significantly [57, 55, 56]. In
contrast, in ShoesLoc we use force sensors, which are resistant to most environment changes.
Therefore, compared with the IMU-based approaches, ShoesLoc can work in more diverse
scenarios.
To improve the localization accuracy, many previous motion sensor-based works applied
the particle filters [6, 63, 7], which help eliminate the invalid trajectories that go across
barriers in maps. However, the particle filters were applied based on the condition that the
absolute walking direction can be measured by the sensors. Since the force sensors cannot
provide the accurate walking direction, the classic particle filters do not work well because the
lower accuracy of the estimated heading direction makes valid particles dropped easily, which
causes huge computation burden. To solve this problem, we improve the particle filter by
designing the direction correction algorithm, which can correct the walking direction based
on the map information and further reduce the computation time.
Force sensor-based walking tracking: Some previous works also considered the usage of in-
shoe force sensors. However, most of them only use force sensors to count steps or analyze
the gaits of users [114, 115]. In [116], the force sensors are used to count the steps made
by the user, and thus help the inertial and magnetic sensors to track the gait states. Some
commercial products such as the ReTiSense Stridalyzer [22] use force sensors to generate
the force maps in shoes, which help doctors analyze the walking patterns of users. To the




In this section, we first show our basic assumptions, and then give an overview of the
sensor deployment and the system architecture of our tracking method.
5.3.1 Basic Assumptions
The design of ShoesLoc is based on the assumption that the floor plan of the walking region
is available to the user’s device. We consider this assumption reasonable, because there are
multiple possible sources of floor plans, such building management offices and Google Maps.
We also assume that the structure of the floor plan is not completely centrosymmetric.
Otherwise, there are always at least two possible positions for the user. We could utilize the
landmarks on the floor plan to weaken this assumption, which will be discussed in Section
5.10.1.
We assume that the smart shoes are equipped with a sufficient number of force sensors,
as will be shown in Section 5.3.2. In our design, we focus on the walking speed of 1 - 3 m/s.
A lower walking speed could blur the difference between straight and turning steps, and a
higher walking speed usually means that the user is running, which is uncommon in indoor
spaces and is also out of our scope.
5.3.2 Sensor Deployment
Ideally, to monitor the force change on the whole insole, we should deploy a mass of force
sensors to cover each point on the insole. However, because of the cost restriction, most of
the commercial smart shoes and foot force mapping systems deploy only a limited number
of force sensors for each insole. One typical deployment is shown in Figure 5.1. For each
insole, five force sensing resistors are deployed at the positions of inside metatarsals, outside
metatarsals, outside midfoot, arch, and heel.
In our work, we use the ReTiSense Stridalyzer insoles [22] to measure the force changes at
the aforementioned five positions. We assign indices i = 1, ..., 5 to the five sensors on each
insole. When the user is walking, each sensor keeps measuring the force with the sampling
rate of 15 Hz. Therefore, the inputs for our system are 10 discrete time series, denoted by
{uli(t), uri (t)|i = 1, ..., 5, t ≥ 0}, where uli(t) is the data sequence received from sensor i in





discrete time series, we write them as continuous time series for convenience, which does not
impact our following analysis. We will show that it is possible to further relax the sensor
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Figure 5.1: Force sensor deployment for each insole.
5.3.3 System Architecture
As shown in Figure 5.2, our system mainly consists of the following components.







Feature Extraction Angle Regression
Stride Length Estimator














Figure 5.2: System architecture of ShoesLoc.
Data preprocessor: This component receives the raw data {uli(t), uri (t)|i = 1, ..., 5, t ≥ 0}
from the force sensors, and then prepares the data for analysis. It first segments the data
for each step made by the left or the right foot, and then adjusts the amplitude of the data
to reduce the impact of the changing weight of the user. The outputs are the step segments
from the left and the right insoles. Each step segment contains the force sequence from each
sensor in each shoe for each step made by the user.
Direction change estimator: This component estimates the direction change made by each
left or right step. For the step segments of each step, it first extracts a set of features, and
then calculates the angle change based on SVM. Note that the output is the relative angle
change made by each step instead of the user’s absolute walking direction.
Stride length estimator: To handle the impact of the changing walking speed, this com-
ponent tracks the change of the stride length based on the step segments. Similar to the
direction change estimator, it roughly estimates the stride length of each step based on SVM.
Walking path recognizer: This component determines the walking path with an improved
particle filter. The inputs are the angle change sequence and the stride length sequence, as
well as the map of the walking region. To handle the issue of high cumulative errors, we
further design the direction correction algorithm to better utilize the map information.
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Before the system can be used, a user needs to provide training data to train the compo-
nents during the offline stage. The training format will be shown in Section 5.5.3 and 5.6.3.
During the online stage, our method can track the position of the user after a convergence
phase.
Next, we introduce the algorithms of these components in detail, respectively.
5.4 DATA PREPROCESSOR
The key design point of this component is to crop the force data sequences for each step,
and further process the data to remove the effect of the changing body weight caused by
carrying backpacks or handbags.
5.4.1 Step Segmentation
We process {uli(t)|i = 1, ..., 5} and {uri (t)|i = 1, ..., 5}, respectively. To accurately detect










i (t). One example is shown by the last subgraph
in Figure 5.3. A naive method is finding the peaks in the signal sequence and each peak
denotes one step. However, due to the various walking state, sometimes two peaks appear
for each step (e.g., peak 1 and 2 in Figure 5.3), which is especially the case when the user is
walking at a low speed.
Inspired by the fact that the force made by a foot tends to be 0 when the foot has left
the ground, we segment steps by detecting the low values of force data. Take the data from
the left shoe as an example, a potential start point of a step is detected if ul(t) ≥ γ1, and
a potential end point of the step is detected if ul(t) < γ1, where γ1 is a constant parameter
and should be much smaller than the body weight of the user. In our implementation, we
set γ1 = 10 kg. To avoid the impact of the small noise peaks that are higher than γ1, a step
is detected only if the max force value between its potential start and end point is higher
than a constant threshold γ2. Clearly, γ2 controls the robustness to the noise peaks, and we
set γ2 = 20 kg. If the max force value is lower than γ2, we discard this potential step. One
discarded potential step is shown in Figure 5.3. For each step, we crop the uli(t) (or u
r
i (t))
between its start and end point, and denote the step segments by sli,k(τ) (or s
r
i,k(τ)), where
i = 1, ..., 5, and k = 1, 2, ... is the index for each left (or right) step. τ denotes the time since
the start point of the step, i.e., τ = 0 at the beginning of the step segment. One example of
the step segments for a single left step is labeled by five red boxes in Figure 5.3.
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Walk straight Turnright Walk straight
Figure 5.3: Data from the sensors while the user is walking. The data of the right foot
between the two dashed straight lines show the force changes during a right turn.
5.4.2 Weight Normalization
It is common that people would carry handbags or backpacks when they are walking,
which changes body barycenters and thus changes the amplitude and distribution of the
force on the sensors. To address this issue, we design a method to normalize the force data
from each sensor during the online stage.
Note that it is invalid to normalize the force segments by simply dividing the signals by
their maximum or average values, because the force distribution is not proportional to the
user’s weight. Since we mainly focus on the amplitude changes of the force peaks in the step
segments, we normalize the peak amplitudes only.
During the offline stage, the user is required to provide training data to train the direc-
tion change estimator and the stride length estimator, which will be introduced in Section
5.5.3 and 5.6.3. We further show that the training data can also provide information for
normalization. We denote the cropped step segments in the whole training data by s̃li,k(τ)
and s̃ri,k(τ), where i = 1, ..., 5, k = 1, ..., K and τ is in the range of the segment’s time length.












s̃li,k(τ), i = 1, ..., 5. (5.2)
In case the training data contains outliers, we can delete the smallest and the largest 2% of
max
t




i can be calculated in the same way.







i among the previous G steps (i.e., step k − G to k − 1). The
parameter G must be large enough to guarantee that the user makes multiple turns in the
G steps. We set G = 100 during our implementation. The calculation is similar to Equation
(5.1) and (5.2), and the same outlier elimination method is applied. For the kth left step,










+ s̃l,mini , i = 1, ..., 5. (5.3)
For the kth right step, s̄ri,k(τ), i = 1, ..., 5 are calculated in a similar way. The intuition
is that, the range of the force peak amplitudes measured in the online stage is normalized
to be the same with that of the peak amplitudes in the training data. Note that after the
normalization, the force value around the start and end point would be smaller than 0.
However, it does not impact the feature extraction in the following components.
One common scenario is that, the user is carrying a bag with a single hand or a single
shoulder, which causes the unbalance of the force changes on different sensors. This unbal-
ance can be complex and vary with different walking habits. For instance, when the user is
carrying a heavy bag with the left hand, the body can either tilt to the left or right, which
leads to different distributions of the signals’ peak amplitudes on the ten sensors. As shown
by Equation (5.3), our normalization method handles this problem by normalizing the force
data from different sensors separately. After weight normalization, the range of the force
peak amplitudes on each sensor is the same with that in the training data. Therefore, the
unbalance of the force changes is eliminated.
For the kth step of the left/right foot, the data preprocessor outputs the normalized force
sequence for each sensor i in the shoe as s̄li,k(τ) or s̄
r
i,k(τ), which is sent to the direction
change estimator and the stride length estimator.
5.5 DIRECTION CHANGE ESTIMATOR
When a user makes a turn during walking, the force distribution in the shoes changes. In
this section, we show that it is possible to estimate the walking direction changes based on
the force changes on the insoles. We first show our observations for the turning patterns
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of human, and then introduce how the direction change estimator extracts features and
estimates the direction changes.
5.5.1 Turning Pattern Observation
It is intuitive that when a person makes a turn, the force made by the feet on insoles
changes. Figure 5.3 shows an example of the force changes during turning. The person
makes a right turn around the 3,000th millisecond. We can observe that the amplitude of
the total force also changes. This is caused by the fact that when the person makes the right
turn using the right foot, the maximum force on the right inside metatarsals drops, as shown
by the first subgraph of Figure 5.3. Therefore, it is possible to recognize the turning actions
according to the force changes on insoles. We further explore the possibility of estimating
the angle changes of the walking direction based on the force data.
In ShoesLoc, we keep measuring the force data from both shoes. This is based on the
observation that, the data from one shoe alone are not sufficient enough for turning detection.
As illustrated by Figure 5.4(a) and 5.4(b), there are at least two possible ways for a user to
make a right turn. In Figure 5.4(a), during the turning the user turns the body by putting
extra force on the left foot. We define a key step as the step on which the user puts extra
force to change the body direction. In Figure 5.4(a) the left foot makes the key step, while
in Figure 5.4(b), the right foot makes the key step. Apparently, the force data of key steps
contain more information for direction change measurement. However, the non-key steps do
not have distinct force change and thus would not help the turning detection. For instance,
in the case shown by Figure 5.3, the person makes the right turn following the turning type
shown in Figure 5.4(b). The right foot makes the key step, and the data from the left shoe
do not show obvious change. Therefore, it is necessary to measure the force change in both
shoes, otherwise some turning actions would not be detected.
Moreover, simply classifying the walking actions as “going straight” and “making a left/right
turn” is not sufficient for walking path tracking. One example is shown in Figure 5.4(c).
When the user is making a 90◦ right turn at a low speed, it is possible that there are multiple
key steps, and each key step makes a direction change smaller than 90◦. However, by accu-
mulating the angle changes of the key steps, we can still get the correct direction change.
On the other hand, the paths in maps are not necessarily latticed. For instance, in Figure
5.4(d) there are two possible walking paths after the user makes a right turn. Therefore, it is
necessary to estimate the direction change made by each step, instead of simply classifying
the step as “straight” or “turning”.
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Figure 5.5: Training format for
angle regression.
left/right step, and then estimate the direction change made by the step based on a trained
SVM.
5.5.2 Feature Extraction
For the step segments of each step, we extract a set of features. The pattern in the features
should not be highly impacted by the user’s walking speed, and thus the features we use are
based on the amplitude of the force signals. Specifically, for the normalized step segment
s̄li,k(τ) or s̄
r
i,k(τ), the features are
F li,k = max
τ
s̄li,k(τ), i = 1, 2, ..., 5, (5.4)
F ri,k = max
τ
s̄ri,k(τ), i = 1, 2, ..., 5. (5.5)
Therefore, for the kth step made by the left or the right foot, the feature set {F li,k|i =
1, 2, ..., 5} or {F ri,k|i = 1, 2, ..., 5} are sent to the subcomponent of angle regression.
5.5.3 Angle Regression
Training format: We first show how the training data for the angle regression are collected.
The range of the direction change is [−90◦, 90◦], where 0◦ denotes that the user’s walking
direction does not change. The positive and negative values respectively denote the angles
of the left and right turns made by the user. During the offline training, the user needs to
make turns with 9 different angles, i.e., −90◦ to 90◦ with the interval of 22.5◦, as shown
by Figure 5.5. Each time the user makes a turn, only one key step should be made. The
training data for each angle include both the cases where the left or the right foot makes
the key step. The training data are labeled with the corresponding angles, and are used to
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train a SVM regression model.
Based on our observations during the experiments, we only consider the direction change
within [−90◦, 90◦] for each footstep. This is because people usually do not make a turn larger
than 90◦ within a single step. Instead, they make multiple shorter steps and the direction
change of each step is smaller than 90◦. Even if a person makes a 180◦ turn within a single
step, it is natural that the velocity direction needs to be reversed, which leads to a stop or a
pause in stepping. This stop or pause can be easily detected and ShoesLoc will restart the
tracking process with the current location.
Ideally, the force changes made by the left and right foot should be symmetric, and the
size of the training data could be reduced by half. However, in practice people’s walking
patterns would be asymmetric [117], which means the feature patterns of left and right foot
are asymmetric. Moreover, the diversity of the hardware used for measurement makes the
models trained for left and right foot unexchangeable. Therefore, it is necessary to collect
training data from both insoles.
SVM regression: In the offline stage, we extract the features from the training data
following the method in Section 5.5.2, and then train two linear kernel-based SVM regression
models for the left and right foot, respectively.
In the online stage, for the kth left or right step made by the user, the angle regression
subcomponent receives the extracted features {F li,k|i = 1, 2, ..., 5} or {F ri,k|i = 1, 2, ..., 5}.
Then, it predicts the angle change caused by the step with the corresponding trained model.
The results are bounded in the range of [−90◦, 90◦]. While the user keeps walking, we get
two sequences of angle changes caused by the left and right steps. We then merge the
two sequences, and index them according to their time stamps. Thus, the output of the
angle regression is a single angle change sequence, denoted by {∆θn|n = 1, 2, ...}. The left
subgraph of Figure 5.6 shows one example of {∆θn}. The performance of the direction
change estimator will be evaluated in Section 5.8.1.












































Figure 5.6: Example of the angle change sequence and the stride length sequence.
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5.6 STRIDE LENGTH ESTIMATOR
To track the walking path of the user, counting steps and estimating walking direction are
insufficient, because the user’s stride length would change. Most of the previous approaches
estimate the stride length by using inertial sensors [118]. With ShoesLoc, we prove that it
is possible to estimate the stride length based on the force changes on insoles. To give an
estimate for the stride length of each step, the stride length estimator extracts another set
of features and also applies an SVM regression algorithm. We first show our observation
for the relationship between the stride length and the foot force, and then introduce our
detailed design.
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Figure 5.7: Data from the left shoe when a user walks with different average stride lengths.
5.6.1 Stride Length Observation
Intuitively, the foot force changes with different stride lengths. One extreme example is
that, when a person is running, the stride length is longer compared with that of the normal
walking, and the impact force on insoles is obviously stronger. Moreover, the changes of foot
force also reflect the stride frequency, which is also correlated with the walking speed and
the stride length.
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In Figure 5.7, we show the changes of the foot force when a user walks with different
stride lengths. Since the stride length is positively correlated to the walking speed during
the uncontrolled walking [119], we require the user to walk along the same corridor at different
speeds during the test, which makes the average stride length differ. It is shown that, when
the user is walking with the longer stride length, the peak values of the total force on the
insole increase. This is because the total impact force on the insoles is stronger when the
user is walking at a higher speed, which usually means a longer stride length during the
uncontrolled walking. Meanwhile, when the stride length is longer, we also notice that the
force peaks on the outside midfoot drop obviously, and those on the outside metatarsals also
decrease slightly. This reflects the user’s walking habit that the foot force moves toward the
body center when he is walking faster with a longer stride length. These clearly show that
the foot force on insoles can be used as the features to estimate the stride length.
On the other hand, as shown by the signals between the two dashed lines in Figure 5.7,
the time length of a step tends to be shorter when the stride length is longer. The relative
time points of the force peaks at some sensor positions also shift. These show that the step
time length as well as the force peak positions are also associated with the stride length.
The stride length estimator extracts a set of features based on our observation.
5.6.2 Feature Extraction
We use the normalized step segments s̄li,k(τ), i = 1, ..., 5 from the left foot as examples to
show how the features are extracted. The same process also applies to the step segments
from the right foot.
Since the change of stride length is often related to the change of walking speed, the stride
frequency is an important feature for stride length estimation. We use the time length of
each step segment s̄li,k(τ) as a metric of the stride frequency. Note that for the same step k,
the time lengths of s̄li,k(τ) for different sensor i are the same. The time length for the kth
step is denoted as Llk.
Moreover, we calculate each step’s loading rate and unloading rate, which denote the














Llk − arg max
τ
s̄li,k(τ)
, i = 1, 2, ..., 5. (5.7)
Note that for each s̄li,k(τ), τ is in the range of [0, L
l
k]. Since arg max
τ
s̄li,k(τ) ≥ Llk never
happens, Ľli,k is always positive. We also calculate the loading and unloading rate of the total





The results are denoted as L̂lk and Ľ
l
k. We also reuse the features extracted in Section 5.5.2.


















The features of the right steps can be calculated in a similar way.
5.6.3 Stride Length Regression
Training format: During the offline stage, the user is required to walk the same distance
at different speeds, which lead to different stride lengths. The number of steps are counted
and thus we get the average stride length by dividing the distance by the number of steps.
For the test with each speed, we label the step segments with the average stride length in
this test. The reason why we do not measure the actual stride length of each individual
footstep is that, the cost of training data collection would be too high if the user needs to
measure each stride length. Therefore, considering the practicality of ShoesLoc, we use the
average stride length instead, which is easy to calculate.
SVM regression: Similar to the idea in Section 5.5.3, we train two linear kernel-based
SVM regression models for the left and right foot to estimate the stride length. In the online
stage, for the kth left/right step made by the user, the stride length regression subcomponent
receives the features as in Formula (5.8), based on which it estimates the stride length of
the step. We merge the two sequences of stride length from the two feet, and denote it
by {d′n|n = 1, 2, ...}. We further smooth the sequence of {d′n} with the exponential moving
average (EMA), i.e., d1 = d
′
1 and dn = α · d′n + (1− α) · dn−1 when n > 1. The coefficient α
is a constant smoothing factor (0 < α < 1), which controls the weights of the current and
the previous observations, e.g., a higher α discounts older stride length values faster. We
set α = 0.6, which is fine-tuned based on the performance of the stride length estimator on
a validation dataset. Then the stride length sequence {dn|n = 1, 2, ...} is the output. One
example is shown in the right subgraph of Figure 5.6. Note that dn−1 and dn denote the
estimated values for different feet. We will evaluate the performance of the stride length
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estimator in Section 5.8.2.
5.7 WALKING PATH RECOGNIZER
The component of walking path recognizer receives the angle change sequence {∆θn},
the stride length sequence {dn}, as well as the map of the localization region, and runs a
map-based particle filter to locate the user.
5.7.1 Key Idea of Walking Path Recognizer
The key idea is shrinking the possibilities for the user’s location by constraining the esti-
mated walking path with the barriers (e.g., walls) on the map. Initially, the user’s location
is unknown to ShoesLoc. However, based on the angle change sequence and the stride length
sequence, we can estimate the possible walking trajectories of the user. Only the trajectories
on the correct walking path can fit into the map, while the others are eliminated because
they imply that the user has run into walls or other barriers. For each eliminated trajectory,
we recreate a new valid trajectory based on the surviving ones. Therefore, once all the
walking trajectories converge to a unique path, ShoesLoc can locate the user’s location.
Some previous approaches have similar ideas, and apply augmented particle filters to solve
the localization problem [6, 7]. Most of them use the accelerometer, gyroscope and com-
pass to measure the user’s walking direction, which helps determine the walking trajectory.
However, in our work we are facing a more complex case because we only know the relative
angle changes instead of the user’s absolute walking direction. Therefore, we can only have
a roughly estimated walking trajectory which has cumulative direction errors. If the cumu-
lative errors are not eliminated, even the correct trajectory could be dropped because of the
direction errors. Therefore, the particle filters proposed in the previous works cannot be di-
rectly applied, because they are based on absolute direction measurement and cannot handle
large cumulative errors, which lead to a low location accuracy and a long computation time.
To address this challenge, we improve the particle filter by proposing the direction correction
algorithm, which makes better use of the map information than the previous approaches.
Direction Correction Algorithm: It is based on the natural observation that when the
user is walking straight, the walking direction must be the same with that of some straight
hallway on the map. Therefore, when we detect that the user is walking straight, we can
correct the current estimated walking direction to the most similar hallway direction. This
will efficiently reduce the cumulative errors of the walking direction. Moreover, since most
of the hallways are horizontal or vertical on the map, there are usually only four possible
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directions of straight paths, which significantly reduces the computation time of the particle
filter and makes realtime tracking and localization possible. We discuss the case of irregular-
shape hallways in Section 5.10.2. The details of the algorithm are included in the workflow
of the particle filter (Step 2 and 4) in the following subsection.
5.7.2 Improved Particle Filter
We first give the definition of particles used in the particle filter.
Particle: In our algorithm, a particle is defined as a possible walking state of the user.







n ], m = 1, ...,M, n = 0, 1, ..., (5.9)
where (xmn , y
m
n ) denotes the 2D location of the user on the map, θ
m
n is the absolute walking
direction, m is the index of particles, and M denotes the total number of particles, which
is a constant for a given map. n = 0 means that the user has not started to move and the
particles are at their initial positions. Both (xmn , y
m
n ) and θ
m
n are defined in an orthogonal




positive direction of the y-axis.
Since the user’s location is initially unknown, we distribute the particles randomly on
the map. Based on the estimated direction change and stride length, we keep updating
the particles for the user’s each step. Then, the location changes of the M particles show
M possible walking trajectories of the user. For the invalid trajectories blocked by the
barriers on the map, we drop the corresponding particles and regenerate new ones on the
valid trajectories. All the M trajectories will converge to a single path, and thus we can
determine the correct location of the user.
The algorithm of the improved particle filter is shown in Algorithm 5.1. It has the following
steps. Note that Step 1-5 in the algorithm do not refer to the physical footsteps made by
the user.
(Step 1) Initialization: The algorithm takes the floor map MAP as an input, which
includes the locations of hallways as well as barriers such as walls. As we do not know the
user’s initial location, we uniformly select U locations in the regions where the user can stay
from the map with a constant density (line 1). For each location, we select V initial walking
directions, i.e., 0, 360◦/V, ..., 360◦(V − 1)/V , and for each direction, we generate W particles
(line 2-7). Thus, the total number of particles is M = UVW . Larger U , V and W would






(a) Real path (b) Initial (c) 50th footstep (d) 90th footstep
(e) 120th footstep (f) 190th footstep (g) Tracing back
0 32 64 feet 0 32 64 feet 0 32 64 feet 0 32 64 feet
0 32 64 feet 0 32 64 feet 0 32 64 feet
Figure 5.8: Example showing how the particle filter works based on the data in Figure 5.6.
(a) shows the real walking path of the user. (b)-(e) show how the particles converge. (e)-(f)
show how the location of the user is tracked after the convergence. (g) shows the traceback
of the walking path.
V should be no less than 4. During our implementation, we set the density of the initial
locations as 25/m2, and V = 12, W = 2. One example of the initial particles are shown in
Figure 5.8(b).
Moreover, based on MAP , we can get the direction set D of the hallways on the map (line
9). Typically, if all the hallways are latticed, the direction set isD = {0◦(360◦), 90◦, 180◦, 270◦}.
Note that D can be modified according to the map. For example, if MAP contains the hall-
ways in Figure 5.4(d), 45◦ and 225◦ are also added to D.
After the initialization, the execution of Step 2-5 is triggered by each step made by the
user.
(Step 2) Straight trajectory detection: For the nth step made by the user (n ≥ 1), the
filter receives ∆θn and dn. Our observation shows that when the user makes a turn, it is
unlikely that the degree change made by the key step is smaller than 40◦. Therefore, the
estimated result |∆θn| < 20◦ almost means that the user is walking along a straight path.
We set ∆θn = 0
◦ in this case (line 11). Moreover, for the nth step, if ∆θn−3, ...,∆θn are all
0◦, we label this step as “straight” (line 12), which implies that the user is walking along a
straight hallway.
(Step 3) Particles update: We update all the M particles for each new footstep. For the




n following line 14-20, where
δn and λn are Gaussian random variables with zero means. In our prototype system, the
standard deviation of δn is 0.1 m, while that of λn is 10
◦. Note that the cumulative error
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ALGORITHM 5.1: Procedure of Walking Path Recognizer
Input: Floor map MAP ; Initial location number U ; Initial direction number V ; Particle redundancy
factor W ; Angle change sequence {∆θn|n = 1, 2, ...}; Stride length sequence {dn|n = 1, 2, ...};
Output: Location sequence {(x̃n, ỹn)|n = 1, 2, ...} and “converged”/“unconverged” labels;
// (Step 1) Initialization
1 Uniformly select U initial locations in the walking region of MAP ;
2 m← 0;
3 foreach selected initial location (x, y) do
4 foreach v = 1, ..., V do
5 foreach w = 1, ...,W do
6 m← m+ 1;






0 ]← [x, y, 360◦(v − 1)/V ];
8 M ← UVW ;
9 Generate direction set D based on MAP ;
// (Step 2-5) Run the following loop once for each footstep made by the user
10 foreach footstep n = 1, 2, ... do
// (Step 2) Straight trajectory detection
11 if |∆θn| < 20◦ then ∆θn ← 0◦ ;
12 if
∑3
j=0 |∆θn−j | = 0◦ then Label step n as “straight” ;
// (Step 3) Particles update
13 foreach m = 1, ...,M do
14 m′ ← m;
15 while true do





16 Generate random variables δn ∼ N(0, 0.12), λn ∼ N(0, (10◦)2);
17 xmn ← xm
′
n−1 + (dn + δn) · cos(θm
′
n−1 + ∆θn + λn);
18 ymn ← ym
′
n−1 + (dn + δn) · sin(θm
′
n−1 + ∆θn + λn);
19 θmn ← (θm
′
n−1 + ∆θn) mod 360
◦;















n ) intersects with barriers in MAP
then
22 Randomly select m′ ∈ {1, ...,M};
23 else Break ;
// (Step 4) Direction correction
24 if step n is labeled as “straight” then θmn ← arg min
ω∈D
{180◦ − ||θmn − ω| − 180◦|} ;
// (Step 5) Convergence check

















n − x̃n)2 + (ymn − ỹn)2);
28 if σ < σT then Label (x̃n, ỹn) as “converged” ;
29 else Label (x̃n, ỹn) as “unconverged” ;
30 return {(x̃n, ỹn)|n = 1, 2, ...} and “converged”/“unconverged” labels;
caused by the calculation in line 19 will be canceled by the direction correction. Then, we








dropped. A new m′ is randomly selected from {1, ...,M} (line 22), based on which we pick
a new particle pm
′
n−1 and update it to p
m
n following line 16-20. This process (line 15-23) is
repeated until a valid pmn is generated.
(Step 4) Direction correction: Recall that we have gotten the direction set D in Step 1.
If the nth step is labeled as “straight”, we change the value of θmn of each particle to the
closest value in D (line 24). Take D = {0◦(360◦), 90◦, 180◦, 270◦} as an example. If the 10th
step is “straight” and θ10010 = 169
◦, we set θ10010 = 180
◦; if θ10110 = 350
◦, we set θ10110 = 0
◦. Note
that both Step 2 and 4 form the direction correction algorithm.
(Step 5) Convergence check: When Step 2-4 are repeated, eventually the particles con-
verge to have similar locations. In line 25-26, we calculate the location center (x̃n, ỹn) of the
particles, which is the estimated user location. Moreover, we also calculate the standard de-
viation of the location differences to the center (line 27). If the standard deviation is lower
than the accepted threshold σT , the particles have converged and we label the estimated
location as “converged”, otherwise the location is labeled as “unconverged” and would have
a low accuracy (line 28-29). In our implementation, we set σT = 2 m. For the nth footstep,
(x̃n, ỹn) and its label are the final outputs of our system. Figure 5.8(b)-(e) show how the
particles keep converging while the user is walking. Note that in Figure 5.8(c), the parti-
cles in the horizontal routes cannot be eliminated because the absolute walking direction is
unknown yet.
After the particles have converged, the system can still track the location change of the
user. Figure 5.8(e)-(f) show how ShoesLoc continues locating the user after convergence. If
the walking path of the user before convergence is needed, we can trace back the trajectories
of the particles, as shown in Figure 5.8(g).
If the particle filters used in the previous works are directly applied, a large amount of
particles on valid paths will be dropped in Step 3 due to the cumulative direction error, which
leads to long computation time. The direction correction in Step 4 significantly reduces the
cumulative direction error and prevents the valid particles from being dropped, and thus
reduces the computation time.
5.8 EVALUATION CONSIDERING CONTINUOUS WALKING
In this section, we first evaluate the accuracy of the direction change estimator and the
stride length estimator. Then, we evaluate the performance of ShoesLoc in the case of
continuous walking by conducting experiments in two different indoor spaces. The case of
frequent walking state changes such as making frequent turns and pauses will be considered
in Section 5.9. The training and test data are collected from 5 male and 2 female volunteers
77
with different ages (23-52), heights (1.58-1.83 m) and weights (53-98 kg).
For the sensors in the shoes, we use the product of ReTiSense Stridalyzer [22] to collect
the force data. Each insole contains five force sensors, and continuously transmits the data
to our host device via a Bluetooth connection. The other components are implemented on
a laptop host (MacBook Pro with 2.7 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16 GB RAM) using Matlab
script. However, as Section 5.9 will show, the computation can be done on mobile devices
and it does not impact the practicality of ShoesLoc.
5.8.1 Performance of Direction Change Estimator
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the direction change estimator. We
collect training data from each of the 7 volunteers following the format in Section 5.5.3. For
each turning direction in Figure 5.5, each volunteer repeats walking 12 times. For 6 times the
left foot makes the key steps, while the right foot makes the key steps for the other 6 times.
We manually label the key steps, which are used to train the direction change estimator.
During the test, each of the volunteers is asked to walk in free style and make 40 turns.
We record the walking of the volunteers with cameras, and measure the direction change
made by each key step with a protractor. Moreover, the steps are manually divided into two
classes, i.e., “straight” and “turn”. The probability distributions of the errors are shown in
Figure 5.9. Note that the sign of the errors follows Figure 5.5, i.e., a positive error means
that the estimated direction change shifts leftward compared with the ground truth, while a
negative error means the estimated value shifts rightward. The average signed errors for the
two classes are −2.30◦ and −1.95◦, while the average absolute errors for the two classes are
16.79◦ and 16.04◦, respectively. Moreover, the results also show that, when the user keeps
moving, the cumulative error of the walking direction is not negligible, which confirms the
necessity of applying the direction correction to cancel the cumulative error by making full
use of the map information.
We further analyze the performance when the sensor number changes. We restrict the
sensor number in each insole to be 1-5 respectively, and select the sensors that can achieve
the best performance. The metric is the average error of both the “straight” and “turn” steps,
and the two classes have the equal size. The results are shown in Figure 5.10. For instance,
if only 3 sensors can be deployed in each shoe, they should be at the inside metatarsals, the
outside metatarsals and the outside midfoot to achieve the best performance. The average
absolute error is 21.37◦. It is shown that, by deploying only 4 sensors we can achieve a
similar performance to the case of 5 sensors. Thus, for the purpose of walking direction





















Figure 5.9: Probability distribution of
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Figure 5.10: Average absolute direction
change error when the sensor number
changes. The corresponding positions of sen-


















Figure 5.11: Probability distribution of


























1 2 3 4 5
Figure 5.12: Average absolute stride length
error when the sensor number changes. The
corresponding positions of sensors are also
shown.
can be deployed. Moreover, Figure 5.10 implies that the sensor at the inside metatarsals
makes the biggest contribution, which accords with our intuition that there are distinct force
changes at the inside metatarsals when people are turning.
5.8.2 Performance of Stride Length Estimator
To collect the training data for the stride length estimator, the volunteers are required to
walk along a straight path of 40 m. It is hard to control the stride length during walking.
Thus, we require each volunteer to repeat this process 5 times, and each time walk at a
different average speed, which ranges in 1-3 m/s at intervals of 0.5 m/s. We get the average
stride length by dividing the distance by the number of steps, and the labeled results are
used as the training data.
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2 kg without weight normalization
2 kg with weight normalization
5 kg without weight normalization
5 kg with weight normalization
Figure 5.13: CDF of absolute direction
change estimation error with different loads.



































2 kg without weight normalization
2 kg with weight normalization
5 kg without weight normalization
5 kg with weight normalization
Figure 5.14: CDF of absolute stride length
estimation error with different loads.
During the test, each volunteer walks along the same path 5 times. Each time the speed is
not tightly controlled, and the average speed varies around 1-3 m/s. We get the ground truth
of each footstep’s stride length by cameras and tape measures. The probability distribution
of the errors are shown in Figure 5.11. The average signed error is −1.22 cm, and the average
absolute error is 6.25 cm. Since the average stride length is 72.60 cm, the error is 8.61%,
which is sufficient for the purpose of walking path tracking because the cumulative error can
be reduced by the particle filter.
We also evaluate the performance of the stride length estimator when the number of
available sensors are changed. For a given number of sensors, we select the sensors that can
achieve the lowest error. The results are given in Figure 5.12. It is shown that, when only 3
sensors can be deployed, the average absolute error is still no larger than 6.41 cm. Moreover,
it can be seen that the sensor at the heel is the most important one for the stride length
estimation.
5.8.3 Impact of Carrying Bags
As mentioned before, carrying handbags or backpacks changes the force distribution on
insoles. In ShoesLoc we design the weight normalization method to reduce this impact. To
evaluate the robustness of ShoesLoc in the face of changing body barycenter, we require
each volunteer to carry a bag of 2 kg or 5 kg. Four of the volunteers carry the bag with
two shoulders and the others carry the bag by hands. The experiments in Section 5.8.1 and
5.8.2 are repeated, and the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the absolute errors
are shown in Figure 5.13 and 5.14.
Figure 5.13 and 5.14 show that, by applying weight normalization, the error of the direction
change and stride length estimation can be reduced. The average angle errors without the
normalization are 28.04◦ and 29.55◦, while after the normalization the errors are 17.39◦ and
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19.07◦, respectively. The average errors of stride length estimation are also improved from
7.12 cm and 9.38 cm to 6.37 cm and 6.32 cm, respectively. Therefore, with the weight
normalization method, we can significantly reduce the impact of carrying bags.
5.8.4 Performance of ShoesLoc
To evaluate the overall performance of ShoesLoc, we require the volunteers to walk in
two indoor spaces, as shown in Figure 5.15. During the test, each of the 7 volunteers walks
randomly in each test region for 30 minutes. The possible walking paths are shown in Figure
5.15. During the walking, the volunteers are asked to carry their backpacks and handbags
(1-5 kg). The way that they carry the bags is not controlled, e.g., the backpack can be
carried by either one or two shoulders. During each test, the volunteers are allowed to take
breaks in place. The break time is not included in the 30 minutes. The stoppages can be
easily detected since the force signals stop showing periodic changes. The tracking process
is resumed when a break ends. We use cameras to record the real walking trajectories, and
use time stamps to match them with the localization results. The trained models in Section
5.8.1 and 5.8.2 are used in this experiment.
(a) (b)
0 32 64 feet
0 32 64 feet
Figure 5.15: The floor maps of the test regions. The dashed lines show the path used in
Section 5.8.5.
Before ShoesLoc can track the location of the user, the particles must converge (Step 5 of
Algorithm 5.1). It is meaningless to evaluate the tracking accuracy before the convergence,
because the user’s location has not yet been uniquely determined. Moreover, it is hard to
control the time length of the convergence phase because it depends on the complexity of
the walking path and the floor structure, as well as the walking speed of the user. Therefore,
we divide the working process before and after the convergence into two phases, i.e., the
convergence phase and the tracking phase, and mainly focus on the tracking phase. During
each walk, once the particles have converged and entered the tracking phase, we continue
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recording 500 steps made by the volunteer. After that we restart ShoesLoc and the conver-
gence phase begins again. Thus, each walk of 30 minutes is divided into several tests, and
each test has two separate phases. During the experiment in Figure 5.15(a), 40 tests are
generated, i.e., each volunteer achieves 5.7 convergences on average. For the test in Figure































































Figure 5.16: Location error during two walks.
As examples, the location errors during two walks are shown in Figure 5.16. We also
evaluate the performance of the particle filter used in [6] where the direction correction
is not applied. Figure 5.16(a) shows that, ShoesLoc keeps converging while the person is
walking, and the convergence phase ends around the 110th step. After that, the system
enters the tracking phase and still maintains high accuracy. If tracing back is applied, the
accuracy during the convergence phase can be significantly improved. On the other hand, if
direction correction is not applied, the particles once tend to converge before the 95th step.
However, after that they keep diffusing during the whole walk, and thus the user cannot
be localized. The reason is that, without the direction correction algorithm, it is easy for
the particles on valid routes to go cross the walls because of the cumulative direction errors.
Therefore, the direction correction algorithm significantly improves the performance of the
particle filter, which is also confirmed by the other example shown in Figure 5.16(b).
The average step number that a volunteer takes before convergence is 69 in Figure 5.15(a)
and 85 in Figure 5.15(b). The main reason why more steps are needed to converge in
Figure 5.15(b) is that, its floor map contains more symmetric corridors, which makes the
convergence a little harder.
We also evaluate the location error during the tracking phase of all the tests. The results
are shown in Figure 5.17. The average errors for the two floor maps are 0.88 m and 1.30 m,
respectively. The case without direction correction is excluded because the particles cannot
converge. Moreover, if tracing back is applied, the average errors for the whole walking paths
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ShoesLoc before traceback, floor map (b)
ShoesLoc after traceback, floor map (b)
ShoesLoc before traceback, floor map (a)
ShoesLoc after traceback, floor map (a)
Figure 5.17: CDF of location error in two
floor maps.









































Figure 5.18: CDF of location error when the
walking speed changes.
are 0.86 m and 1.05 m, respectively. Thus, the average location error of ShoesLoc is lower
than that of the Wi-Fi RSS-based methods (2-3 m) [120], and is comparable with that of
the inertial sensor-enhancing approaches (1.5-2 m) [50]. Meanwhile, ShoesLoc requires no
site survey and has better robustness to magnetic interference.
To evaluate the realtime performance of ShoesLoc, we also record the computation time.
When the particle number is 60,000, the average computation time for each step is 0.35s. If
direction correction is not applied, the average computation time is 0.73s. This is because
the high dropping rate of the particles on valid paths increases the time cost of generating
new valid particles. In some extreme cases, more than 90% of the particles could be dropped
at a step, which leads to a long computation time. Given that the average time length of
people’s each step is around 0.70-0.81s [121], ShoesLoc is able to provide realtime localization
and tracking. A shorter computation time can be achieved, if the particle number is further
reduced. In Section 5.9, we will show that ShoesLoc is also efficient when working on a
mobile device.
5.8.5 Impact of Walking Speed
In Section 5.8.4, we have no control on the walking speed of users. In this subsection, we
evaluate the impact of the walking speed on the performance of ShoesLoc. Since it is hard
to measure and control the actual instantaneous speed of users, we use the average speed
instead. The average speed used for our tests ranges from 1 m/s to 3 m/s at intervals of 0.5
m/s. As shown in Figure 5.15(a), each volunteer is required to go along a given path 5 times.
For each time, a different average speed is followed. During each walking, an experimenter
walks after the volunteer and uses a timer to help the volunteer reach the destination at
the given average speed. We then calculate the location error in the tracking phase. The
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results are shown in Figure 5.18. When the average speed changes from 1 m/s to 3 m/s,
the average errors of all the volunteers’ walks are 1.09 m, 0.83 m, 0.81 m, 0.98 m and 0.85
m, respectively. Therefore, the change of the walking speed does not seriously impact the
performance of ShoesLoc. This is because the features used for direction change estimation
are not highly impacted by the walking speed, and the design of the stride length estimator
naturally handles the speed changes well.
5.9 EVALUATION CONSIDERING FREQUENT TURNS, PAUSES AND SHOE TYPE
CHANGES
In Section 5.8, some walking paths selected by the volunteers go through long straight
hallways. In our daily life, it is also likely that users’ walking paths include more short
straight lines with more turns, e.g., walking from a desk to a printer or to a meeting room.
Moreover, users would also make short pauses while walking, e.g., looking at a poster, or
greeting someone. On the other hand, it is possible that the type of the shoes that the user
wears is different during the training and the daily usage. In this section, we evaluate the
impacts of frequent turns, pauses, and shoe type changes.
In the indoor space shown in Figure 5.19, we conduct a similar experiment as in Section
5.8.4. We recruit another group of volunteers (6 males and 5 females) with different ages (21-
53), heights (1.62-1.85 m) and weights (57-104 kg). The same training format is followed,
and all the volunteers wear hard bottom shoes during the training. To test ShoesLoc’s
performance on mobile devices, we implement our components on an iPad (2017) with iOS
11.2.2 operating system. To adapt to the computing power of the device, we adjust the
density of initial particle locations, and the particle number is 45,000.
We design four test cases for each volunteer. In Case 1, the volunteer walks randomly for
10 minutes. The only rule is that a left or right turn must be made at each intersection.
To make the comparison among different test cases meaningful, we record the walking path,
and require the volunteer to walk along the same path in the following test cases. In Case
2, the volunteer is required to make a 2-second pause every 10 seconds (controlled by an
interval timer), and continue to walk along the original direction after the pause. In both
Case 1 and Case 2, all the volunteers wear hard bottom shoes. In Case 3, the volunteer
follows the same path, but wears sneakers with air cushions instead and makes no stop. In
Case 4, the volunteer wears sneakers and repeats Case 2.
The test results without traceback are shown in Figure 5.20. The average errors of the four
test cases are 1.03 m, 0.99 m, 1.15 m and 1.27 m, respectively. The average step numbers
before convergence are 90, 95, 92 and 97, respectively.
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Paths without pause, sneakers with air cushions (Case 3)  
Paths with pauses, sneakers with air cushions (Case 4)
Paths without pause, hard bottom shoes (Case 1) 
Paths with pauses, hard bottom shoes (Case 2) 
Figure 5.20: CDF of location error when users
make frequent turns. The impacts of frequent
pauses and different shoe types are also shown
in the figure.
The comparison between Case 1 and the experiment in Section 5.8.4 shows that, frequently
turning does not impact the average error. On the other hand, while the floor plan in Figure
5.19 has a similar scale to those in Figure 5.15, the step number before convergence increases.
This is because the floor plan contains multiple corridors in similar shapes, and more short
straight lines make it harder to uniquely determine the user’s location. However, ShoesLoc
can still converge and achieve a good accuracy.
The comparison between Case 1 and Case 2 as well as Case 3 and Case 4 shows that
there is no obvious impact caused by frequent pauses. Making a stop and restarting walking
would slightly increase the direction and stride length estimation errors for the footsteps
before and after the pause. However, the particle filter adds random variables (δn and λn) to
the estimated values, which reduces the impact of the estimation errors for these footsteps.
The EMA smoothing in the stride length estimator further mitigates this impact.
The results of Case 3 and Case 4 show a slight decrease in accuracy. This is because
air cushions attenuate the maximum impact force on insoles when the shoes are touching
the ground [122], which also changes the force distribution on the sensors. However, the
weight normalization method normalizes the measured data and keep the distribution of the
force peak amplitudes consistent with that in the training data. Therefore, ShoesLoc still
maintains good performance even if the shoe type in the tests is different from that in the
training.
During the tests, the average computation time for each step is 0.43s, which is still effi-
cient for realtime tracking. We also analyze the device’s energy log with the Instruments
application of Xcode, and use the energy usage level as the metric [123]. The level ranges
from 0 to 20, which indicates how much energy an application is using at the given time.
The sampling rate is 1 Hz, and a lower average level means that the application consumes
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fewer energy. The average energy usage level of ShoesLoc during the tests is 10/20. As a
benchmark, our test shows that the average level of Apple Maps is 8/20. Therefore, the
energy consumption of ShoesLoc is acceptable since users typically do not keep using the
tracking service all the time.
5.10 DISCUSSION
5.10.1 Accelerating Convergence
Before ShoesLoc can locate the user, the user needs to keep walking until the particles
converge. The speed of the convergence depends on the user’s walking speed, the complexity
of the walking path, as well as the structure of the barriers on the map. To speed up the
convergence, similar to the idea in [124], we can further make use of the special facilities on
the map to reduce the possible region of the user’s initial location. For instance, the user
must go through entrances to enter buildings. Also, by using the force sensors in the shoes,
it is easy to detect the actions of going up/down stairs or using elevators. By recognizing
the start point of the user’s walking path, the convergence process can be significantly sped
up. In our work, to guarantee the practicality of ShoesLoc, we only focus on the general case
that the initial location is unknown. The walking path tracking with known initial locations
is a special case of the challenge solved by ShoesLoc.
5.10.2 Hallways in Irregular Shapes
Although most hallways are straight, some of them would still have complex shapes. For
instance, in some shopping malls the hallways are curving or in the shape of arcs. However,
usually the radius of the arcs are large enough that they can be considered as straight
hallways by ShoesLoc. Specifically, if the direction difference between the start and the end
of a curving hallway is smaller than 30◦, we treat it as a straight hallway. If the direction
changes a lot, we can crop the hallway into shorter hallways and treat each of them as
a straight hallway. For more complex irregular hallways, we can simply consider them as
non-straight hallways, which can still be handled by ShoesLoc.
5.10.3 Security Issue
As what we have mentioned, there have been commercial force sensors or force mapping
systems for shoes [22, 21, 58, 59]. Some of these products allow users to upload their data
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to the cloud for analysis or statistics. The design of ShoesLoc implies that, if the data are
leaked, it is possible for unauthorized third-parties to recognize the daily walking paths of
the users. Although the training data would be unavailable, it is still possible to learn the
walking pattern of the users by recognizing some common actions. For example, it is easy
to detect the action of going up/down stairs, during which a user needs to make several left
or right turns at each floor. Then the attacker can crop the training data for the direction
change estimation. We will continue to explore the privacy leakage through the force data
from smart shoes in Chapter 6.
5.10.4 General Model for Walking Path Tracking
Currently, because of the diversity of walking habits, ShoesLoc requires each user to
provide training data before use. Moreover, our weight normalization method assumes that
the weight of the user is consistent during the training data collection. If we train a general
model by simply mixing the training data from different people, the signal measured during
the user’s walking will be incorrectly normalized to fit the data patterns of the heaviest or
lightest training data providers. Some other factors such as the measurement differences
caused by the device diversity would also lead to a low accuracy of the general model.
However, there are still potential solutions. For instance, based on a large amount of data,
it is possible to train the general model with deep neural networks. We leave it to our future
work to design a system that works without requiring training data from each user.
5.10.5 Foot Force as A Biometric Identifier
The diversity of foot force patterns implies the possibility of using the foot force informa-
tion as a biometric identifier. It has been shown that, due to the various walking habits,
gaits can be used for person identification [15, 71, 72]. The patterns of foot force are clearly
associated with the user’s gait. It is even possible that the information hidden in foot force
properly includes the gait information, and can be used to restore the user’s walking habit.
Thus, investigating the possibility of using force sensors for biometrics is promising.
5.10.6 Obtaining and Preprocessing Floor Maps
In our work, we assume that the indoor floor maps are available to users’ devices. In
practice, there are multiple possible sources of floor maps. For instance, Google Maps [125]
provides the floor plans of a large number of buildings, which can be fetched by users’ devices.
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Moreover, since the rooms and hallways on the maps are labeled with different colors, the
walking regions and barriers can be programmatically recognized with image processing
techniques. For the buildings where digital floor plans are not available yet, there have been
approaches that reconstruct indoor maps based on crowdsourcing techniques [126, 127]. In
our implementation, after we have obtained the floor plan image, we preprocess the floor
map by dividing it into a matrix of small grids with the resolution of 0.2 m × 0.2 m. The
grids occupied by walls and barriers are programmatically recognized and labeled in the
matrix according to their colors in the image. In this way, we can locate possible walking
regions and detect if a walking trajectory goes through walls or barriers.
5.11 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we present ShoesLoc, a novel indoor walking path tracking method that
is based on in-shoe force sensors. We design algorithms to estimate the walking direction
change and the stride length based on the force signals, and apply the particle filter to
determine the walking path. We further propose the direction correction algorithm and the
weight normalization method to improve the particle filter’s performance and handle the
impact of handbags and backpacks. The experimental results show that ShoesLoc achieves
the accuracy of 0.9-1.3 m, which is sufficient for walking path tracking.
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CHAPTER 6: SHOESHACKER: INDOOR CORRIDOR MAP AND USER
LOCATION LEAKAGE THROUGH FORCE SENSORS IN SMART SHOES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The recent popularization of wearable devices has been impacting people’s lives. For in-
stance, many smartwatches can measure heart rate [4], and smart shoes can count footsteps
or detect users’ fatigue levels [22, 21, 58, 23]. However, besides the benefits brought by the
new devices, people should also be aware of the danger caused by measurement data leak-
ages. It has been shown that if the motion data measured by smartwatches were leaked, an
attacker could recognize the content that victims input via keyboards [24], or the passwords
of turntable password locks [10]. However, it has not yet been recognized that the data from
smart shoes also leak information. Many smart shoes are equipped with force or piezoelectric
sensors. For instance, ReTiSense [22] and Zhor-Tech [23] provide foot force mapping systems
that help analyze users’ gaits. It has not been explored if the force mapping systems are vul-
nerable to side-channel attacks. Moreover, many products allow users to upload their data
to cloud servers for statistical analysis, which increases the attack surface. In this chapter,
we show that if an attacker has access to the foot force data, it is possible to reconstruct the
corridor map of the building that the victim walks in, and even locate the building and the
victim on a global map.
Some previous works have shown the capability of smart shoes for indoor walking path
tracking [63, 61, 62], among which ShoesLoc [60] is the first system that utilizes in-shoe
force sensors to track users. However, ShoesLoc requires floor plans and users’ training data
as additional inputs, and thus cannot be used for attack, because the attacker usually does
not know the building and cannot directly collect the training data from the victim. In our
work, we assume that the attacker has got the force data by hacking the user’s device or
cloud servers. However, no training data or prior knowledge about the floor plan is needed.
In this chapter, we present ShoesHacker, an attack scheme that reconstructs corridor maps
and locates victims based on the smart shoes equipped with force sensors. Our method is
based on the basic assumption that the corridors are latticed, which means that all the
turning angles in corridors are 90◦. We consider this assumption reasonable because the
latticed corridors are common in office buildings, which are the main targets of attackers.
The main idea of our attack method is that, during the victim’s daily use of smart shoes, we
extract training data to train support vector machine (SVM) models, based on which we can
estimate the victim’s walking trajectories. By merging the trajectories, we can reconstruct
the corridor map of the floor, and also locate the victim on the floor. By comparing the
89
corridor map with the floor plans provided by some global maps such as Google Maps [125],
the attacker could recognize the building, and thus locate the victim on the global maps.
The main challenge is that, due to people’s diverse walking habits, we need to train an
individual machine learning model for each victim to recognize the turning steps during
walking. However, in attack scenarios, labeled training data are unavailable. We show that
it is possible to extract the training data by recognizing the action of going up or down
stairs. For instance, in a typical office building, when a victim walks from the first floor to
the third floor, the walking path goes through three stair landings, during which the victim
makes three U-turns. We propose the stair landing detection algorithm to detect the action
of walking on stairs, and recognize the turning steps in the U-turns, which can be used for
training. Thus, the training data can be collected during the victim’s daily life, which makes
the supervised learning applicable.
Another challenge is that, the walking paths of the victim are scattered, i.e., the victim
usually does not traverse the whole floor at once. Thus, it is hard to estimate the whole
corridor map during a single walk. We propose that we can estimate the trajectory of
each walk, and keep merging the trajectories. As the victim will eventually visit all the
corridors during the daily use, ShoesHacker can reconstruct the whole corridor map. We
design methods to detect the continuous walking in corridors, and estimate the trajectory
of each walk. We propose the path merging algorithm to merge the trajectories, even if the
estimated trajectories contain errors and their absolute directions are unknown.
The main contributions of our work are:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore the possibility of reconstructing
corridor maps based on in-shoe force sensors, and reveal the danger of location privacy
leakage through smart shoes.
• To handle the lack of the training data from victims, we propose to extract the training
data during the victim’s daily usage. We design the stair landing detection algorithm,
and recognize the turning steps made on stair landings, which can be used to train our
machine learning models.
• To reconstruct corridor maps, we propose the path merging algorithm, which can merge
the estimated walking trajectories even if the absolute walking directions are unknown.
• We implement a prototype system, and design a metric to evaluate its performance.
Experiments confirm that the privacy leakage through the force data from smart shoes
is highly probable under certain conditions.
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ShoesHacker is still a proof-of-concept system based on our basic assumption. However,
it sheds light on a new threat to people’s location privacy caused by smart shoes.
We first introduce related works in Section 6.2, and present a system overview in Section
6.3. Then we successively introduce the methods used by ShoesHacker in Section 6.4 - 6.9.
In Section 6.10, we evaluate the performance of ShoesHacker with experiments. We have
further discussion in Section 6.11, compare ShoesLoc and ShoesHacker in Section 6.12, and
conclude this chapter in Section 6.13.
6.2 RELATED WORK
Mobile device-based side-channel attacks: While smart mobile devices are evolving rapidly,
exploring the side-channel privacy leakage in mobile devices has been a hot research topic
for years. For instance, the mobile devices can be fingerprinted based on the hardware
imperfections of accelerometers [128], speakers [129], or cameras [130]. By using the inertial
sensors in a smartwatch, an attacker can track the victim’s hand motion, and recognize the
content that the victim inputs via keyboards [24] and keypads [131], or guess the password of
a turntable password lock [10]. By using the data from a cellphone’s permissionless sensors
such as accelerometer and gyroscope, the attacker can reconstruct the victim’s secret PIN
for unlocking the cellphone [11, 132].
However, while researchers have been exploring the privacy leakage via smartphones and
smartwatches, the possible information leakage via smart shoes has not been discovered. We
are the first to reveal the threat of localization attacks on smart shoes.
User localization attacks: With the fast popularization of location-based services, people
have been aware of the harmfulness of location leakages. The exposed location traces can
be used to infer the victim’s activities, habits, or even identity [133, 134]. While researchers
and the industry have designed and adopted many location protection approaches to protect
users’ geographical locations [135, 136], users’ location traces can still be inferred via multiple
channels such as social networks [137, 138], call records [139], and people-nearby services
[140].
It has also been shown that cellphones are vulnerable to side-channel localization attacks.
For instance, Powerspy [141] shows that it is possible to locate a user by reading the phone’s
power consumption, because the power usage reflects the received signal strength (RSS)
from cellular base stations, which helps infer the user location. ACComplice [142] reveals
that the signal measured by the accelerometer of a cellphone can be used to infer the driving
trajectory of a vehicle. In [70], it is shown that the driving instructions played by navigation
applications change the audio on/off status of the phone, which provides a side channel for
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victim tracking.
However, since commercial smart shoes are still at the primary stage, the possible location
privacy leakage from them has not been well-investigated. In our work, we explore the
possibility of locating people based on the force data leaked from smart shoes.
Indoor localization: A large number of works have been done in the field of indoor localiza-
tion [36, 107, 34, 38]. While most methods are designed for legitimate use cases, potentially
their techniques can also be used for localization attacks. For instance, the Wi-Fi RSS can
help locate users [44, 45, 46], but can also be used to locate victims once the data are leaked
[143]. ShoesLoc [60] demonstrates that, if the floor plan is available, the user can be lo-
cated based on in-shoe force sensors. However, ShoesLoc can hardly be applied for attacks,
because the floor plan and training data are usually unavailable to the attacker. In our
work, we require no pre-known floor plan of the target building, and design algorithms to
extract training data when the victim is walking in stairwells. Some other works show that
the inertial measurement units (IMUs) embedded in shoes can also locate users [63, 61, 62].
However, these works estimate the path of a single walk, which can hardly determine the
user location when the building is unknown. In our work, we design an algorithm to merge
multiple walking paths and reconstruct the corridor map, based on which the building can
be recognized. If the smart shoes are equipped with IMUs instead of force sensors, the
attack can still be conducted by combining the previous IMU-based tracking methods and
our work. Thus, ShoesHacker can serve as a framework that works for both force sensors
and IMUs.
Floor plan reconstruction: While most of the floor plan reconstruction methods are based
on videos or images [126, 127], there are also works that utilize acoustic signals [144], laser
[145], or inertial sensors plus landmarks [146, 147, 148]. For instance, CrowdInside [146]
utilizes the cellphone motion sensors to estimate people’s walking traces, and thus reconstruct
the floor plan through crowd-sourcing. However, this approach requires the existence of
points of interest, such as elevators, to reset the errors in the estimated walking traces. By
contrast, except of the walking on stairs, ShoesHacker does not require any point of interest
on walking paths, and can handle the walking trajectories with larger errors. In the work
of MapGENIE [149], the authors show that the data collected from foot-mounted IMUs can
also be used to reconstruct the floor plan. As mentioned before, the path merging algorithm
of ShoesHacker also works for the IMU based approaches, and our algorithm can handle an




In this section, we first introduce the threat model and the basic assumptions, and then
give an overview of the sensor deployment and the system architecture of our attack method.
6.3.1 Threat Model and Basic Assumptions
The purpose of the attack is to reconstruct the corridor map of the building that the victim
daily walks in, which makes it possible to further locate the building and the victim. The
corridors are latticed, i.e., the turning angles of intersections are 90◦. We assume that the
attacker knows the rough region that the building locates in, e.g., a university campus or an
industrial park. The floor maps of the buildings in the region are available to the attacker,
which is practical since many global maps such as Google Maps [125] provide indoor floor
maps. We also assume that the floor structures of these buildings are diverse, because we
can hardly distinguish two buildings with the same floor structure.
We assume that the smart shoes are equipped with a sufficient number of force sensors,
which will be shown in Section 6.3.2. The force data have been leaked from the mobile
device that is paired with the shoes, from the cloud, or during the data transmission. If the
data are leaked in real time, we can further locate the victim in real time.
The attack is based on the daily use of smart shoes. Before the corridor map can be
estimated, the victim should have traversed the floor of the target building several times,
and have used staircases (not necessarily in the target building). The attack period can be
days, weeks or months, which is acceptable since the typical attack scenario is locating the
office building that the victim works in.
6.3.2 Sensor Deployment
Currently, most of the smart shoe-based force mapping systems deploy plenty of force
sensors in insoles. For instance, the sensor deployment of the ReTiSense Stridalyzer insoles
[22] is shown in Figure 6.1. For each insole, eight force sensing resistors are deployed at the
positions of hallux, fourth toe, inner metatarsals, outer metatarsals, outer midfoot, arch,
inner heel, and outer heel.
In this chapter, we use the off-the-shelf ReTiSense Stridalyzer insoles to show how the
location information would leak from the force data. For each insole, we assign indices
i = 1, ..., 8 to the eight sensors. While the victim is walking, each sensor keeps outputting a




















Figure 6.1: Force sensor deployment for each insole.
assume that the attacker has access to these raw data via the data leakage. We treat the 16
force data sequences as 16 discrete time series, denoted by {uli(t), uri (t)|i = 1, ..., 8, t ≥ 0},
where uli(t) is the data sequence received from sensor i in the left insole, and u
r
i (t) is from
sensor i in the right insole. Although uli(t) and u
r
i (t) are discrete time series, we write them
as continuous time series for convenience, which does not impact our following analysis. In
Section 6.10.2, we show that it is possible to conduct the attack with less sensors.
6.3.3 System Architecture
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Figure 6.2: System architecture of ShoesHacker.
Step detector: It receives the raw signals {uli(t), uri (t)} from the 16 force sensors, and
extracts the data for each step made by the left or right foot. The outputs are the step
segments from the left and right insoles. Each step segment contains the force data from
each sensor for each step made by the victim.
Training data extractor: It detects the action of walking on stairs, and recognizes the
turning steps made on stair landings. These turning steps are extracted as training data,
which are used to train the walking path estimator.
Continuous walking detector: This component recognizes the victim’s continuous walking
in corridors based on the frequency domain analysis. Since we aim to recover the corridor
map of the floor, we focus on the continuous walking in corridors instead of the intermittent
walking in rooms.
Walking path estimator: This component reconstructs each of the victim’s walking paths
in corridors. For each footstep, it extracts features from the step segments, and estimates the
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heading direction change based on SVM. Then, it reconstructs the path of each continuous
walk. Note that the output walking paths are at the same scale, but do not necessarily
follow the same rotation. The output paths are stored in the dataset of historical paths.
Corridor map estimator: Based on the historical paths, this component keeps estimating
and updating the map of the corridors in the floor plan. If the victim is currently walking
in corridors and the data are available in real time, it is also possible to locate the victim.
Building recognizer: Assume that the corridor maps of candidate buildings have been
stored in a pool. This component searches in the pool and finds the corridor map that is
most similar to the output of the corridor map estimator. The corresponding building of the
best match is the recognition result, and thus the building is located.
Before the system can estimate the floor plan, the victim must have gone up or down stairs
several times, so that enough training data can be collected to train the machine learning
models. Note that the attacker can keep updating the training data during the victim’s
daily walking.
Next, we introduce the algorithms of these components in detail, respectively.
6.4 STEP DETECTOR
This component aims to crop the force data sequences for each footstep. We treat
{uli(t)|i = 1, ..., 8} and {uri (t)|i = 1, ..., 8} respectively. Similar to the method used in









i (t), as shown by the last subgraph in Figure 6.3. Since the foot force
always falls back to near-zero values when the shoe leaves the ground, we can segment steps
by detecting the low values of ul(t) or ur(t). The start point of a left step is detected if
ul(t) ≥ γ1, and its end point is detected if ul(t) < γ1, where γ1 is a constant threshold and
γ1 = 10 kg in our implementation. The right step detection follows the same method. An
example of a detected left step is labeled in the last subgraph of Figure 6.3.
For each detected step, we crop the uli(t) (or u
r
i (t)) between its start and end points. The
cropped step segments are denoted by sli,k(τ) (or s
r
i,k(τ)), where i = 1, ..., 8, and k = 1, 2, ...
is the index for each left (or right) step. Note that the left and right steps are indexed
independently, and sli,k(τ) is contiguous to s
r
i,k(τ). Moreover, τ denotes the time length since
the start point of the step, and τ = 0 at the beginning of the step segment. An example of
the eight step segments for one left step is labeled by the red boxes in Figure 6.3.
As a result, for the kth left or right step, the step detector outputs the force data as
sli,k(τ) or s
r
i,k(τ), i = 1, ..., 8, which are sent to the training data extractor and the continuous
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Figure 6.4: A walk from
Level 1 to Level 3.
walking detector. For the purpose of periodic signal detection, ul(t) and ur(t) are also sent
to the continuous walking detector.
6.5 TRAINING DATA EXTRACTOR
In this section, we first show the necessity of training an individual machine learning
model for each victim, and then introduce how the training data can be collected during the
activity of going up or down stairs.
6.5.1 Necessity of Training Data for Walking Path Estimator
To estimate the walking paths of the victim based on force data only, it is necessary to
train a machine learning model to recognize the victim’s actions, such as making turns.
Since commercial smart shoes are still in infancy, the measurement differences caused by
the diversity of embedded force sensors cannot be ignored. Thus, it is hard to train a
general model that works for any smart shoes. While the learning technique of deep neural
networks could be applied, a large amount of data is needed, which is less practical for
attackers. Therefore, compared with training a single model that works for everyone, it is
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more valuable to investigate if it is possible to train individual models for different victims.
Since we aim to reconstruct the topological corridor map only, the scale correctness is
less important than the structure correctness of the output map. Thus, we do not estimate
the stride length, the accuracy of which impacts the map scale only. We will show how we
handle the stride length in Section 6.7.4.
Intuitively, to recognize the corners in the floor plan, it is necessary to detect the action
of turning. It has been shown in [60] that SVM regression models are capable of estimating
the direction change made by each step based on force data. Thus, we need to collect the
labeled training data to train the SVM models for the turning angle estimation. We propose
to extract the training data during the action of going up or down stairs. As shown in Figure
6.4, when a victim goes from Level 1 to Level 3, it is natural that he/she makes three U-turns
at the three stair landings. Thus, it is possible to extract the data to train the turning angle
estimation model, if we can detect the action of walking on stairs and thus determine the
turning steps on the stair landings. Note that we do not assume the existence of stairs in
the target building. Besides the target building, the training data can also be collected from
any other buildings that have stairs.
6.5.2 Stair Landing Detection
There have been approaches that detect the action of going on stairs using inertial sensors
[150, 124]. However, how to recognize this action based on the force data from shoes is still
an open question. A naive method is monitoring the peak value changes of the entire force in
shoes. Intuitively, because of the need of acceleration and deceleration, the impact force on
insoles increases when the person is going on stairs. Thus, the increase of foot force implies
the action of walking on stairs. However, in the real case, the entire foot force cannot be
directly measured, because the force sensors are discretely and non-uniformly embedded in
insoles. The sum of all the sensors’ force values does not reflect the real total impact force
made by the foot. Moreover, this method suffers high false positive rate, because many other
actions such as running and jumping can also lead to the changes of the maximum impact
force.
To address these challenges, we propose the stair landing detection algorithm for in-shoe
force sensors. The key idea is that, we detect the periodic change of the peak amplitudes of
the force signal from each embedded sensor. As illustrated by Figure 6.5, while the sum of all
the sensors’ outputs does not show any obvious change, the peak amplitudes of some sensors
change obviously. This is because, depending on the person’s walking habit, some foot parts
do not touch the stairs. As labeled by the red dashed lines in Figure 6.5(a), when the person
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Figure 6.5: Examples showing the signals when the victim is going up or down stairs. The
signals come from the right foot.
is going up stairs, the sensors at the inner and outer heel almost have no output since the
heel does not touch the stairs. The output appears again when footsteps are made on stair
landings. Thus, periodic changes exist in the signals. Even if the person walks following
the habit shown in Figure 6.5(b), the periodic peak amplitude changes at the fourth toe
are still visible, which is because walking through multiple floor levels is fundamentally a
periodic action. The similar phenomenon also occurs for the case of going down stairs, as
shown in Figure 6.5(c). Thus, by detecting such periodic changes, we can recognize the
footsteps made on stairs. This method also eliminates the impacts of instantaneous impact
force changes caused by running and jumping, because these actions do not show periodic
force peak changes.
The observation illustrated by Figure 6.5 also shows that it is unreliable to use only
one sensor to detect the action of going on stairs. When the person is walking on stairs,
sometimes a sensor has visible periodic output but sometimes not, depending on various
walking habits. In Figure 6.5(c), the outputs of the sensors at the inner and outer heel show
obvious amplitude changes when the steps are made on stairs. However, in Figure 6.5(b),
there is no obvious change at the heel. Instead, the output from the fourth toe contains
periodic amplitude changes. Therefore, using the output from a single sensor is unreliable,
98
and we should make use of all the sensors to improve the detection accuracy.
The stair landing detection algorithm consists of five steps. Algorithm 6.1 shows Steps
1-4, which process the data from a single sensor in the left or right insole. Steps 1-4 are
repeated for each of the 16 sensors, and in Step 5 we aggregate all the results. For brevity,
in Steps 1-4, we make sk(τ), k = 1, 2, ..., K denote the K continuous step segments from one
sensor, i.e., sli,k(τ) or s
r
i,k(τ), k = 1, 2, ..., K. Note that Steps 1-5 in the algorithm do not
refer to the physical footsteps made by the victim.
(Step 1) Signal conversion: Figure 6.6(a) shows an example of the raw signal from a
sensor (the partitions of step segments are omitted). Since we focus on the amplitude of the
signal, in line 1, we first extract the peak value of each step segment, denoted by p[k]. The
peak value array extracted from Figure 6.6(a) is shown in Figure 6.6(b). In the following
steps we process p[k] instead of sk(τ).






































(a) Real signal (b) Peak values          and detected stair framesp[k]
Go up stairs Go down stairs Stair frame: Step 2: (20, 69)     Step 3: (27, 60) Stair frame: Step 2: (81, 127)     Step 3: (87, 125)
Figure 6.6: Example of signal conversion and rough stair detection. The data come from
the sensor at the heel of the right foot.
(Step 2) Rough stair detection: We roughly detect the existence of stairs using a sliding
window of size W = 30. W is tuned based on the observation that there are usually less
than 8 left/right steps in each flight of stairs [151].
In line 4-6, we first remove the steady component from the signal, and then conduct the
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) with a Hanning window. Two examples in frequency spectrum
are illustrated in Figure 6.7. It is shown that strong periodic signal exists when the person
is walking on stairs and stair landings. In line 7 we consider that the periodic signal exists
if a peak in the amplitude-frequency diagram is higher than a constant threshold AT = 60
kg, and store the index of the peak’s frequency bin in r[m].
In line 8-9, we determine the ranges of the continuous steps made on stairs and stair
landings, and crop them by stair frames. Two examples of stair frames are shown in Figure
6.6(b). Each stair frame contains a continuous walk from one floor to another, e.g., stair
frame (20, 69) denotes that the person is walking on a staircase from the 20th to the 69th
right step. The range accuracy will be further refined in Step 3. We store the stair frames in
set Π. Note that the boundary condition checking for r[k1− 1] and r[k2−W + 2] in line 9 is
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ALGORITHM 6.1: Turning step detection based on a single sensor
Input: Step segments sk(τ), k = 1, ...,K;
Parameter: Window size W ; Amplitude threshold AT ; Minimum stair frame size Γ; Minimum
period ψT ; Minimum standard deviation σT1; Maximum standard deviation σT2;
Maximum peak width ψd; Maximum turning step difference rate rp;
Output: Stair frame set Π; Turning step sets Ũg, g = 1, ..., |Π|; Stair periods ψ̄g, g = 1, ..., |Π|;
// (Step 1) Signal conversion
1 p[k]← max
τ
sk(τ), k = 1, 2, ...,K;
// (Step 2) Rough stair detection
2 r[k]← 0, k = 1, 2, ...,K;
3 foreach m = 1, 2, ...,K −W + 1 do
4 p̃[k]← p[k]− 1W
∑m+W−1
k=m p[k], k = m, ...,m+W − 1;
5 Get Hanning window h = hanning(W );
6 {A[n]|n = 1, ...,W} ← 1W ‖FFT ({p̃[k] · h[k −m+ 1]|k = m, ...,m+W − 1})‖;
7 if peaks exist in {A[n]} with altitude larger than AT then r[m]← the bin index of the first peak
with altitude larger than AT ;
8 Π← ∅;
9 foreach (k1, k2) that satisfies k2−k1>Γ, r[k]>0, k = k1, ..., k2−W+1 and r[k1−1] = 0,
r[k2−W+2] = 0 do Π← Π ∪ {(k1, k2)} ;
// (Step 3-4) Run the following loop for each stair frame in Π
10 foreach (kg1 , k
g
2) ∈ Π, g = 1, ..., |Π| do
// (Step 3) Period Estimation
11 Ψ← ∅;
12 k′1 ←∞; k′2 ← −∞;
13 foreach m = kg1 , ..., k
g
2 −W + 1 do












16 if ψ ≥ ψT and σ ≥ σT1 then
17 Nψ ← bW/ψc;







∥∥∥vj − 1Nψ ∑Nψj=1 vj∥∥∥2;
20 if σ′ ≤ σT2 then
21 Ψ← Ψ ∪ {ψ};
22 if m < k′1 then k
′
1 ← m;
23 if m+W − 1 > k′2 then k′2 ← m+W − 1;
24 kg1 ← k′1; k
g
2 ← k′2;
25 ψ̄g ← mode(Ψ);
// (Step 4) Turning Step Extraction
26 Find all peaks in p[k] (or −p[k]), k = kg1 , ..., k
g
2 that meet the following conditions:
27 (1) The peaks are separated by more than the minimum peak distance ψ̄g − ψd;







29 Denote the average peak height by p̂ (or p̌). Denote the indexes of the peaks by set U1 (or U2);
30 if |p̂− p̄| > | − p̌− p̄| then U ← U1; else U ← U2 ;
31 Ũg ← ∅;
32 foreach k ∈ U do
33 foreach k′ = k − 4, ..., k + 4 do
34 if |p[k′]− p[k]| < p[k]rp then Ũg ← Ũg ∪ {k′} ;
35 return Π, Ũg and ψ̄g, g = 1, ..., |Π|;
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omitted for brevity, and the minimum stair frame size is Γ = 35 during our implementation.
The following Steps 3, 4 are executed for each stair frame (kg1 , k
g
2), g = 1, ..., |Π|.
(Step 3) Period Estimation: One peculiarity of signal p[k] is that, since the stair number
between adjacent stair landings is usually constant, the period of p[k] in each stair frame
should also be roughly constant. Although the steps in each period also include a various
number of steps made on a stair landing, based on our observation during our experiment,
the step number difference is usually limited during a single walk. Moreover, since the index
k is the count of steps instead of time, this period is independent of the person’s walking
speed on stairs. We can further tune the ranges of stair frames and get more accurate period
length.
In line 13-23, for the signal within each stair frame (kg1 , k
g
2), we apply a new sliding window
of size W . In line 14-15, we calculate the signal period ψ based on the FFT result in Step
2, as well as the standard deviation σ of the signal in the window. The results are discarded
if the ψ is shorter than ψT , or σ is smaller than σT1 (line 16). ψT = 5 and σT1 = 2 kg are
two constant thresholds. This lowers the false positive rate by reducing the impacts of burst
signals and weak periodic noises.
In line 18, we break the signal in the window into segments based on the period length
ψ, and treat them as vectors. The trailing signal is discarded if the window length is not
the integral multiple of ψ. One example is shown in Figure 6.8. Then, we calculate the
standard deviation σ′ of the vectors, and check if it is smaller than a constant threshold
σT2 = 16 kg (line 19-20). Note that the impact of various vector length has been removed
during the calculation in line 19. If σ′ ≤ σT2, the signals in different segments are similar
enough to each other, and we record the period ψ in set Ψ. After the sliding window has
gone through the stair frame, we use the most common element in Ψ as the signal period ψ̄g
in the stair frame (line 25). Moreover, we shrink the stair frame range by finding the first
and the last window position that satisfies σ′ ≤ σT2 (line 22-24). Two examples are given
in Figure 6.6(b). It is shown that this method fine-tunes the start and end points of the
on-stair walk.
(Step 4) Turning Step Extraction: While the start and end points of the stair frames
have been estimated, we still need to determine the steps made on stair landings. Naturally,
the steps made on stairs are more than those made on stair landings. Thus, if the signal p[k]
flips between two states, i.e., on-stair state and on-landing state, the state with less steps
should be the on-landing state.
Based on our observation on 15 volunteers, there are two pattern types of the signal p[k]
in a stair frame, as shown in Figure 6.9. The two data examples are collected from two
volunteers who are going up stairs, but at the same sensor position. It is shown that the
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Figure 6.9: Two types of peak amplitude signals (p[k]) during a walk in a stairwell.
signal is lower when the first volunteer is walking on stairs (Figure 6.9(a)). However, this
is inverse for the second volunteer (Figure 6.9(b)). To handle this, in line 26-29 we find the
positive/negative peaks which are higher/lower than the average signal, and then calculate
the average positive and negative peak heights. As shown in Figure 6.9(a), if the average
negative peak height is nearer to the average signal, the positive peaks should denote the
steps made on stair landings (line 30). Otherwise, the negative peaks denote the steps made
on stair landings.
We need further extend the on-landing steps since currently only one step is detected for
each stair landing. In line 31-34, for each detected on-landing step, we search in its adjacent
eight steps, and regard the steps with similar signal values as additional on-landing steps.
In our implementation we set the similarity threshold as rp = 0.3. The step indexes of all
the on-landing steps are included in set Ũg.
Therefore, for each stair frame (kg1 , k
g
2), the output of Steps 3, 4 is the turning step set Ũg.
The total stair frame number is |Π|.
(Step 5) Aggregation: Following Algorithm 6.1 (Steps 1-4), we can recognize the turning
steps based on the output of a single sensor. The same steps are applied to all the 16 sensors,
and the results are denoted by Ũ li,g, g = 1, ..., |Πli|, i = 1, ..., 8 and Ũ ri,g, g = 1, ..., |Πri |, i =
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Û l and Û r include the steps that can be used to train the machine learning model in the
walking path estimator. Note that we have not distinguished the left-turn and right-turn
steps, which will be discussed in Section 6.5.3.
In daily life, there are some other activities that would lead to the periodic foot force
changes, such as doing exercises. However, our design handles this problem well. As shown
in Step 3, we utilize the peculiarity that the stair number between every two stair landings is
usually fixed and not too small. Thus, the period of signal p[k] on staircases is usually stable,
which is unique compared with those of other periodic activities. Therefore, our algorithm
achieves a low false positive rate when detecting the action of going on stairs, which will
also be confirmed by the experiment in Section 6.10.1.
Since Algorithm 6.1 also outputs the stair frame set and the signal periods, we can easily
recognize the level that the person has gone to. For instance, in a typical office building, if
a stair frame is (121, 162) and ψ̄g = 10, the person should have gone up or down by 2 levels
because (162 − 121 + 1)/10 ≈ 4 stair sections appear in this frame. The attacker can use
this feature to locate the building level that the victim is walking in.
6.5.3 Training Data Labeling
Absolute direction change labeling: For each step in Û l and Û r, we need to label the
heading direction change that it makes, which is hard if there is no observation about the
victim’s walking. However, since a U-turn is made on each stair landing, we can first label
the absolute direction change made by each turning step.
If we merge the steps in Û l and Û r and sort them in time order, usually the adjacent
continuous left and right steps will fall in a group of 2 - 7 steps. The steps in each group
are made on the same stair landing. We name each group as a stair landing group. Three
examples are show in Figure 6.10. Note that the first step on the stair landing is excluded
from the group, because it is actually a step made on a stair, even if it also causes the
walking direction change. Therefore, if we denote the size of a stair landing group by L, the
average absolute direction change made by each step in the group is 180◦/(L+ 1). We label
the steps in the group with this angle (in (0◦, 90◦]).









Turn left Turn right
Straight
45°
Figure 6.11: Direction format of angle
regression. Examples of left and right
45◦ turns made by a left foot are given.
changes, the turning direction (i.e., left or right) of the steps is still unknown. Since there
is no common rule about whether the staircases should be left-handed or right-handed,
currently we cannot determine whether a step is turning left or right. However, the turning
directions are usually inverse in two adjacent walks on staircases. For instance, a person
always makes left/right U-turns when going up stairs, and then makes right/left U-turns
when going down stairs. This makes it possible to distinguish different turning directions.
While we have gotten the stair frames in Algorithm 6.1, it is easy to distinguish different
walks in stairwells. By default, we simply label the turning steps in the first walk with “left”,
and label those in the second walk as “right”, and so on. If we flip the direction labels, the
output of the corridor map estimator will simply be symmetrically flipped, which does not
impact the effectiveness of our attack method, because the attacker can still easily recognize
the real floor plan on maps using our output.
Therefore, for each turning step in Û l and Û r, we label it with the absolute direction
change in (0◦, 90◦] and the turning direction (“left” and “right”). For the convenience of
expression, we reformat the two labels following the format in Figure6.11. Thus, the label
attached to a turning steps is a value within [−90◦, 0◦) ∪ (0◦, 90◦]. We still need to extract
the training steps that make no direction change (i.e., steps labeled with 0◦).
Straight step labeling: In Section 6.6, we will show how we can detect the continuous
walking in corridors. Assume that we have known which steps belong to the continuous
walking based on the output of the continuous walking detector. Based on the observation
that the number of straight steps is much larger than that of turning steps, we randomly
select the steps during the continuous walking, and regard them as straight steps (labeled
with 0◦). Indeed, these “straight” steps would contain turning steps. However, as long as
the training data size is sufficiently large and the balance among the training steps with
different degrees is carefully kept, the impacts of the wrongly-labeled steps is limited, which
will be confirmed by the experiment in Section 6.10.2.
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Thus, the training data extractor detects the steps that can be used for training, and
assigns them with the degrees within [−90◦, 90◦]. The signals of the training steps and their
labels are sent to the walking path estimator.
6.6 CONTINUOUS WALKING DETECTOR
Typically, the indoor walking can be classified into two types: in-room walking and in-
corridor walking. The former contains complex turning and intermittence, while the latter is
usually continuous. As mentioned in Section 6.1, ShoesHacker aims to recover the corridor
map of the floor plan, which is sufficient for attackers to locate the building on global maps.
Thus, we only focus on the in-corridor walking.
In practice, it is hard to recover the whole corridor map at once, because the victim is
unlikely to traverse the whole floor within one walk. Instead, we need to extract multiple
in-corridor walks during the victim’s daily walking, based on which we estimate multiple
walking paths and reconstruct the corridor map. Thus, we need to detect the continuous
walks in corridors and separate them from in-room walks.
The method we use is based on frequency-domain analysis, which is similar to Step 2 of
Algorithm 6.1. However, we conduct FFT on the consecutive force data directly, instead of
on the peak value sequences. Since the two feet have the same in-corridor/room walking
state, we only use the data from the left shoe to detect the in-corridor walking. We apply a
sliding window with size W ′ = 60 on the total force ul(t), the sampling rate of which is still
15 Hz. Assume that the window currently starts at time t′ in ul(t), we remove the steady
component by




ul(t), t = t′, ..., t′ +W ′ − 1. (6.2)
Then we conduct FFT on ũl(t) by
{Al[n]|n = 1, ...,W ′} = 1
W ′
∥∥FFT ({ũl(t) · h′[t− t′ + 1]|t = t′, ..., t′ +W ′ − 1})∥∥ , (6.3)
where h′[t] denotes a Hanning window with length W ′. If there exists a peak in {Al[n]} with
altitude larger than 5 kg, we consider that the person is walking during t′ to t′ +W ′ − 1. If
we detect that the person keeps walking during t1 to t2, and t2 − t1 >= 10 s, we regard the
signals in t = t1, ..., t2 contain an in-corridor walking path. The corresponding step segments
sli,k(τ) and s
r
i,k(τ) within this time range are sent to the walking path estimator to restore
the trajectory of this walk.
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Note that the continuous walking detector would find multiple in-corridor walks in the
signal ul(t). Assume that Nw in-corridor walks are detected. We output the step segments
of each walk separately, and the walking path estimator will process them respectively.
6.7 WALKING PATH ESTIMATOR
When a person is walking on a floor, the force distribution changes in shoes imply the
changes of walking directions. With the basic assumption that all the corners in the building
are 90◦, we show that it is possible to roughly estimate the person’s walking path based on
the force changes on the insoles.
We first show our design consideration, and then introduce how we extract features, esti-
mate direction changes, and generate the estimated walking path for each of the Nw walks
detected by the continuous walking detector.
6.7.1 Design Considerations
When a person is making a turn, the foot force on insoles is different from that during
a straight walking. As shown in Figure 6.3, when the person makes a right turn using the
right foot around the 4th second, the force values at the hallux and the inner metatarsals are
obviously different from those during the straight walking. Thus, it is possible to detect the
turning actions based on the force changes. Moreover, as shown in [60], when the training
data are available, the heading direction change in degrees can be further estimated.
Although we assume that the paths in maps are latticed, we cannot simply classify the
footsteps as “going straight” and “making a left/right turn”. As shown in Figure 6.12,
typically a person makes multiple steps to make a 90◦ turn, and each step makes a direction
change smaller than 90◦. Thus, we need to estimate the heading direction change made by
each step, and accumulate the changes to detect if the turning action really happens.
In the walking path estimator, we extract features from step segments, and then estimate
the direction changes made by the steps using trained SVMs, which is similar to the method
in [60]. Moreover, based on the sequence of the direction changes, we further estimate the
person’s walking path.
6.7.2 Feature Extraction
For the step segments of each step, we extract a set of features. The pattern in the features
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Figure 6.13: Example of the angle change sequence and its corre-
sponding path.
are mainly based on the amplitude of the force signals. Specifically, for the step segment
sli,k(τ) or s
r
i,k(τ), the features are
F li,k = max
τ




sri,k(τ), i = 1, 2, ..., 8. (6.4)
Therefore, for the kth step made by the left or the right foot, the feature set {F li,k|i =
1, 2, ..., 8} or {F ri,k|i = 1, 2, ..., 8} are sent to the subcomponent of angle regression.
6.7.3 Angle Regression
In Section 6.5.3, we have gotten the labeled training data. In the offline stage, the data
from left and right foot are used to train two SVM regression models with linear kernels, re-
spectively. Since people’s walking patterns of left and right feet are proved to be asymmetric
[117], it is necessary to train a separate SVM model for each foot.
In the online stage, the walking path estimator would receive multiple step segment sets
belonging to different in-corridor walks. We process each walk respectively. In each walk,
for the victim’s kth left or right step, the corresponding SVM receives the extracted features
{F li,k|i = 1, 2, ..., 8} or {F ri,k|i = 1, 2, ..., 8}. Then, the direction change caused by the step
is predicted. The result follows the format shown in Figure 6.11. For each walk, we get
two angle change sequences of the left and right steps. The two sequences are merged and
indexed by their time stamps, and the result is a single angle change sequence. We denote
this sequence by {∆θn|n = 1, 2, ...}, and an example is shown in Figure 6.13(a). Note that
{∆θn} is the output for a single in-corridor walk. We repeat the same process for each walk.
6.7.4 Path Generation
For each of the Nw walks, based on its angle change sequence {∆θn}, we can roughly
estimate the person’s walking path. Intuitively, in order to draw the walking path, besides
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the walking direction changes, the stride length should also be necessary. However, due to
the lack of the observation on the victim, it is hard to estimate the stride length of each
step. Previous works show that the stride length and the cadence are linearly correlated
[152]. However, the detailed parameters of the linear relation vary among different people
[153]. Since we only aim to roughly estimate the shape of the corridor structure, we assume
that the stride lengths of all the steps follow the same parameter lstride. Obviously, lstride only
impacts the scale of the estimated map output by ShoesHacker. Without loss of generality,
we set lstride = 0.77 m, and follow this scale in the following parameter setting.
In sequence {∆θn}, if the cumulative direction change of three continuous steps is larger
than 60◦ or lower than −60◦, the three steps are labeled as potential left or right turning
steps. Assume that the indexes of the continuous potential turning steps are a, ..., b, we
label the step with the index b(a + b)/2c as a left or right turning step. The other steps
are recognized as straight steps. All the steps have the same stride length lstride = 0.77 m.
We discard the steps before the first turning point or after the last turning point. Without
loss of generality, we set the coordinates of the starting point (the first turning point) of
the path as (0, 0), and the direction of the first step is parallel with the vector (0, 1). Thus,
we can plot the path based on {∆θn}. One example is shown in Figure 6.13(b). For the
wth in-corridor walk, the path can be stored as a tuple sequence {(xwi , ywi )|i = 1, ..., Nwc },
which denotes the coordinates of the corners (including the start and end points) on the
walking path. Nwc is the total number of turns during the wth walk, and w = 1, ..., Nw.
Note that the tuples in {(xwi , ywi )|i = 1, ..., Nwc } are ordered, and the coordinates only show
the relative locations of the turning points. Then absolute location and direction of the path
are unknown.
6.8 CORRIDOR MAP ESTIMATOR
The corridor map estimator merges the paths {(xwi , ywi )|i = 1, ..., Nwc }, w = 1, ..., Nw, and
reconstructs the corridor map in the floor plan.
6.8.1 Design Considerations
As illustrated by Figure 6.14, the basic operation of the corridor map estimator is merging
a pair of paths. However, the absolute locations and directions of the estimated paths are
unknown. Thus, we cannot merge two paths by simply overlapping them. Some previous
works in the field of image processing have proposed image blending methods to merge
the images with common regions [154, 155]. While we already have the paths stored as
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Figure 6.15: Two paths with same shape but with dif-
ferent corridor orders.
sequences, the problem can be simplified. A naive solution is treating each walking path as
an action sequence, such as “go straight for 5 m, turn left, go straight for 10 m, turn right,
...”, and find if there are similar segments between each pair of paths. The paths can be
merged if continuous segments match. However, two paths would have the same shape but
with different corridor orders. One example is shown in Figure 6.15(a). Path 1 and 2 have
the same shape, but their action sequences are different and thus cannot be easily merged.
To handle this problem, the key idea of the corridor map estimator is that, when merging
two paths, we treat the first path as an undirected graph, and check if any part of the
second path can fit into the graph. If the matching part is long enough, the two paths can
be merged, and the non-matching part of the second path is added to the graph to form a
new undirected graph, which is the base of the next path merging. We name this undirected
graph as base graph. As shown in Figure 6.15(b), with this method, Path 2 can completely
fit into Path 1.
During the path merging, we also need to handle the case that some nearby intersections
(or corridors) are actually the same one, or two orthogonal corridors intersect each other at
an undetected intersection. Thus, our algorithm should merge nearby intersections, or even
create new intersections. Three examples are shown in Figure 6.16. Note that in Figure
6.16(c), even if the person does not make turns when walking from point a to b and c to d,
we still need to create a new intersection between the two edges.
In the following subsections, we describe the details of our algorithm. The workflow is
illustrated in Figure 6.17.
































































Figure 6.17: Workflow of corridor map estimator. In this example, {(x1i , y1i )|i = 1, ..., N1c } is
selected to generate the initial base graph.
6.8.2 Path Preprocessing
For each in-corridor walking path, the walking path estimator outputs {(xwi , ywi )|i =
1, ..., Nwc }. For the convenience of graph-based processing, we first convert this tuple se-
quence to the format of vertex set Vw, edge set Ew and traverse order ~ow, as shown in
Figure 6.17. We treat each path corner as a vertex in Vw, denoted by v. We make v.x and
v.y denote the coordinates of the vertex. The elements in Ew follow the format e(v1, v2),
which denotes the edge (path) between two vertices v1, v2. All the edges are undirected,
i.e., e(v1, v2) = e(v2, v1). ~ow is a sequence of vertices, which denotes the order by which the
person went through the vertices. ~ow[i] denotes the ith vertex in ~ow. During the conversion,
we merge the nearby vertices or edges, and create new vertices or edges if new intersections
are generated.
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6.2. In line 2 we start to traverse each tuple in
{(xwi , ywi )}. In line 3-4, if the current corner is near to a previously-visited vertex, we
consider that the person went through the previous vertex, and merge the two vertices. In
our implementation, the distance bound of vertex merging is dT1 = 4 m. A larger dT1 could
increase the risk of merging two real intersections by mistake. The case in Figure 6.16(a) is
handled by this method.
In line 6-13, we check if the current corner is near to any previous visited edge by drawing
a vertical line to the edge. If the foot point is on the edge and its distance to the current
corner is shorter than dT1, we break the edge to two edges and create a new vertex at the
foot point. Then we consider that the current corner is at the new vertex. The case that
the corner is near to the edge but the foot point is off the edge is equivalent to the case that
the corner is near to one of the edge’s endpoints, which has been handled in line 3-4. This
method handles the case in Figure 6.16(b). If no nearby edge is detected, a new vertex is
110
ALGORITHM 6.2: Path preprocessing
Input: Path tuple sequence {(xwi , ywi )|i = 1, ..., Nwc };
Parameter: Distance threshold dT1;
Output: Vertex set Vw; Edge set Ew; Traverse order ~ow;
1 V ← ∅; E ← ∅; ~o← [];
2 foreach i = 1, ..., Nwc do
3 if
√
(xwi − v.x)2 + (ywi − v.y)2 < dT1,∃v ∈ V then
// Merge nearby intersections
4 Add v to the end of ~o;
5 else
6 foreach e(v1, v2) ∈ E do
7 Calculate the vertical line from vertex (xwi , y
w
i ) to edge e(v1, v2);
8 if the foot point (x, y) is on the edge, and
√
(xwi − x)2 + (ywi − y)2 < dT1 then
// Merge nearby corridors
9 Create a new vertex v, where v.x = x, v.y = y;
10 V ← V ∪ {v};
11 E ← E\{e(v1, v2)}; E ← E ∪ {e(v1, v), e(v, v2)};
12 Insert v between any adjacent v1 and v2 in ~o, and add v to the end of ~o;
13 break;
14 if no new vertex is added in line 6-13 then
15 Create a new vertex v, where v.x = xwi , v.y = y
w
i ;
16 V ← V ∪ {v};
17 Add v to the end of ~o;
18 if ‖~o‖ < 2 then continue;
// Add new vertex if two edges intersects
19 Denote the current last two elements in ~o by v1 and v2;




2) ∈ E, j = 1, .., J then
21 foreach j = 1, ..., J do
22 Denote the intersection by (x, y). Create a new vertex v, where v.x = x, v.y = y;
23 V ← V ∪ {v};
24 E ← E\{e(vj1, v
j
2)}; E ← E ∪ {e(v
j
1, v), e(v, v
j
2), e(v1, v), e(v, v2)};
25 Insert v between any adjacent v1 and v2 in ~o;
26 v1 ← v;
27 if no new vertex is added in line 20-26 then E ← E ∪ {e(v1, v2)} ;
28 Create a new path tuple sequence {(xwi , ywi )} based on ~o and V , and then reverse the tuple order ;
29 Repeat line 1-27 with the new path tuple sequence as the input. Get new V , E and ~o, and relabel
them by Vw, Ew and ~ow, respectively;
30 return Vw, Ew and ~ow;
created for this corner (line 14-17).
In line 19-27, we create the new edge from the last visited vertex to the current vertex,
and also check if the new edge intersects with any previous edges. If so, we break the two
intersected edges to four edges, and add a new vertex at the intersection point. The case
shown Figure 6.16(c) is handled by this method.
In line 28-29, we traverse the path from the other end, and repeat the previous process.
The reason is that some merging would be left out if the path is traversed only once. For
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example, in Figure 6.16(b), if we traverse the path from a to b, the merging does not happen.
We need to traverse again from b to a to detect this need of merging.
For each path, we get Vw, Ew and ~ow, based on which we conduct the following path
merging method.
6.8.3 Path Merging
The path merging algorithm is shown in Algorithms 6.3-6.5. Initially, among the paths
to merge, we randomly select one path as the base graph. Its vertex set and edge set are
denoted by V and E. We first need to extend the base graph following Algorithm 6.3, and
then merge each path into the base graph with following Algorithm 6.4. After each merging,
we re-conduct Algorithm 6.3 on the base graph before we try to merge the next path.
ALGORITHM 6.3: Base graph extension
Input: Edge set E;
Output: Extended edge set Ê;
1 E′ ← ∅;
2 foreach e(v1, v2) ∈ E and e(v1, v2) /∈ E′ do
3 V ′ ← {v1, v2};
4 while the size of V ′ has changed do
5 foreach v ∈ V ′ do
6 foreach e(v′1, v
′
2) ∈ E do
7 if v′1 = v or v
′




2) is collinear with e(v1, v2) then V
′ ← V ′ ∪ {v′1, v′2} ;
8 foreach combination of two vertices va, vb in V
′ do E′ ← E′ ∪ {e(va, vb)} ;
9 Ê ← E ∪ E′;
10 return Ê;
Base Graph Extension: The reason why we need to extend the base graph is that, while
we have merged some nearby edges during the path preprocessing or the previous merging,
the edges between some collinear vertices would still be missing. As illustrated in Figure
6.18(a), after we have merged vertex c and d to edge e(a, b), edge e(b, d) does not exist in E.
Then, even though the new path actually goes through e(b, d), it cannot be directly fitted
into the base graph because e(b, d) is broken into e(b, c) and e(c, d). In Figure 6.18(b), after
we have merged vertex b and b’, edge e(a, c) is still not in E, and thus the new path cannot
directly fit into e(a, c).
For the convenience of future merging, we first extend the base graph following Algorithm
6.3. The idea is that, for each edge e(v1, v2) in the base graph, we try to find all the other





satisfies this condition, we further search for the other edges that are both collinear with
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Figure 6.18: The necessity of extending the edge set in the base graph.
and connected to e(v′1, v
′
2). This process is repeated until no new edge is founded. Then we
add new edges to fully connect all the vertices on these edges (line 8). The output is the
extended edge set Ê. For instance, in Figure 6.18(a) all the 6 edges among a, b, c, d are
included in Ê, and in Figure 6.18(b), e(a, b), e(a, c), e(b, c) are included in Ê.
Merging A New Path to Base Graph: After we have extended the base graph, in
Algorithm 6.4, we start to measure how well the new path can fit into the base graph. We
define the overlapping part of two paths as a matched segment, as illustrated in Figure 6.14.
Since any vertex could be the start point of the matched segment, and the initial walking
direction is unknown, we try all the vertices and initial directions. For each vertex v1 in the
base graph, we try each edge e(v1, v2) as the start edge of the path (line 2-3). Given the
start edge, we run Algorithm 6.5 to get the matching level of the path (line 4).
In Algorithm 6.5, since any vertex on the new path could be the start point of the matched
segment, we try each vertex ~ow[i] as the start point (line 2). In line 3-7, we check the length
difference between the start edge in the base graph and the edge ew(~ow[i], ~ow[i + 1]) in the
new path. If the difference is larger than a constant threshold dT2 = 10 m, we consider that
the two edges do not match and continue to try the next start point. If the two edges match,
we traverse the following edges of the new path and find if the similar edges exist in the base
graph (line 8-22).
Assume that the current vertex on the new path is ~ow[j], and the previous trajectory
[~ow[i], ..., ~ow[j − 1]] matches with the path [..., v1, v2] in the base graph. We check if there is
an edge e(v2, v3) in the base graph that makes the corner from e(v1, v2) to e(v2, v3) and the
corner from ew(~ow[j − 2], ~ow[j − 1]) to ew(~ow[j − 1], ~ow[j]) have the same turning direction
(line 10-11). Among all the found edges, we select the one that has the minimum edge length
difference d from ew(~ow[j − 1], ~ow[j]) (line 12-14). If d ≤ dT2, the two edges match, and we
update the matched segment (line 17-20) and continue finding the next matched edge in the
base graph.
During the matching process, we record the matched segment and the maximum number
of matched edges. If two matched segments have the same matched edge number, we select
the one with the minimum cumulative edge length difference (line 21-22). The matched
segment is returned to Algorithm 6.4.
Back to line 4 in Algorithm 6.4, we try each start edge, and record the best matched
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ALGORITHM 6.4: Merge the base graph and a new path
Input: Base graph’s vertex set V and extended edge set Ê; New path’s vertex set Vw, edge set Ew,
and traverse order ~ow;
Parameter: Minimum matching edge number Ne; Distance threshold dT1;
Output: Merged vertex set Ṽ ; Merged edge set Ẽ; Edge counter set CE ;
1 Ṽ ← V ; Ẽ ← Ê; N ′M ← 0; d′M ← Inf; ~o′B ← []; ~o′P ← [];
2 foreach v1 ∈ V do
3 foreach e(v1, v2) ∈ Ê do
4 Run Algorithm 6.5 on V , Ê, e(v1, v2), Vw, Ew and ~ow. Get NM , dM , ~oB and ~oP ;
5 if NM > N
′
M , or NM = N
′
M and dM < d
′
M then
6 N ′M ← NM ; d′M ← dM ; ~o′B ← ~oB ; ~o′P ← ~oP ;
7 if N ′M < Ne then return Ṽ , Ẽ and CE ;
8 foreach adjacent elements v1, v2 in ~o
′
B do CE(e(v1, v2))← CE(e(v1, v2)) + 1;
// CE(e(v1, v2)) denotes the counter for e(v1, v2). If it does not exist, create a new
one with initial value 1
9 Rotate and rescale the new path to make the coordinates of the first and last vertices in ~o′P equal to
those of the first and last vertices in ~o′B . Update the coordinates of vertices in Vw accordingly;
10 Compare ~ow and ~o
′
P , and get the prefix path ~opre and the suffix path ~osuf. Reverse ~opre;
11 vlast ← the first element in ~o′B ;
12 foreach i = 1, ..., ‖~opre‖ do
13 if for vertex ~opre[i] ∈ Vw, ∃v ∈ V,
√
(~opre[i].x− v.x)2 + (~opre[i].y − v.y)2 < dT1 then
14 vcurrent ← v;
15 else
16 Create a new vertex vcurrent, where vcurrent.x = ~opre[i].x, vcurrent.y = ~opre[i].y;
17 Ṽ ← Ṽ ∪ {vcurrent};
18 Ẽ ← Ẽ ∪ {e(vlast, vcurrent)};
19 vlast ← vcurrent;
20 vlast ← the last element in ~o′B , and repeat line 12-19 for ~osuf;
21 return Ṽ , Ẽ, CE ;
segment (line 5-6). If the largest matching edge number is larger than a constant threshold
Ne = 3, we consider that the path can fit into the base graph (line 7).
To merge the path, we first rotate and rescale the path to make the first and last vertices
of its matched segment overlap those of the matched segment in the base graph. The
coordinates of all the vertices in Vw are updated accordingly (line 9). Then we crop the
prefix and suffix paths that lie before and after the matched segment in the merged path.
We reverse the prefix path, and then treat ~opre and ~osuf as two separated paths that need to
be added into the base graph (line 10). The merging process in line 11-20 follows a similar
vertex merging method as in Algorithm 6.2. Finally, the algorithm outputs the new base
graph Ṽ , Ẽ. We conduct Algorithm 6.3 on Ẽ to connect the collinear vertices, and then
start to process the next path with the new base graph, as shown in Figure 6.17.
If a path fails to be merged to the base graph, we skip it and continue to merge the next
path. Once all the paths have been tried, we loop back and try to merge the un-merged
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ALGORITHM 6.5: Given start edge in base graph, find the longest matched segment
between base graph and new path
Input: Base graph’s vertex set V and extended edge set Ê; Starting edge e(v1, v2); New path’s
vertex set Vw, edge set Ew and traverse order ~ow;
Parameter: Edge length difference threshold dT2;
Output: Maximum matched edge number NM ; Edge length difference dM ; Best matched segment in
base graph ~oB ; Best matched segment in new path ~oP ;
1 NM ← 0; dM ← Inf; ~oB ← []; ~oP ← [];
2 foreach i = 1, ..., ‖~ow‖ − 1 do
// ew(., .) denotes an edge in Ew; e(., .) denotes an edge in Ê; ‖e(., .)‖ is the length
of e(., .);
3 dm ← |‖ew(~ow[i], ~ow[i+ 1])‖ - ‖e(v1, v2)‖ |;
4 if dm > dT2 then continue;
5 ~ob ← [v1, v2];
6 ~op ← [~ow[i], ~ow[i+ 1]];
7 Nm ← 1;
8 foreach j = i+ 2, ..., ‖~ow‖ do
9 d← Inf; vb ← 0; vp ← 0;
10 foreach e(v2, v3) ∈ Ê and v3 6= v1 do
11 if turning direction from e(v1, v2) to e(v2, v3) is same with that from
ew(~ow[j − 2], ~ow[j − 1]) to ew(~ow[j − 1], ~ow[j]) then
12 d′ = | ‖ew(~ow[j − 1], ~ow[j])‖ - ‖e(v2, v3)‖ |;
13 if d′ < d then
14 d← d′; vb ← v3; vp ← ~ow[j];
15 if d > dT2 then break;
16 else
17 v1 ← v2; v2 ← v3;
18 Add vb to the end of ~ob; Add vp to the end of ~op;
19 Nm ← Nm + 1;
20 dm ← dm + d;
21 if Nm > NM , or Nm = NM and dm < dM then
22 NM ← Nm; dM ← dm; ~oB ← ~ob; ~oP ← ~op;
23 return NM , dM , ~oB and ~oP ;
paths. This process is repeated until no more path can be merged.
If the current merged path is estimated based on the latest data leaked from the victim,
the end point of the suffix path ~osuf in the merged graph is the latest location of the victim.
Eliminating Inaccurate Edges: It is possible that some wrong edges are merged to
the base graph, which cannot be directly detected. To handle this, we keep a counter for
each edge, which records the number of times the edge appears in the matched segments.
In Algorithm 6.4, we keep a counter set CE that denotes these counters. When enough data
have been collected, the attacker can discard the edges with low counter values. Thus, the
impacts of inaccurate edges can be reduced. It is also possible that the path selected as the
base graph is incorrect, which leads to wrong merging results. This can be avoided by trying
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different paths as the base graph, and check the consistency of the results.
6.9 BUILDING RECOGNIZER AND EVALUATION METRIC DESIGN
We assume that the attacker knows the region that the target building locates in, and
the actual corridor maps of all the candidate buildings in that region have been stored in
the corridor map pool. After the corridor map has been estimated, a comparison metric is
needed to find the best match in the pool, so that the target building can be recognized.
Moreover, for the purpose of our evaluation, we also need a metric to quantify the similarity
between the estimated graph and the ground truth.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6.19: Comparison based on Hamming distance.
Intuitively, we can treat the graph as topological structures, and apply the corresponding
mathematical algorithms to evaluate their difference [156]. However, the vertices have the
location information, which is lost if we apply the topology-based comparison metric. More-
over, the vertices have relative locations instead of absolute locations, and the directions
and scales of different graphs would also be different. Thus, the geographical location-based
comparison cannot be directly applied. Our metric should resolve these problems.
A naive metric is based on calculating the Hamming distance between two binary images.
One example is shown in Figure 6.19(a), where we aim to compare two triangles. We first
divide the images into cells, and a cell is occupied if a line of the triangle goes through it, as
illustrated by Figure 6.19(b). Assume that the larger blue triangle is the ground-truth graph
and the smaller red triangle is the estimated graph. For each cell occupied by the estimated
graph, we calculate the distance to the nearest cell occupied by the ground-truth graph, as
in Figure 6.19(c). The cumulative distance is the Hamming distance from the estimated
graph to the ground-truth graph. Note that this distance changes if we use the red triangle
as the ground-truth graph, i.e., the comparison is asymmetric.
The comparison in ShoesHacker is more complex because the graphs follow different co-
ordinate systems, i.e., they have different directions and coordinate origins. Moreover, since
we have no stride length information, the scale of the estimated graph also changes with
different lstride. To solve these problems, we apply a brute-force method for the comparison.
We make A denote the ground-truth graph and B denote the estimated graph. As shown
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Figure 6.20: Brute-force comparison.
in Figure 6.20, we zoom, rotate and move the estimated graph over the ground-truth graph,
and calculate the Hamming distance from B to A (denoted by diffA(B)) in each case. The
time cost is acceptable because the graphs has been rasterized. Moreover, to eliminate the
impact of the graph size, we divide diffA(B) by the number of the cells occupied by B.
The result is denoted by diff′A(B). We record the smallest diff
′
A(B) during this process, and
denote it by minDiffA(B).
However, the metric minDiffA(B) is defective because of two issues. As illustrated by Fig-
ure 6.21(a), we can always achieve the lowest Hamming distance by rescaling the estimated
graph to a extremely small size, and put the estimated graph on any edge of the ground-truth
graph. In Figure 6.21(b), graph B and B′ have the same distance to A, but obviously B′
is more similar to A. To hand these issues, during the graph zooming, rotating and moving
in the previous comparison, we also exchange A and B, and compute diff′B(A). In the case





Thus, we use diff(A,B) = (diff′A(B)+diff
′
B(A))/2 instead of diff
′
A(B) during the comparison.
diff(A,B) keeps a good balance when we rescale the estimated graph. When the estimated
graph is either too small or too large, diff(A,B) increases. The smallest diff(A,B) during
this process is denoted by minDiff(A,B).
diff
A
(B) 0 is incorrectly small












(B ) = 0
Figure 6.21: Issues in the naive metric.
In ShoesHacker, we use minDiff(A,B) as the metric to evaluate the similarity between two
corridor maps. Note that A and B are non-exchangeable, because only the ground-truth
graph A contains the scale information while the estimated graph B does not, and only B is
rescaled during the calculation. If we set the cell size as 1× 1 m2 , the physical significance
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of minDiff(A,B) is the average distance (in meters) from a location in the estimated graph
to the nearest location in the ground-truth graph, when the two graphs have been best
overlapped.
To recognize the target building, we compare the estimated corridor map with each map in
the corridor map pool using minDiff(A,B). The map with the minimum minDiff(A,B) is the
best match, and the corresponding building is the recognition result. Therefore, ShoesHacker
has located the building that the victim walks in.
6.10 EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of the stair landing detection, and then
measure the accuracy of the angle regression based on the extracted training data. We
also show the accuracy of the walking path estimator for individual paths. The overall
performance of the corridor map estimator is evaluated in Section 6.10.4. Moreover, in
Section 6.10.5 we reveal the danger of the global user location leakage based on the corridor
maps generated by ShoesHacker. The data are collected from 6 male and 4 female volunteers
with different heights (1.60 - 1.83 m, mean: 1.71 m, median: 1.73 m) and weights (55 - 103
kg, mean: 75 kg, median: 68 kg).
We use the product of ReTiSense Stridalyzer [22] to collect the force data in shoes. Each
insole contains eight force sensors, and continuously transmits the data to a cellphone via a
Bluetooth connection. Then, the data are uploaded to our laptop host (MacBook Pro with
2.7 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16 GB RAM), which analyzes the data using Matlab scripts.
6.10.1 Performance of Stair Landing Detection
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the training data extractor. More specif-
ically, we measure how well the steps made on stair landings are distinguished from normal
steps. The quality of the extracted training data will be reflected during the experiment in
Section 6.10.2.
During the evaluation, we consider the impacts of shoe type, stair length, and walking
speed. We divide the 10 volunteers into two groups. Under the constraint that each group
has 3 males and 2 females, group members are randomly assigned. The volunteers in Group
1 wear hard bottom shoes, while those in Group 2 wear sneakers with air cushions. In the
first building, each volunteer first keeps doing random exercises, such as jumping, running, or
marking time, for 5 minutes. After that the volunteer keeps walking for 2 minutes. Then the
volunteer goes from Level 1 to Level 4 using stairs and then goes back. The walking on stairs
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is repeated 3 times, each time at different speeds. The three speeds can be roughly classified
as slow, medium, and fast, but they are not tightly controlled. Each time the volunteer
reaches Level 1 or Level 4, a 30-second walk on flat floor is taken before the volunteer can
go back to the stairs. The same test is repeated in the second building. The step number
in a flight of stairs is 14 in the first building and 9 in the second one. During the tests, the
insoles measure the force changes, and we record the walking with cameras. The steps on
stair landings are manually labeled based on the video.
On average, 1149 steps are recorded for each person in each building, among which 121
steps are made on stair landings. Since the number of on-stair landing steps (positive
examples) is much less than that of other steps (negative examples), the data are imbalanced.
Moreover, for training data collection, we only focus on on-stair landing steps. Thus, we
use precision and recall as the metrics to evaluate the performance, which are illustrated in
Figure 6.22. The error bars show the maximum and minimum metric values in each test case.
The precision ranges in 89.3% - 93.4%, while the recall ranges in 76.9% - 88.6%. Therefore,
around 90% of the extracted training data are correct, and in Section 6.10.2 we will show
that this is sufficient for the walking direction change estimation. Although the recall is
lower, it is still acceptable because there is a trade-off between precision and recall, and we
put more weight on precision to keep the purity of the extracted training data. Figure 6.22
also shows that different shoe types do not obviously impact the performance of the training
data extractor. The recall in the second building is lower, but the precision is consistent and
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Figure 6.23: Performance of stair landing de-
tection when sensor number changes.
We further analyze the performance when the sensor number changes. In each insole, we
restrict the sensor number to be 8, 6, 4, 2, respectively, and select the sensors that can achieve
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the highest average recall over all the test cases. The results are shown in Figure 6.23. For
example, if we could deploy only 2 sensors in each shoe, deploying the sensors at the fourth
toe and the inner heel can achieve the best recall (39.4%), while the precision is 97.3%. The
results imply that it is possible to loose the sensor number requirement without impacting
the precision. However, it takes the attacker longer time to collect enough training data,
because the recall obviously drops.
6.10.2 Performance of Angle Regression
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the angle regression in the walking
path estimator. We first examine the distribution of the training data collected in Section
6.10.1. For each volunteer, we merge the data collected during all the test cases and build a
personal training dataset.
Figure 6.24 shows the probability distribution of the step number in each stair landing
group. In most cases a person takes 3 - 4 steps on a stair landing. Note that the first
step on the stair landing has been excluded, as mentioned in Section 6.5.3. The probability
distribution of the corresponding labels (in absolute values) is shown in Figure 6.25. Since
the labels are calculated by 180◦/(L+1), and the step number L is an integer usually ranging
in [1, 7], the absolute degree can only be 22.5◦, 25.7◦, 30◦, 36◦, 45◦, 60◦, or 90◦. Apparently,
the training data between 60◦ and 90◦ is vacant. However, we will show that the performance
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Figure 6.27: Average absolute angle estima-
tion error when the sensor number changes.
Figure 6.25 also raises the problem of the training data imbalance. While the data between
±25.7◦ and ±60◦ are sufficient, we have only limited data for ±22.5◦ and ±90◦. Thus, we
do oversampling on the data of ±22.5◦ and ±90◦ by randomly replicating existing examples,
and make sure that each degree has 10 examples of turning steps. As mentioned in Section
6.5.3, the training steps of 0◦ are directly sampled from the continuous walking, and thus
their number is always sufficient. In practice, the attacker can wait for a longer time to
collect enough training data for each degree. The sampled training data are used to train
the angle regression model.
To evaluate the performance of the angle regression, each of the 10 volunteers is asked
to walk in free style and make 20 turns. Each turn is ±90◦ and can be made by multiple
turning steps. The walking is recorded with cameras, and the direction change made by
each turning step is manually measured. Moreover, we also collect 20 straight steps from
each volunteer. Note that 5 of the volunteers still wear hard bottom shoes, while the others
wear sneakers with air cushions. Totally 676 steps are collected, among which 476 steps are
turning steps.
The probability distribution of estimation errors is shown in Figure 6.26. The sign of
the errors follows Figure 6.11. The average signed error is −2.6◦, and the average absolute
error is 20.3◦. ShoesLoc [60] also estimates the direction change made by each step, and
achieves a lower average absolute error (around 16◦). However, ShoesLoc directly collects
the training data from its user, while ShoesHacker extracts the training data during the
victim’s daily walking. The inaccuracy in our training data leads to the lower estimation
accuracy. However, under the basic assumption that the corridors are latticed, this accuracy
is still acceptable, which will be shown in Section 6.10.3.
Furthermore, we analyze the performance when the sensor number changes. We follow
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the same sensor selection as shown in Figure 6.23. The results are shown in Figure 6.27.
It is shown that, when the sensor number is reduced to 6, i.e., the sensors at the inner
metatarsals and the outer heel are removed, the average absolute error is 24.0◦, which drops
only slightly. Thus, it is possible to further reduce the sensor number. However, as shown
in Figure 6.23, the current 8-sensor setting achieves a higher recall rates, which speeds up
the training data collection.
6.10.3 Performance of Walking Path Estimator
In this subsection, we show the performance of the walking path estimator when estimating
a single walking path. The same volunteer groups with the two shoe types participate in the
test, and we directly use the angle regression models trained in Section 6.10.2.
(a) (b)
0 32 64 feet
0 32 64 feet
0 32 64 feet
(c)
(d) (e)
0 32 64 feet
0 32 64 feet
Figure 6.28: The floor plans of the test regions.
During the test, each volunteer walks along 10 randomly selected paths in each of the
three buildings shown in Figure 6.28(a)-(c). The average length of the paths is 78.2 m. At
the beginning and the end points of each path, the volunteer is required to intermittently
hover in place for 1 minute, as if he/she is moving in rooms. When walking on the given
path, the volunteer keeps moving continuously. The walking speed is not controlled, and the
average speed varies around 1 - 3 m/s.
Based on the force data, the continuous walking detector detects the start and end of
each continuous walk, and the walking path estimator outputs the estimated paths. We
compare each estimated path with the ground truth using the metric minDiff(A,B), and
Figure 6.29 illustrates some examples. The probability distribution of the results is shown
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Figure 6.29: Examples of path estimation. The esti-
mated path has been rotated and rescaled to fit the









Figure 6.30: Probability distri-
bution of minDiff(A,B) between
estimated paths and real paths.
in Figure 6.30. The average minDiff(A,B) is 1.5 m, i.e., when the estimated and the real
paths are best overlapped, the average distance from a location on the estimated path to
the nearest location on the real path is around 1.5 m. In Figure 6.30, the errors around
4 - 11 m are caused by the errors of the turning action detection. minDiff(A,B) increases
significantly once a turn is missed or wrongly recognized. However, as shown by the figure,
more than 84.3% of the paths can be estimated with minDiff(A,B) < 4 m. Moreover, the
wrong estimated path can hardly fit into the base graph, and will be eventually removed
based on the low CE counter value. Thus, the walking path estimator provides a good basis
for the corridor map estimator, as will be shown in Section 6.10.4.
6.10.4 Performance of Corridor Map Estimator
To evaluate the overall performance of the corridor map estimation, each of the 10 vol-
unteers is required to walk in two of the five indoor spaces, as shown in Figure 6.28. As in
the previous experiments, 5 volunteers wear hard bottom shoes, and the others wear sneak-
ers with air cushions. In each floor, the volunteer walks for 30 minutes. During the first
15 minutes, the volunteer randomly traverse in the corridors multiple times. The speed is
roughly stable and not controlled. We use cameras to record the walking path. After that,
we check if all the corridors have been gone through. If not, the volunteer is required to go
along a path that goes through the missing corridors. In the following 15 minutes, the same
process is repeated, but the volunteer consciously walks at the non-uniform speed, i.e., the
volunteer keeps changing the walking speed during the test. During the tests, the volunteers
are allowed to take breaks, and the break time is excluded from the test time. The stoppages
can be easily detected by the continuous walking detector. We continue using the trained
models in Section 6.10.2.
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Figure 6.31: Examples of estimated corridor maps. The oblique lines are caused by the
intersection merging.
For each 15-minute walk, we uniformly divided the walk into 5 parts in the time domain,
and treat each part as a single continuous walk. Thus, 40 test cases are collected from the
five indoor spaces, and each test case contains 5 walks. For the data of each test case, we
run ShoesHacker to estimate the corridor map. Five examples are shown in Figure 6.31.
Some adjacent intersections are not correctly merged because the distance between them
exceeds the threshold dT1. However, the rough shapes of the corridor maps are still correct.
Since our comparison metric minDiff(A,B) is based on the shapes of maps instead of their
graph structure, the comparison between the estimated maps and the ground truth is not
highly impacted, and the attacker still has a good chance to recognize the building, as will
be shown in Section 6.10.5.
We compare each estimated map with the ground truth using minDiff(A,B), and the
results are shown in Figure 6.32. The average minDiff(A,B) is 6.1 m. The large errors
of some estimation results are caused by the wrong turning direction estimation. If the
estimated path contains wrong turns, it can hardly be merged to the base graph. As shown
in Figure 6.31(b), some corridors are missing in the estimated map because the walking
paths going through them failed to be merged. The wrong turning detection would also add
corridors that do not exist. One example is shown in Figure 6.31(c). The corridors marked
by the blue dashed line are wrongly generated, because the left turn made by the volunteer
at point A is not correctly detected. In the real case, it is possible to further avoid these
errors based on the counter CE. The attacker can keep monitoring the daily data from the
victim, and remove the corridors that are rarely visited.











Figure 6.32: Probability distribution of







































Figure 6.33: Impacts of different shoe types
and changing speed.
6.33, the test results are classified, and each error bar presents the second largest/smallest
minDiff(A,B) in each test class. It is shown that the impact of different shoe types is
not obvious. However, the changing walking speed increases the estimation error. This is
because the changing speed causes the stride length changes, which can hardly be estimated
by the attacker, and we assume that the stride length is constant during walking.
As mentioned before, if the force data are leaked to the attacker in real time, the attacker
can locate the victim in the building. After the tests, we overlap each estimated map with
the real floor map based on the match result that we got when computing minDiff(A,B). On
each of the estimated paths that compose the estimated map, we select all the turning points
as the sampling points to estimate the localization error. Based on the video record, we find
the real locations of the volunteer when he/she is walking on this path. Then we calculate
the distance between the sampled turning points and the real locations. The cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the localization errors is given in Figure 6.34. The average
error is 5.4 m, which shows that if the attacker has determined the building (as will be shown
in Section 6.10.5), the victim could be further localized. Moreover, as long as the victim’s
current walking path has been merged to the base graph, the average time cost of updating
the victim’s location for each future footstep is 98.6 ms. Thus, if the force data for each
footstep are leaked to the attacker in real time, the victim can be located with low time
latency.
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Figure 6.34: CDF of localization error.



















Figure 6.35: CMC curve of building recogni-
tion.
A
0 32 64 feet
Figure 6.36: Example of an error during building recognition. The red lines show the esti-
mated map for the floor in Figure 6.28(e). The extra turn at A causes the wrong matching.
6.10.5 Performance of Building Recognizer
In this subsection, we aim to show how likely the attacker can recognize the building
based on the output of the corridor map estimator. We randomly select 35 floor plans from
a map dataset of a university campus [157]. The corridors in each floor plan are manually
labeled. Together with the five floors shown in Figure 6.28, we build a corridor map pool
that contains 40 corridor maps for the recognition test.
For each of the 40 estimated maps from the five buildings in Section 6.10.4, we compare
it with each of the 40 corridor maps in the pool using minDiff(A,B), and sort the results.
The corridor map with the smallest minDiff(A,B) is the best match. In Figure 6.35, we
plot the Cumulative Matching Characteristics (CMC) curve, which shows how the proba-
bility of correct recognition (y-axis) changes with the number of the candidates output by
ShoesHacker (x-axis), i.e., the rank-k accuracy represents the probability that the correct
recognition result is included in the top-k best matches [158].
As shown in Figure 6.35, the rank-1 accuracy is 77.5% for the five buildings. One typical
recognition error is shown in Figure 6.36. The result implies that, if the victim is known
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to be on the campus of 40 buildings, with the probability around 78%, the attacker can
correctly guess the building that the victim lives or works in. The accuracy can be higher if
more candidates are allowed, e.g., the rank-10 accuracy reaches 95.0%. Moreover, in Section
6.10.4 we have shown that once the building has been determined, the attacker can even
locate the victim with the average error lower than 6 m, if the force data are leaked in real
time.
Therefore, ShoesHacker reveals the danger of the location leakage through the force data
from smart shoes.
6.11 DISCUSSION
6.11.1 Limitation of ShoesHacker
Atypical staircases: Currently ShoesHacker only handles the typical staircases as shown
in Figure 6.4, which are common in office buildings. In other public places such as shopping
malls, there would also be atypical staircases such as spiral stairs. However, as long as the
stair landings exist and the stair number between adjacent floors is consistent, ShoesHacker
can still detect the steps on stair landings. The limitation is that, if the stair landings do not
follow the U-turn type, the direction labels of the extracted training data would be incorrect.
We leave it to our future work to design a method that also works for atypical staircases.
Symmetry in floor plans: It is possible that the structure of a floor is completely symmet-
ric, which makes it hard to correctly merge the paths. One possible solution is making use
of landmarks to pin the paths, which is similar to the idea in [146, 124, 148]. For example,
victims must go through entrances to enter buildings, and reach new floors using elevators or
stairs (already handled by ShoesHacker). By recognizing the landmarks on walking paths,
the symmetric floor structure could be handled. In our work, we only focus on the gen-
eral case that no landmark is found, and leave it to our future work to further utilize the
landmarks.
Irregular corridor structures: As mentioned previously, the basic assumption of our attack
method is that the corridors are latticed. Although most intersections have only 90◦ turns
and most corridors are straight, some of them could have more complex shapes. Due to the
estimation error in the angle regression, the error of the walking path estimator will increase
if our basic assumption does not hold. One possible solution is that, we first use ShoesHacker
to roughly find a group of candidate buildings that have small minDiff(A,B) values. Then,
for each candidate, we assume that its floor map is the ground truth, and apply the particle
filter-based localization approaches such as ShoesLoc [60] on it. If the candidate floor is the
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correct guess, the particles should be able to converge stably, otherwise they keep diffusing.
We will continue to investigate how to handle the irregular corridor structures.
Multiple target buildings: Currently, for the attack scenario of office buildings, we assume
that the victim works and walks in a single building, which is true for many occupations.
However, it is also possible that the victim daily walks in multiple buildings. With the stair
landing detection, we can detect the action of walking on stairs, and thus roughly estimate
the moment when the victim enters or leaves a building if elevators are not used. However,
it is still difficult to distinguish different buildings. One possible solution is counting the
number of floor levels that the victim has gone through in each building. If the floor levels of
two buildings differ, we can still distinguish them. In the future research, we can investigate
other possible ways to handle the case of multiple target buildings.
6.11.2 Extending ShoesHacker
Improving localization accuracy: If the attacker has correctly determined the building,
based on our test the average error of the victim localization is 5.4 m. It is possible to
further improve the localization accuracy in this case. Since the floor map has been know,
we can determine the length of the corridors, and thus measure the average stride length.
This information can be used to train a stride length estimation model, based on which
ShoesLoc [60] can be applied. The accuracy of ShoesLoc is around 1 m, which makes the
room-level localization possible. Moreover, while we use some constant thresholds such as
dT1, they can be further fine-tuned based on the determined floor map. For example, dT1
can be reduced if multiple intersections are found merged by mistake when compared with
the floor map. This helps increase the accuracy of the future attacks on the victim.
Crowdsensing: Waiting for one victim to traverse the whole floor could take a long time.
If the attacker has accesses to multiple victims’ data and these victims are known to work in
the same building, our method can merge the estimated paths from different victims. This
reduces the time until the whole corridor map is reconstructed.
Guessing floor plans: As an intermediate product, the estimated corridor map can already
leak important information. For example, if the workplace of the victim is already known,
but the indoor structure of the building is unknown, the attacker can guess the floor plan
based on the corridor map and the building outline, which is especially critical for confidential
departments.
Exploring other information leakages: Besides the victim’s position, other privacy infor-
mation could also leak from the force data. For example, around the noontime, if the force
data from a victim show no footstep, it is likely that the victim is having lunch. If the non-
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walking time of a victim perfectly fits into a class schedule, the victim could be a student.
Therefore, it is possible to infer victims’ living habits and occupations based on foot force
data. We leave it to our future work to further explore other information leakages from
smart shoes.
6.11.3 Defending Against ShoesHacker
One intuitive way to defend against the attack is protecting the force data from expo-
sure. To narrow the attack surface, an effective solution is processing force data locally and
avoiding uploading raw data to the cloud. Typically, smart shoes are connected to a user’s
cellphone via Bluetooth. The cellphone can preprocess the force data before uploading them
to the cloud. This prevents the walking path estimation, as long as the Bluetooth connection
and the user’s device are well protected.
6.12 COMPARISON BETWEEN SHOESLOC AND SHOESHACKER





























































Figure 6.37: Assumptions of ShoesLoc and ShoesHacker.
The performance of ShoesLoc and ShoesHacker cannot be directly compared, because they
are designed based on different assumptions. As shown in Figure 6.37, ShoesLoc assumes
that the floor plan is known, the training data are available, and it has no strong requirement
on the corridor structure. On the other hand, ShoesHacker assumes that the corridors are
latticed, but does not need the floor plan of the target building (the floor plans of candidate
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buildings are still needed), and requires no training data from the victim. Thus, as illustrated
in Figure 6.37, the basics of ShoesLoc and ShoesHacker are opposite.
There are some similar subcomponents in ShoesLoc and ShoesHacker. For example, both
of them use SVM regression models to estimate the relative direction change made by each
footstep. However, since ShoesHacker extracts training data by itself, the training data
contain errors. The average angle estimation error increases from 16.04◦ to 20.3◦, even if
more sensors have been used by ShoesHacker. Similarly, while ShoesLoc estimates the stride
length of each footstep, ShoesHacker does not get this information due to the lack of training
data. Because of these differences, most of the components of ShoesLoc and ShoesHacker
are uniquely designed and cannot be applied to each other.
6.13 CONCLUSION
We present ShoesHacker, an attack scheme that explores the possibility of reconstructing
corridor maps and locating victims based on the force sensors in smart shoes. We propose
the stair landing detection algorithm to extract training data during the victim’s daily
walking, and design the path merging algorithm to merge the estimated walking trajectories.
Moreover, we design a metric that can evaluate the similarity between two corridor maps.
ShoesHacker shows that it is possible for an attacker to locate the victim if the force data
leakage happens. The experimental results show that, in a dataset that contains 40 buildings,
the attacker can recognize the correct building with an accuracy around 78%, and can even
further locate the victim with an accuracy better than 6 m. Thus, ShoesHacker reveals the
danger of the location privacy leakage through the foot force data.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
To conclude the thesis, I first summarize the research findings, and then discuss some
future research directions.
7.1 SUMMARY
In this thesis, we propose the MSAA framework, which describes the connection between
the two faces of mobile sensing. MSAA shows how we design an effective mobile sensing
system by exploring different sensors, various requirements for user/environment contexts,
and different sensing algorithms. It also shows the way to explore potential user privacy
leakages, i.e., breaking a system into basic components, and for each component considering
the possible privacy exposure if data are leaked. Moreover, our framework can be a research
guideline that helps researchers find and close the gaps in the mobile sensing research.
Then, following the MSAA framework, I use four mobile sensing designs as examples to
show how we can propose effective sensing techniques, and how we can explore the corre-
sponding threats that can be caused by these techniques. On one hand, TableWrite and
ShoesLoc are new designs that benefit people’s lives. TableWrite provides convenient hand-
writing input method for tiny mobile devices, and ShoesLoc provides a new indoor tracking
method for smart shoes. On the other hand, WritingHacker and ShoesHacker reveal the
threat of privacy leakage if the sensing techniques are maliciously used. WritingHacker
shows that it is possible to recognize the handwriting content if the victim’s handwriting
sound is recorded by the attacker. ShoesHacker reveals the possibility of locating the victim
if the force data from smart shoes are leaked. These confirm our statement, i.e., every mobile
sensing design should be considered with respect to its benefits and its potential threats,
which is reflected in the MSAA framework. The rapid evolution of mobile devices amplifies
the need for new sensing techniques, while ignoring the information leakage will expose users
to unpredictable danger.
7.1.1 Mobile Sensing Application-Attack Framework
In Chapter 2, I present the MSAA framework, a general model showing the structures
of mobile sensing applications and attacks. MSAA provides a guideline on how to design
effective mobile sensing systems, i.e., exploring the defects of the previous approaches, and
overcoming the defects by trying different sensors, context requirements and algorithms. In
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my thesis, TableWrite shows how we reduce the sensor cost of handwriting input by using
microphones as sensors and utilizing the contextual information of users’ handwriting styles.
ShoesLoc shows how we improve the accuracy and robustness of indoor walking path tracking
by using new force sensors and utilizing the floor map context. On the other hand, MSAA
also describes the way mobile sensing applications and attacks are connected. If not well
protected, the user information can leak through the physical signal leakage, the raw data
leakage, the indirect privacy leakage, and the direct privacy leakage. Based on this structure,
MSAA provides a guideline that helps explore the possible information leakages that can be
brought by a mobile sensing technique. In my thesis, WritingHacker considers the case where
the handwriting signal is leaked through the physical signal leakage, and ShoesHacker shows
the danger if the foot force signal is leaked through the raw data leakage. WritingHacker and
ShoesHacker reveal the threats caused by the possible leakages in TableWrite and ShoesLoc,
which matches the structure of the MSAA framework.
7.1.2 TableWrite: Audio based Handwriting Input for Tiny Mobile Devices
To address the problem that it is hard to efficiently input messages on tiny mobile devices,
in Chapter 3, I present TableWrite, an audio-based handwriting input scheme. TableWrite
allows users to input words to mobile devices by writing on tables with fingers. The design
is mainly based on the contextual information of the user’s writing habit, i.e., the stroke
number of each letter. The key feature is that, once trained by a user, TableWrite does
not require any retraining phase before each use. To reduce the impacts of audio signal’s
multipath propagation, we design multiple features that maintain consistency even when
writing positions keep changing. We apply machine learning and gesture tracking techniques
to further improve the accuracy of handwriting recognition. The word recognition accuracy
of 90%-95% is achieved, which validates the effectiveness of the new sensing technique.
7.1.3 WritingHacker: Audio based Eavesdropping of Handwriting via Mobile Devices
In Chapter 4, we investigate the possibility of the handwriting content leakage if the
technique of TableWrite is maliciously used. By presenting a proof-of-concept system, Writ-
ingHacker, I show how the attackers could eavesdrop on and recognize handwriting content
via nearby mobile devices. To reduce the impacts of various writing habits and writing
locations, the system utilizes the methods of letter clustering, dictionary filtering and letter
time length based offsetting. Moreover, if the relative position between the device and the
handwriting is known, the hand motion tracking method can further enhance the system’s
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performance. The experimental results show that the accuracy of word recognition can
reach 70%-80%, which helps raise the public’s concern about privacy leakage through the
handwriting sound.
7.1.4 ShoesLoc: In-Shoe Force Sensor-Based Indoor Walking Path Tracking
To show that smart shoes are capable of tracking users’ walking path, in Chapter 5, I
present ShoesLoc, an indoor walking path tracking method based on in-shoe force sensors.
Based on the force signals from a user’s shoes, it is possible to estimate the walking direction
change and the stride length of each step with machine learning techniques. I apply a particle
filter to combine this information with the environment context of the barriers labeled on
floor maps, and thus can determine the walking path and the current position of the user.
To solve the problem of the low accuracy caused by cumulative walking direction errors, I
improve the particle filter by designing the direction correction algorithm. I also propose
the weight normalization method to handle the impact of handbags and backpacks. The
experimental results show that, after a convergence phase, ShoesLoc achieves the average
location error of 0.9-1.3 m. Moreover, it requires no wireless anchor or extra site survey, and
has good robustness to interferences. Thus, ShoesLoc achieves better effectiveness compared
with the previous approaches.
7.1.5 ShoesHacker: Indoor Corridor Map and User Location Leakage through Force
Sensors in Smart Shoes
In Chapter 6, I further investigate the attacker’s capability of locating the victim if the
force data from the victim’s smart shoes are leaked. I present ShoesHacker, an attack scheme
that reconstructs the corridor map of the building that the victim walks in based on force
data only. The corridor map enables the attacker to recognize the building, and thus locate
the victim on a global map. To handle the lack of training data, we design the stair landing
detection algorithm, based on which we extract training data when victims are walking in
stairwells. ShoesHacker estimates the trajectory of each walk, and applies the path merging
algorithm to merge the trajectories. Moreover, I design a metric to quantify the similarity
between corridor maps, which makes building recognition possible. The building recognition
accuracy reaches 77.5% in a 40-building dataset, and the victim can be located with an
average error lower than 6 m, which reveals the danger of privacy leakage when the force
data from smart shoes are not protected.
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7.2 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
While technologies keep evolving, the sensors and the computing power of mobile devices
also keep growing, which will bring researchers great opportunities and also challenges. For
the approaches introduced in this thesis, there are still aspects waiting for further exploration.
Generalizing and extending MSAA framework: The current MSAA framework only focuses
on the information leakages in mobile sensing applications. However, as a guideline, MSAA
can also be generalized for other fields. For example, inspired by MSAA, we can find multiple
possible information leakages in the security system of a company. The lighting on/off status
directly shows whether an office building is empty (physical signal leakage). The running
speed of an electricity meter could reflect if any high-power appliances are running (raw data
leakage). The water bill of the office building could indirectly show the number of employees
working in the building (indirect privacy leakage). Therefore, MSAA can be generalized
as a guideline that helps examine the possible sources of information leakages. Moreover,
while MSAA mainly considers the information leakages, we can further extend it to handle
the injection attacks. For instance, if the software of TableWrite is hacked by the attacker,
the attacker can inject fake handwriting sounds to the word detector, or inject fake features
to the word recognizer, and thus disturbs the input method or generates malicious input
content. These injection points can be added to the MSAA framework in the future, so that
it can cover more attack threats.
Training general models with deep learning: Currently, deep learning has been widely
used in many research fields, such as image-based object recognition [159, 160, 161], social
network analysis [162, 163], and sensor-based human activity recognition [164, 165]. It is
also promising to apply deep learning to our current approaches for better performance. For
instance, in TableWrite and ShoesLoc, we can train a general handwriting/walking model
that works for every user, so that we can eliminate the training phase. However, there are
several challenges to address. First, due to the limited computing power and energy of tiny
mobile devices, it is expensive to run neural network classifier locally. One possible solution
is uploading the data to the cloud and running the classifier on cloud servers. However,
this requires network connection, which is inconvenient and less practical, especially for
TableWrite. Second, as mentioned in Section 5.10.4, we also need to address the issue
caused by the device diversity. For instance, currently there is no industrial standard for
the force sensors in smart shoes, and different smart shoes from the same manufacturer can
even have different outputs for the same use case. Due to the low dimension number of
force data, the impacts of the device diversity could seriously impact the performance of the
general model. It is valuable to further address these challenges.
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Defending against attacks: While we have revealed the possible threats caused by the
malicious use of the new techniques, it is still an open question to defend against the threats.
In Section 4.10.3 and 6.11.3, we have shown some defense methods against WritingHacker
and ShoesHacker. However, as more and more sensors are embedded in new mobile devices,
it is harder to prevent side-channel attacks. For instance, if smart shoes are equipped
with accelerometers and compasses, it is possible to locate the victim based on motion
data instead, and the algorithm of ShoesHacker is still applicable to the attack. Therefore,
investigating the capability of the sensors in different mobile devices is always valuable, and
is worth researchers’ tireless exploration.
Exploring sensor fusion-based applications and attacks: It is possible to further improve
the effectiveness of our applications if the constraint on sensor cost is loose. While ShoesLoc
requires the floor map as an input, we can eliminate this requirement by applying sensor
fusion. For example, foot motion sensors can be used to reconstruct the floor map [149].
In this case, the output of the motion sensor can be seen as a new contextual input to
ShoesLoc. For the attack scenario, although WritingHacker has used accelerometers to
handle the near-field burst noise, in this thesis we mainly focus on the attacks that use
a single sensor type. The assumption that the device is equipped with multiple types of
sensors can shrink the attack scope, and requiring multiple data leakage sources reduces
the attack success rate. However, if the device limitation is loose, sensor fusion can help
handle more complex attack scenarios. For example, while ShoesHacker uses force sensors
for victim tracking, the motion sensors can also help track the victim [61] if the magnetic
field interference is negligible. It is possible that the fusion of force and motion sensors can
further improve the tracking accuracy. Exploring the benefits that sensor fusion can bring
to our applications and attacks is left for our future work.
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